CTX (Combating Terrorism Exchange), v.3:4 by Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program CTX: Combating Terrorism Exchange
2013-11
CTX (Combating Terrorism Exchange), v.3:4
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37967
EDITORIAL STAFF
MICHAEL FREEMAN Executive Editor
ANNA SIMONS Executive Editor 
ELIZABETH SKINNER Managing Editor
RYAN STUART Design & Layout
EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD
VICTOR ASAL


















Africa Center for Strategic Studies
ALFRED OEHLERS





Joint Special Operations University
NICK PRATT








This issue brings you many different perspectives on terrorist activity, begin-
ning with a highly critical discussion by Dr. Steve Miska and Roslyn Warren 
of the United States’ general failure to protect its “soft” human networks of 
host-nation contractors, interpreters, and others who regularly put their lives 
at risk in service of U.S. forces and interests. Dr. Brian Nussbaum returns to 
the journal (see vol. 2, no. 1) with a hard look at the increasing danger to in-
formation networks from anti-technology violence. The paradox, as he points 
out, is that both the scientists who are developing new forms of technology 
and those who are willing to resort to violence to stop them believe they are 
working in the service of humankind. 
LTC Rehan Mushtaq delves directly into the question of why Muslim youth 
in Great Britain become susceptible to the Islamist message, with implications 
for diaspora youth elsewhere. He describes several of the messaging techniques 
that Islamist recruiters exploit to attract vulnerable youth, and offers some 
novel, even counter-intuitive, but simple and accessible methods to counteract 
their insidious influence. 
The next two articles consider the results of violence—the casualties of 
war and conflict. War, we all know, has been the catalyst for many of the 
extraordinary medical breakthroughs of the past century. In this issue, LTC 
Ramey Wilson, MD, expands on ideas he discussed in the CTAP interview that 
appeared in the August issue (vol. 3, no. 3) of CTX: swift, reliable medical care 
for injured military personnel is vital not only to the operational well-being 
of the armed forces, but also for effectiveness, retention, and security. This 
idea is reinforced by MAJ Cesar Rolon Villamizar and MAJ Andrés Fernández 
Osorio, who describe a program they helped set up for Colombia’s army to 
ensure that injured personnel, civilians, and even enemy fighters will be given 
appropriate medical care within the “golden hour” of maximum survivability.
COL Imre Porkoláb (vol. 3, no. 3) explores the ways in which both NATO and 
the U.S. Special Operations Command are developing online education tools 
to enhance readiness and interoperability at all levels of SOF. COL Porkoláb 
warns that while such methods can be useful to disseminate specialized educa-
tion across scattered forces, too much reliance on distance learning comes 
at the expense of the collaborative experience officers gain in a traditional 
classroom.
The Haqqani Network, a family-based jihadist enterprise that operates on 
both sides of the porous Afghan-Pakistani border, has come to resemble a 
mafia crime network more than an insurgency, according to MAJ Lars Lilleby 
(vol. 2, no. 1). He makes the case that going after their finances is the best 
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way to end the Haqqanis’ depredations. In the final feature article, MAJ Mike Loconsolo offers us an alternative way 
to evaluate the choices Mexican business owners must make when faced with the constant threats of extortion and 
violence posed by another terrorist network, the drug cartels. 
For this issue’s CTAP interview, Dr. Doug Borer of the Naval Postgraduate School spoke with COL Billy Shaw, an 
American Special Forces officer whose job was to train Afghan Special Forces commandos in Afghanistan. With the 
support of a forward-looking Afghan general and a dedicated staff, and with fortuitous help from a British journalist, 
COL Shaw developed a values-based training program drawn from the ethics of the Qur’an.
We welcome Dr. Pauline Kaurin of Pacific Lutheran University to this issue’s Ethics and Insights column. Dr. Kaurin 
explores the timely question of “kill or capture” in an essay that weighs issues of courage and community, and calls 
into question our deep assumption that preservation of life is always preferable to death. 
The first review in this issue, by MAJ Donald Reed, offers a new look at an old book, The Deceptive American (1977), 
by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick. Set in a fictional Southeast Asian country in the 1950s, this sequel to The Ugly 
American was suppressed for 22 years, apparently by the U.S. government. It is shocking, writes Reed, “how the main 
themes of the novel still resonate.” CPT Edval Zoto (vol. 3, no. 3) then reviews a work of historical non-fiction, The 
Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle (2008), by Roderick Bailey. Bailey’s topic is another of those fascinating 
but little-known operations that took place during WW II: the efforts of 100 British Special Operations Executive 
troops to prevent the Axis takeover of Albania. 
Our publications announcements include a new book by Dr. Douglas Porch of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, 2013), plus a number of new essays from our 
friends at JSOU.
The upcoming issue of CTX (vol. 4, no. 1 February 2014) will be another special issue, guest edited this time by  
Dr. David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Tucker’s theme is the evolution of intelligence gathering 
post-9/11, and the uses and sharing of information to counter terrorism around the world. Until then, keep on 
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7/26/05–Bullet holes and blood on the windshield from a recent 
assassination of a police officer in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico. 
The killing occurred during an upscale in drug war violence between 
the Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel for control of the Laredo truck 
crossing turf. Photo by Erich Schlegel via Corbis.com. 
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Protecting Soft Networks: Time to Counter the Enemy’s Logical 
Strategy
Dr. Steve Miska, Marine Corps 
War College, and Roslyn Warren, 
Georgetown University
The United States today 
consistently fails to protect 
the human networks critical to 
its effectiveness in the field.
5
November 2013 
In local gathering places, away from the ears of the occupiers, 
insurgents meet and discuss ways to punish occupation supporters. Although 
the techniques vary—insurgents confront traitors in the street, leave messages 
at their homes, and threaten their family members—all of their tactics are 
designed to make supporting the illegitimate occupation unattractive, danger-
ous, and even deadly. Once identified by the insurgents, collaborators often 
cease supporting the occupiers, go into hiding, or move their families away 
from the area. Those who fail to heed the warnings may pay dearly as they and 
their families live under constant threat. Does this sound like Iraq or Af-
ghanistan to you? It might be. But it is also colonial Philadelphia, New York, 
Boston, and every other hotbed of the American Revolution. Rather than 
harm their livelihoods for a highly risky cause like revolution, a large propor-
tion of the colonials fervently supported the English Crown while many others 
simply hoped to maintain the status quo. The colonial patriots—the conflict’s 
insurgents—used a variety of tactics to pressure Loyalists to forgo British 
allegiance, including public recantation, intimidation, financial penalties, and 
forfeiture of all property, among others. These tactics proved invaluable to the 
revolution’s success.  
Although this age-old stratagem to intimidate collaborators 
is pulled straight from the American Revolution playbook, 
the United States today consistently fails to protect the 
human networks critical to its effectiveness in the field. U.S. 
agencies are still surprised when enemies use these same pres-
sure tactics to stymie overseas enterprises—tactics America’s 
founding fathers adeptly used while fighting from a position 
of weakness against the British. As operational success in any 
foreign endeavor becomes increasingly interlocked with the 
strength and durability of soft networks—those nonmilitary 
and indigenous partners who support U.S. COIN and CT 
operations—America must build a diverse portfolio of means 
to meet the safety needs of those partners who are integral to 
its engagements abroad.1
An examination of the treatment of British Loyalists during 
the American Revolution turns the United States’ present-
day perspective on its head. Great Britain lost its North 
American colonies, in part, because it could not adequately 
protect its in-theater soft networks. Today, where U.S.-friendly 
host-nation governments lack stability, locals who support 
the United States (U.S. “loyalists,” branded as “collabora-
tors”) suffer intimidation by America’s enemies, a situation 
that jeopardizes U.S. operations.2 Terrorist groups and 
insurgents, such as al Qaeda in Iraq, al Shabaab in Somalia, 
or the Taliban in Afghanistan, quell indigenous support for 
Western initiatives through coercion and violence. As U.S. 
“Tory Refugees on the Way to 
Canada,” by Howard Pyle, 1901.
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COIN doctrine notes, warfare is increasingly network-centric, with operational 
effectiveness dependent on the strength of relationships with local allies on 
the ground.3 To remain effective militarily, strategists and practitioners must 
ask themselves the following questions: How can the United States protect 
its closest indigenous allies in dangerous areas? Does the United States have 
the right mix of policy tools necessary for its national security actors to 
operate effectively when cultivating indigenous networks? What policies and 
means might be brought to bear? Do any other organizations already use best 
practices? How can the United States proactively protect its soft networks in 
fragile environments where national interests are at stake? The recent conflicts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly illustrate the problem at hand: the U.S. 
military, and the State Department to a lesser degree, desperately needs to 
set up dynamic protection systems to safeguard its indigenous partners who 
facilitate logistics, linguistics, and other critical functions for overseas opera-
tions. Moving forward, the United States must enter hazardous environments 
fully aware of the risks that indigenous partners take when facilitating U.S. 
operations. In strategy and practice, the United States must anticipate that the 
enemy will target its soft networks, and prepare accordingly.
Experiences with Soft Networks in Iraq and Afghanistan
With respect to protecting close partners in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. 
military found itself first unprepared, and then ill-equipped. The Department 
of Defense was blindsided by the enemy’s intimidation (and, at times, elimi-
nation) campaigns aimed at collaborators. Military units responded to such 
attacks through trial-and-error measures, leaving many interpreters and other 
contractors to initiate their own survival policies. Some interpreters used nick-
names and wore face masks when on patrol with military units. They slept on 
U.S. bases, at the military unit’s discretion, to minimize the risk of discovery 
during transit between their workplaces and their homes. With a premium 
placed on U.S. force protection, some units realized too late the peril in which 
they placed their soft networks; the U.S. mission and the corresponding 
legitimacy of the host-nation government suffered accordingly. 
On the ground, those units that did realize the value of their soft networks 
found few policy tools available to protect local partners. Indigenous contrac-
tors, interpreters, and others took extreme risks to work alongside the U.S. 
forces; their lives and the lives of their families were jeopardized not only 
during the U.S. presence but also long after U.S. troops left Iraq. Ultimately, 
many suffered intimidation—and even death—for their U.S. affiliation. In 
these environments, daily survival was paramount. Tactically, U.S. units have 
responded to these challenges by improvising, or by acquiescing to techniques 
that the interpreters developed on their own, of the kind mentioned earlier. 
Some units issued weapons and uniforms to their interpreters. Often near 
the end of a deployment, units explored possible U.S. immigration for their 
interpreters, to bring them permanently out of harm’s way.4
The Special Immigrant Visa
As a surface-level policy, immigration to the United States for critical U.S. 
employees and partners seems appropriate and comprehensive. It is not. For 
an array of reasons, the vast majority of host-country nationals who assist the 
United States cannot or will not pick up and move halfway across the world. 
On the ground, those units 
that did realize the value of 
their soft networks found 
few policy tools available to 
protect local partners.
The U.S. Department of 
Defense was blindsided by the 
enemy’s intimidation (and, at 
times, elimination) campaigns 
aimed at collaborators.
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Some cannot steer through the labyrinth that is the U.S. immigration system, 
while others lack either the financial means or the mental fortitude to move 
their entire family and start their lives over in a culture utterly different from 
everything they know and understand. The few who can make this extreme 
relocation to the United States—if they successfully navigate the arduous 
bureaucratic process—start down a long road riddled with serious assimilation 
challenges. Meanwhile, the large proportion of indigenous partners who are 
either not able or not willing to emigrate to the United States find themselves 
essentially abandoned by the U.S. government and forced to fend for them-
selves in an increasingly dangerous and hostile environment, simply because 
they supported the United States.5 This is true particularly during the nascent 
stages of a state-building campaign when the host-nation government is still 
establishing legitimacy. An exploration of the particulars of the United States’ 
special immigrant visa (SIV) policy more clearly highlights the shortfalls of this 
one-size-fits-all protection policy.
In 2006, the United States instituted the SIV to assist interpreters in immi-
grating to the United States.6 This visa remains the only formal policy tool 
available to protect a limited number of local individuals, predominantly 
interpreters, who worked closely with U.S. forces and civilian agencies during 
the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. If the interpreter met certain requirements, 
such as working with a U.S. unit for at least 12 months, he or she could apply 
for the SIV. The application process, however, is at best cumbersome and at 
worst pointless. Between fiscal year (FY) 2008 and FY2012, the United States 
filled a mere 22% of Iraq SIV quotas and only 12% for Afghanistan for the 
comparable time period.7 Without active assistance from an embassy or other 
U.S. source, most foreign nationals cannot navigate, or even understand, 
the program and its requirements.8 Moreover, as the only policy available to 
help America’s indigenous partners, the SIV does nothing for those for whom 
immigrating to the United States is not a viable alternative. Adding to this, 
the United States needed (and still needs) large-scale indigenous support for 
its state-building operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempting to 
evacuate the most useful and proven U.S. friends and partners from these 
countries could create a “brain drain” that would undoubtedly directly affect 
the United States’ future relations with the countries into which it has now 
poured staggering amounts of time and money. According to the U.S. Army’s 
Counterinsurgency manual,
Commanders must protect their interpreters. They should em-
place security measures to keep interpreters and their families 
safe. Insurgents know the value of good interpreters and will often 
try to intimidate or kill interpreters and their family members. 
Insurgents may also coerce interpreters to gather information on 
U.S. operations. Soldiers and Marines must actively protect against 
subversion and espionage, to include using a polygraph.9
Despite the fact that COIN doctrine affirms that mission success hinges on the 
strength of U.S. relationships with indigenous experts, and on the military’s 
ability to insulate those experts from threats, the military possesses few policy 
options to protect its local partners.10 To explore potential alternative policies, 
national security departments and agencies should take lessons from U.S. 
domestic witness protection systems. These systems offer a variety of more 
National security departments 
and agencies should take 
lessons from U.S. domestic 
witness protection systems.
The special immigrant 
visa application process 
is at best cumbersome 
and at worst pointless.
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moderate methods, such as identity protection and temporary relocation, 
that may achieve better results for both protecting partners and safeguarding 
present and future U.S. missions.
Domestic Best Practices
In areas of the United States with prevalent gang activity or that are enmeshed 
in organized crime (locales where arguably the United States is not the sole 
legitimate governing authority nor the only provider of stability and security), 
U.S. federal and state governments take advantage of specific legal protec-
tions to encourage informants and witnesses to assist with the prosecution 
of accused perpetrators. In this capacity, these witnesses and informants 
fulfill “soft” roles similar to those of indigenous partners in areas of conflict, 
serving as the eyes and ears necessary for the operation to meet its end goal. 
Since 1971, the United States has protected key witnesses and their families in 
cases against organized criminals, gangs, and other malevolent actors under a 
federal witness security program.11 Under the purview of the U.S. Marshals 
Service, the program to date has safeguarded over 8,500 witnesses and 9,900 
of their family members.12 
Many states, such as Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Illinois, and Con-
necticut (to name a few), also run their own state-level programs. California 
and some other states offer comprehensive identity-change and family-
relocation services (similar to the federal program),13 while 33 states administer 
address-confidentiality programs,14 and nearly every state in the United States 
allocates at least some resources to help witnesses navigate the criminal justice 
system. Given the robust and diverse tools used at both the national and state 
levels within the United States to promote public safety, similar programs 
deployed abroad could enhance the United States’ operational flexibility and 
help deliver security to soft networks, yielding significant benefits during 
overseas operations.  
The United States needs to fund measures short of international relocation 
to fill the deleterious gap in protective services available to local partners in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and in future operations. Like many witnesses enrolled 
in federal and state witness protection programs, interpreters and other local 
While the knowledge that 
some individuals possess 
makes them invaluable to U.S. 
operations, it often disqualifies 
them from legally immigrating 
to the United States.
U.S. federal and state 
governments take advantage 
of specific legal protections 
to encourage informants 
and witnesses to assist 
with the prosecution of 
accused perpetrators.
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contractors can offer inside knowledge of opposition actors and groups, in 
part because some of these contractors worked personally in such groups in 
the past, and/or maintain ongoing relationships with members inside these 
adversarial networks.15 
Similar to the way prosecutors depend on the testimony of federal- and state-
level witnesses to combat organized crime in the United States, the U.S. military 
relies on interpreters and contractors to achieve operational effectiveness. 
While the knowledge that some individuals in these soft networks possess 
makes them invaluable to U.S. operations in combating terrorist networks in 
places like Afghanistan, it often simultaneously disqualifies them from legally 
immigrating to the United States. For example, the Material Support Bar 
enacted by Congress to stop potential terrorists from seeking asylum in the 
United States also blocks those with a legitimate and “well-founded fear of 
persecution” from entering the country.16 Of course, not all members of a soft 
network will possess intimate knowledge of insurgents and militia organiza-
tions, but many do, simply from the need to survive and protect their fami-
lies. Adding to the reasons cited earlier, and because the U.S. legal system bars 
many of its closest supporters from entering the country, the United States 
needs provisions short of immigration to protect its indigenous partners. 
Certainly, if U.S. federal and state law enforcement agencies need dynamic 
protective policy options to meet the needs of the U.S. criminal justice 
system, an environment far more mature in its legal and rule-of-law structures 
than Iraq or Afghanistan, then the United States can also provide an array of 
policy options for its foreign affairs apparatus if it means to successfully meet 
its stated goals abroad. Using the domestic programs as a guide, the cost of 
such a program overseas would be minimal. 
At the federal level, under H.R. 1741, the Witness Security and Protection 
Grant Program Act of 2010, the U.S. Congress authorized $30 million for 
each fiscal year from 2010 to 2014, totaling $150 million, to support a federal 
witness protection and assistance program. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated the outlays based on historic rates of spending to total $100 million 
during that five-year period.17 At the state level, even California’s program, 
perhaps the most robust in the nation, costs under $5 million a year,18 which 
would amount to a drop in the bucket of overall U.S. defense spending. These 
protection funds go a long way. Since 2010, California has protected 1,482 wit-
nesses, 2,272 family members, and 2,433 defendants.19 Given the low costs of 
domestic programs, an international provision could easily be rolled into the 
National Defense Authorization Act to provide greater operational flexibility 
to protect soft networks in dangerous areas.  
International Best Practices
If the U.S. military or other national security organizations received funding 
for the members of their soft networks, how could they better protect these 
local partners abroad? The media and some nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) provide useful examples from overseas operations, where many of 
these groups apply the principles of identity protection and temporary reloca-
tion. The media use local “stringers,” or indigenous freelance employees, who 
understand the culture and can report from areas where Western journalists 
have difficulty gaining access. NGOs operate with similar local support staff, 
especially in dangerous environments where foreigners would be targeted. In 
There is much that military 
leaders can do to better 
protect the identities of those 
within their soft networks 
and improve discretion during 
in-theater interactions.
At the state level, even 
California’s program, perhaps 
the most robust in the nation, 
costs under $5 million a year.
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“The most successful attacks 
on criminal networks are likely 
to be those carried out by 
innovative law enforcement 
structures that transcend 
the normal bureaucratic 
ways of doing business.”
Future mission effectiveness 
may depend on U.S. willingness 
and ability to safeguard 
those who risk their lives in 
support of U.S. objectives.
general, these organizations provide anonymity with respect to an individual’s 
Western affiliation whenever possible. They use nondescript vehicles to 
mask identity, and avoid displaying identifiable logos. They allow their local 
employees to conduct their work without traveling into areas where Western 
offices are known to be located, and instead communicate via phone and 
internet for updates. 
For their partners who face more severe threats, these entities provide modest 
and temporary relocation alternatives that do not demand significant assimila-
tion or hugely bureaucratic processes. One NGO in Somalia, for example, 
temporarily moved a local contractor from the Somali capital of Mogadishu to 
Nairobi, Kenya, to insulate him and his family from militia threats generated 
by his relationship with the organization.20 If the danger were minimal or if 
leaving the country were problematic, this same organization could move an 
operative within Somalia, from Mogadishu to Puntland, for example, where 
there is less violence.21 Depending on the situation at hand, a temporary 
internal or regional relocation could be sufficient to ensure security and allow 
the threat to subside. Just like U.S. domestic witness security programs, these 
media organizations and NGOs protect the identities of and provide limited 
relocation options for members of their critical soft networks. While difficul-
ties with implementing some of these strategies in the military arena will 
undoubtedly arise, there is much that military leaders can do to better protect 
the identities of those within their soft networks and improve discretion 
during in-theater interactions. They simply need to recognize the threat and 
be given the operational flexibility to insulate indigenous partners—just as the 
COIN manual tells them to do.
Conclusion
COIN and CT operations depend on robust and trustworthy relationships with 
local partners. If the United States wishes to continue achieving success in 
current and future operations overseas, it should protect those who help en-
able that success. U.S. partners in other potential conflict zones are watching 
how the United States treats its networks in Iraq and Afghanistan; the poli-
cies used in those theaters will influence confidence and loyalties elsewhere 
when supporters are needed. Future mission effectiveness may depend on the 
United States’ willingness and ability to safeguard those individuals, and their 
families, who risk their lives in support of U.S. objectives. A one-size policy 
does not fit all. For this reason, the SIV should be only one of the policy tools 
in the U.S. national security toolkit to meet these ends. As Phil Williams sug-
gested, because “it takes a network to defeat a network, the most successful at-
tacks on criminal networks are likely to be those carried out by innovative law 
enforcement structures that transcend the normal bureaucratic ways of doing 
business.”22 In today’s highly dangerous overseas operations, U.S. conventional 
forces should creatively protect their soft networks, first, by anticipating the 
threats, and second, by proactively using a variety of policy alternatives. 
The United States must remove its blinders to adequately meet the threats 
that exist in current and future operations. Promoting an understanding of 
the value of soft networks and developing a diverse portfolio of policy options, 
including those short of extreme relocation, will arm national security profes-
sionals with the necessary tools to protect the United States’ closest partners 
and achieve U.S. national security interests abroad. Not only is this a moral 
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approach but it is an operationally prudent one, and it will do much to 
sustain the vital human networks that facilitate U.S. national security objec-
tives across the globe. 
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A small but determined 
number of people have 
taken it upon themselves 
to oppose technological 
advances by lashing out at 
technology and technologists.
  Attacks against researchers 
in Mexico have been claimed 
by an organization whose 
name translates as “Individuals 
Tending Toward Savagery.”
The recently released film The easT, a thriller about a corporate 
spy infiltrating an anarchist collective, has sparked interesting discussions about 
surveillance, eco-terrorism, corporate espionage, and the violent anarchist 
fringe.1 It touches upon, though doesn’t fully explore, another theme related 
to terrorism and political violence—those individuals who engage in anti-
technology violence. That is, political violence that targets researchers, firms, 
and producers because of their involvement in technological innovation and 
distribution. It is a phenomenon with a longer history than you might imagine.
From British folk hero Ned Ludd (who supposedly smashed newfangled 
weaving machines in eighteenth-century England, and whose name was the 
source of the term Luddite) to “Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, history is full 
of examples of ideologically based anti-technology violence. Whether they 
are smashing knitting looms with a hammer for economic reasons or at-
tacking scientific researchers with letter bombs for ideological ones, a small 
but determined number of people have taken it upon themselves to oppose 
technological advances by lashing out at technology and technologists. Such 
violent episodes seem to be rooted in ideologies that identify with Aldous 
Huxley’s assertion that “technological progress has merely provided us with 
more efficient means for going backwards.”2 These instances of violence have 
been occasional and usually small in scale; recent events, however, suggest that 
they may become more common, and perhaps even more deadly. This kind of 
expansion—in scale, scope, or both—of ideologically driven anti-technology 
violence is not highly likely, but it is also far from a trivial concern. 
Anti-technology violence has never been monolithic, but rather has brought 
together numerous disparate ideological concerns and causes: environmental 
conservation, ethical questions about the impact of technology on society, eco-
nomic self interest, anger at industry or capitalism, and broad philosophical 
questions about what technology does to the human experience. While these 
ideological underpinnings are quite different from each other, the resulting 
prescription of some of the activists has been similar: attack new technologies 
and those engaged in their pursuit. 
Recent Anti-Nanotechnology Violence
In the last several years, there have been several cases of attacks and plots 
targeting the nanotechnology industry, notably in Mexico and Switzerland.3 
The attacks against researchers in Mexico have been claimed by an organiza-
tion whose name translates as “Individuals Tending Toward Savagery” (ITS). 
ITS posted a manifesto online that enumerates many complaints ranging 
from ethical questions about nanotechnology to concerns about “gray goo” (a 
notional cloud of out-of-control, autonomous, self-replicating nano-robots).4 
The case in Switzerland involved Swiss and Italian environmental extremists, 
who targeted a nanotechnology research center with a bomb. The activists in 
that case are currently in prison.5  
The Ideologies of Anti-Technology Violence




Today’s scientific and 
technological advances are 
increasingly impinging on 
philosophical and ethical 
territory that is likely to 
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Both technologists and 
violent anti-technologists are 
pursuing what they see as the 
broader good for humanity.
Both of these cases of terrorism targeting the nanotechnology sector contain 
a microcosm of the broader phenomena of anti-technology terrorism. Re-
searchers and research facilities are being targeted with violence for doing 
what the scientists and their colleagues see as a noble pursuit: exploring new 
science and technology to improve human life. Thus it appears that both 
technologists and violent anti-technologists are pursuing what they see as 
the broader good for humanity, the planet, themselves, and their many other 
constituencies.  
Might New Technologies Inspire Further Violence?
There is reason to believe that these recent examples of anti-technology vio-
lence may be indicative of a broader trend. Today’s scientific and technological 
advances are increasingly impinging on philosophical and ethical territory that 
is likely to elicit visceral responses. The increasing fusion of technology and 
life in the biotech industry, the ability to understand and manipulate the ge-
netic code, increasingly small and effective nano-engineering, and other such 
developments each creates new ethical and ideological challenges that may 
well elicit reactions of fear and anger—perhaps some violent ones.  
The recent debate around whether Dutch researchers should be allowed to 
publish the findings of their scientific work on manipulating the characteris-
tics of strains of influenza is another example of the increasingly high societal 
stakes that scientific research can have. Such scientific research could, conceiv-
ably, highlight information that would enable the creation of hyper-virulent 
biological agents, a possibility that could be as alarming to today’s techno-
skeptics as knitting machines were to eighteenth-century British weavers like 
Ned Ludd. These high stakes are likely to fuel both uninformed specula-
tion and worthwhile ethical debates about the possibility of technological 
disasters, such as a man-made pandemic. Many technologies and kinds 
of scientific research have already created controversies resulting in 
threatening rhetoric or actual violence; these technologies and research 
range from stem cell research and nuclear energy to cloning and genetic 
manipulation.   
Science author Arthur C. Clarke wrote that any sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic.6 Few things raise the ire of 
people more than “magic,” particularly when that magic seems uncontrol-
lable, plays into their fears, or seems incompatible with their worldview  
or belief system.
The Monkey Wrench Gang: An Example of Enviro- 
anarchist Writing
The Turner Diaries, a novel depicting the aftermath of a race war in the 
United States, has long been seen as a key document for understanding 
the white supremacist and antigovernment militia movements in the 
United States.7 The Order, a white supremacist terrorist organization 
active in the 1980s, took its name from the fictional racist group in 
the book. Timothy McVeigh’s attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City had many parallels to a fictional attack 
outlined in The Turner Diaries, a book McVeigh sometimes sold at gun 
shows. Similarly, Edward Abbey’s The Monkey Wrench Gang has helped 
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inspire anti-technology ideologues and activists over the decades since its 
publication in 1975.8 This is not to suggest any moral equivalence between 
the racist violence against people advocated by Turner Diaries author William 
Pierce (who wrote under the pseudonym Andrew MacDonald) and the destruction 
of machinery advocated by Abbey. The works of both authors, however, served 
similar roles by providing fictional archetypes for the activists who were inspired 
by their messages.  
The Monkey Wrench Gang is a comedic novel that revolves around a campaign 
of sabotage targeting environmentally damaging facilities and industries in the 
American Southwest. While this violence only targets property, not people,9 
today the Federal Bureau of Investigation certainly considers that kind of 
activity to be terrorism.10 The book is an interesting contrast to some concep-
tions of modern-day environmentalists. It features characters eating meat; 
driving large, inefficient cars; littering; and carrying weapons, yet the characters 
engage in real violence, unapologetically attacking consumerism, particularly a 
large dam project they see as despoiling nature. The Monkey Wrench Gang gave 
rise to a new term for anti-technology violence—monkeywrenching, meaning 
activist sabotage11—and inspired numerous environmental activists, including 
“direct action” activists and violent terrorist activists like the Earth Libera-
tion Front (ELF). “Violence” in this case is a relative concept; ELF targets 
property rather than people, and its members historically have gone out of 
their way to avoid injuring or killing anyone. Some ideological compatriots at 
organizations like Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), however, have 
shown a willingness to target researchers—and even their homes—directly.12 
The types of violence and targets chosen by environmental extremists have 
historically been greatly limited by the activists’ ideological constraints (such 
as respect for life—human and otherwise), as well as by their relatively narrow 
aims. While ELF and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have largely 
eschewed attacking people, however, their violence is clearly designed 
to intimidate, harass, and coerce various audiences into changing their 
behavior.    
The Monkey Wrench Gang is not the only piece of writing that should 
be read in order to understand these kinds of violent activists. Ted 
Kaczynski’s rambling manifesto and the many public pronounce-
ments of radical organizations such as ALF, SHAC, and ELF offer 
insight into the justifications for violence that these groups might use. 
It is not possible to understand the global wave of leftist violence in 
the 1970s and early 1980s from the statements of the Weathermen, the 
Red Army Faction, or the Japanese Red Army alone, without also un-
derstanding the broader ideologies that underpinned these radical and 
violent interpretations. Merely reading the violent activists’ writings 
is not sufficient. Rather, there needs to be a broader engagement with 
the ideologies that underpin these impulses, from the Deep Ecology 
movement, to the anarcho-primitivism of John Zerzan and others, to 
the Christian anarchism of Jacques Ellul. These movements, like most 
leftist movements in the 1970s, are not violent movements, nor do they 
typically advocate violence or even sabotage; however, the ideologies 
they present have the potential to be used by some fringe elements to 
support violent action, just as leftist ideologies did decades ago.
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Concluding Thoughts
At the moment, violent anti-technology activism is a relatively minor concern for 
public safety officials, at least when compared with the various other terrorist 
threats facing many modern societies (religious fundamentalists like al Qaeda, 
state-supported organizations like Hezbollah, or lone-wolf extremists like 
Anders Breivik and Eric Rudolph). That said, some of the recent anti-
nanotechnology attacks by such activists have shed a light onto the constel-
lation of ideological underpinnings used to justify attacking technology and 
technologists. The need for discussions about the ethics and implications 
of technology will only grow as we move further into the realm of Arthur 
Clarke’s “magic,” but the willingness of a small minority to eschew discussion 
for violence has the potential to grow ever more serious as the stakes seem to 
get ever higher.
It is to be hoped that those concerned about the future of new technologies 
will be willing to stay within the confines of a democratic debate about tech-
nology, science, and ethics. We should not forget, though, that not long ago, 
a math professor in a cabin in Montana waged a one-man war against what 
he saw as the corrupting influence of technology on humanity. He killed three 
people and wounded more than 20: researchers, graduate students, scientists, 
secretaries, small-business owners, professors, a police officer, business execu-
tives, and engineers. 
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Weak and in some cases almost non-existent family bonds have 
left young Muslims in Britain caught between the beliefs and networks 
of their parents and those of the host society. This confusion, along with 
feelings of disenfranchisement and discrimination, creates an identity 
crisis. Reinvigorating the extended family would help youth overcome the 
trauma of their identity crisis by granting them a firm sense of belonging 
to a network of peers, in the form of cousins and other relatives who would 
help put family first. Muslim youth, in this way, would be connected with 
the wider British society through having a sense of place and belonging to 
something.
The general study of religious radicalization tends either to oversimplify the 
process by stressing single-factor explanations, or it overemphasizes the com-
plexity of the phenomenon and arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that it is 
impossible to identify “a typical terrorist,” let alone typical ways of becoming a 
terrorist.1 But both of these views are too extreme. Radicalization is a process; 
individuals do not typically awaken with a sudden epiphany that drives them 
to join a radical Islamic group. They instead experience an often extensive 
socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debate and 
deliberation, and even experimentation with alternative groups. In pursuit of 
their “true identity,” young people tend to look for a “purer” version of Islam 
and hop from one group to another: from groups that espouse milder views 
toward those that take a harsher, more fundamentalist standpoint. Only when 
an individual is convinced that he or she has found the group that represents 
the “true” version of Islam is he or she likely to join.2
Some clear patterns can help explain why and how people become attracted to 
radicalization. For instance, Marc Sageman writes in Leaderless Jihad that there 
are three ways to study the process of radicalization: 1) focus on the individual 
and his background; 2) search for “root causes” in the social conditions; or 
3) concentrate on how people in groups influence each other to become ter-
rorists.3 Though Sageman prefers the third approach, saying it offers the most 
fruitful way to understand the process of radicalization,4 I differ from him and 
take into consideration all three aspects.5
Radicalization, in my view, consists of four stages. Muslims in the UK become 
receptive as a direct result of an identity crisis. The state’s policies trigger 
a cognitive opening, making individuals vulnerable to outside influences. 
Cloaked in their new “Islamic identity,” Muslims suffer a sense of moral out-
rage at apparent injustices against all Muslims, both globally and locally. This 
becomes a central theme of their self-image, as outside influences resonate 
with personal experiences of discrimination. From here begins the process of 
recruitment through gradual indoctrination, which marks the second stage. 
Social bonds play a critical role at this stage and sometimes precede ideological 
commitments. The third stage involves a process of activism, when the fully 
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indoctrinated individual undergoes a replication process by spreading his 
convictions to others to whom he has links. Progression along this path car-
ries the individual to the final stage—fanaticism, the acme of radicalization. 
A graphic representation of this journey is depicted in Figure 1.
Predicaments of Muslim Communities in the UK
The UK is home to 1.6 million Muslims out of a British population of nearly 
60 million, according to the UK’s 2001 census.6 The majority of Muslims in 
the UK have their roots in Britain’s former colonial territories of Pakistan, Ban-
gladesh, and India. Others hail from the Middle East and African countries, 
as well as Turkey. Some of these immigrant families have been in the UK for 
generations. Muslims are the largest religious minority in the UK: 46 percent 
of all Muslims living in the UK are British-born.7
Muslim Ghettos
British Muslims have established themselves in certain areas of the UK over 
the past several decades. For instance, during my interviews in Bradford, 
I came across a Pakistani who had lived there for the last 35 years; he said, 
“When I moved in here, there was only one other family of Asians on the 
street. But now, over the course of 35 years, it’s mainly Asians. This commu-
nity is more traditional, like back home, Pakistan.”8 One hears much the same 
story in East London, which has a Bangladeshi majority, or in Finsbury, which 
is predominantly Arab. Elsewhere in the UK, Birmingham and Manchester 
are well known for their Asian Muslim enclaves.
One can only understand how tightly knit and closed these communities are 
if one gets a chance to visit them. They have their own food shops, mosques, 
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Figure 1: Stages of Radicalization
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schools, and recreational spots. Among these, the two social institutions that 
cast a dominant influence over the community are mosques and schools. Both 
are interlinked. As an imam of East London Mosque told me in an interview, 
“almost 90 percent of the Muslim community that lives in and around East 
London sends their kids to schools affiliated with East London Mosque.”9
Another peculiar feature of the British Muslim community is that one finds 
people still anchored to their culture and traditions back home. It is a common 
sight to see people wearing their regional dress, especially women and older 
people. Muslim families also subscribe to those channels on cable or satellite 
TV that broadcast in their mother tongue. The main reason they give for this 
is that “they do not want their kids watching European channels because most 
of the programs are objectionable.”10
Multiculturalism
There are many factors that are responsible for the apparent alienation of 
young British Muslims from mainstream influences in society, multicultur-
alism being one of them. The unwillingness—or inability—of the British 
government to promote a single, identifiable British identity and culture is 
the single most important reason “for the self-imposed segregation of Muslim 
communities, a proliferation of mosques staffed by radical clerics and the es-
tablishment of Muslim faith schools that emphasize Koranic studies and teach 
South Asian languages.”11 The policy of multiculturalism may focus too much 
on ethnic diversity instead of integration. Consequently, after more than 
sixty years of British citizenship, some ethnic minorities remain segregated by 
culture. The fact that many adhere to a different religious faith and remain 
attached to their country of origin and its culture and traditions is deemed 
problematic because such attachments help discourage them from identifying 
with Britain and “Britishness.”12
Perception of Not Being Accepted
There is a widespread perception among Muslims that they are not accepted 
by British society, despite government programs to support multiculturalism. 
In their view, experiences with “Islamophobia” belie official claims of toler-
ance.13 During my visit to the UK, I asked one Pakistani whether he thinks he 
has been accepted as British in the UK. He replied, “Well, these goras [whites] 
tell us you can be a British but not an English, who associate themselves with 
privileges of the House of Lords, foxhunting, and exclusiveness of class.”14
Many Muslims also believe that the law treats them more harshly because of 
their religion. The Muslim community cites as an example the prison sen-
tences given to the predominantly Muslim Asian participants in the Bradford 
riots (July 2001). The average length of sentence meted out to 46 rioters was 
4.5 years longer than terms handed down to rioters in Belfast.15
Although these disparities may not be a direct result of racism, racial discrimi-
nation compounds the sense of exclusion and inequity. Forty percent of all 
Britons believe Britain is a racist society. Sixty percent of blacks and Asians say 
they have experienced verbal racism, 20 percent complain of physical racial 
abuse, and 33 percent of Asians feel that racial prejudice is worse now than 
it was five years ago.16 These experiences are exacerbated by the activities of 
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racist, right-wing groups like the British National Party, a group known for 
its public anti-Muslim campaigns. After the worldwide row over the Danish 
cartoons that lampooned the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), BNP was accused 
of deliberately ramping up racial and religious tensions by launching a leaf-
leting campaign with anti-Muslim messages, including its own controversial 
cartoons of the Prophet.17
The experience of both racial and religious discrimination often prompts 
some young Muslims to question their identity and how they fit into British 
society.18 According to a survey in 2002, 69 percent of Muslims felt that the 
broader society did not consider them integral to life in Britain. Since 9/11, the 
situation has grown worse. 
Today, more than ever, British Muslims are asked to prove themselves to be 
not only loyal and peaceful, but also as integrated citizens.19 Questions about 
loyalty and citizenship are regularly asked within a frame that juxtaposes Islam 
with Europe and, in so doing, frequently serves to exacerbate the tensions of 
having a Muslim presence in the West.20 Social exclusion, unemployment, and 
the lack of opportunities further strengthen the perception that citizenship is 
constructed in exclusive terms.21
Clash of Values
British Muslims are experiencing inter-generational strains. The liberal secu-
larism of British law often clashes with Muslim religious doctrine. In his book 
Made in Bradford, M.Y. Alam attributes this tension to competition between 
Western secularism and traditional religious beliefs, which leaves young Mus-
lims in Britain caught between the traditions and networks of their parents 
and those of a host society that limits their acceptance on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, and faith.22 The dominant reaction to this predicament is a non-
violent, non-political, neo-fundamentalist reinvigoration of faith and a return 
to activism that emphasizes personal action and social activism in search of 
“a new Ummah [community].”23 As one reporter puts it, “Reconciling these 
contradictions with compromising their faith and way of life is a central chal-
lenge for British Muslims and the society in which they live.”24
Disenfranchisement and discrimination have led many to wonder, What does 
it mean to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim country? Here it must be remem-
bered that British Muslims enjoy only limited theological guidance about how 
to practice Islam in a Western country, dominated as it is by secular social, 
political, economic, and cultural traditions.
This question of what it means to be Muslim in a non-Muslim country is 
complicated by the fact that Muslim minorities in Western countries are 
heterogeneous: they are frequently subdivided by ethnicity, language, culture, 
and religious traditions. As Olivier Roy observes, “While old minorities had 
time to build their own cultures or to share the dominant culture (Tartars, 
Indians, China’s Hui), Muslims in recently settled minorities have to reinvent 
what makes them Muslim, in the sense that the common defining factor of 
this population as Muslim is the mere reference to Islam, with no common 
cultural or linguistic heritage.”25
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Identity Crisis and Cognitive Opening
Because many of the young British Muslims drawn to extremism feel a sense 
of cultural alienation, disenfranchisement, and discrimination in a society 
that does not fully accept them, they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of 
collective identity to counteract their feelings of exclusion.26 Exclusion is 
constructed by outsiders, i.e., other Britons, whose discrimination reinforces 
individual Muslims’ cognitive boundaries. Consequently, despite being 
heterogeneous, Muslims recast and rationalize a collective identity expressed 
through new cultural material—names, narrative, symbols, verbal styles, 
rituals, clothing, and so on.
Besides creating a collective identity, such alienation and disenfranchisement 
also lead to what Quintan Wiktorowicz calls a cognitive opening. In Wiktoro-
wicz’s view, individuals are initially inspired by a cognitive opening that shakes 
their certitude in previously accepted beliefs. Once individuals are willing 
to expose themselves to new ways of thinking and worldviews, the cognitive 
opening helps facilitate their receptivity to joining a movement and engaging 
in activism.27
In many cases, individuals can address and resolve a crisis or psychological 
distress through their current belief system. But, where this seems inadequate, 
individuals may be open to other views. The specific crisis that prompts a cogni-
tive opening varies across individuals. Any number of things can prompt a cog-
nitive opening (for instance, experiences with discrimination, a socioeconomic 
crisis, or political repression), which means that there is no single catalyst for 
triggering initial interest. Worth noting is that when an individual’s identity 
is tied to religion or derives its meaning from religion, a cognitive opening 
may lead to “religious seeking”—a process by which an individual searches for 
some satisfactory system of religious meaning through which to interpret and 
resolve his discontent.28
The Radicalization Path—An Influence Campaign 
The Muslim community in the UK, comprising migrants from different 
countries, resembles a society that is fragmented into clusters of individuals 
who share similar characteristics. In The Islamist, his autobiographical account 
of becoming radicalized, Ed Husain describes how his friendship with one 
particular individual allowed him to connect to more people, and introduced 
him to new social clusters.29 Throughout his journey inside different radical 
networks, Husain was always influenced by just a few people. His account 
makes clear how a very small number of people can be linked to everyone else 
in just a few steps. Although the Islamists Husain describes operated in dif-
ferent, distinct hubs—like the Young Muslims Organization, Hizbut-Tahrir, 
or al-Muhajiroun—their frequent interaction with each other enabled them to 
recruit new people from society’s vast pool.30 The singular journey Ed Husain 
describes can help us better grasp the path of radicalization.
One of the most widely accepted notions related to behavior in networked 
societies is that word-of-mouth communication plays an important role in 
shaping people’s attitudes and behaviors.31 For example, “Word-of-mouth 
is the most important source of influence in the purchase of household 
goods and food products. It was seven times as effective as newspapers and 
When an individual’s identity 
is tied to religion or derives 
its meaning from religion, a 
cognitive opening may lead 
to “religious seeking.”
Muslims recast and rationalize 
a collective identity expressed 
through new cultural material—
names, narrative, symbols, verbal 
styles, rituals, clothing, and so on.
Although the Islamists Husain 
describes operated in different, 
distinct hubs, their frequent 
interaction with each other 
enabled them to recruit new 
people from society’s vast pool.
21
November 2013 
magazines, four times as effective as personal selling, and twice as effective 
as radio advertising in influencing consumers to switch brands.”32 One finds 
illustrations of this in Ed Husain’s journey through radicalism. Husain was 
mostly influenced by messages that came to him by word of mouth. Although 
he and other activists would start their own canvassing of new recruits among 
those with whom they had “stronger ties,” we find them quickly approaching 
anyone and everyone. 
People pass on all kinds of information to each other all the time through 
word of mouth. “But it’s only in a rare instance that such exchanges ignite the 
word-of-mouth epidemic.”33 In The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell attributes 
the start of a word-of-mouth epidemic to the “involvement of people with a 
particular rare set of social gifts.”34
Societal Links—Some People Are More Influential
In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment to investigate how 
humans are connected. This led to his famous concept that every person on 
earth is connected to every other person through “six degrees of separation.”35 
Gladwell explains that Milgram’s concept does not mean that everyone is 
linked to everyone else in just six steps. Instead, it means that a very small 
number of people are linked to everyone else in a few steps, and the rest of 
us are linked to the world through those special few—people with a gift for 
bringing the world together.36 Gladwell characterizes these individuals as 
Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen.
What makes someone a Connector? The first and most obvious criterion is that 
Connectors know lots of people. They are individuals with a knack for making 
friends and acquaintances,37 and master what sociologists call the “weak tie,” a 
friendly yet casual social connection. However, Connectors are important for 
more than simply the number of people they know. They are also important 
for the kinds of people they know;38 they manage to occupy many different 
worlds, subcultures, and niches, which is a function of something intrinsic to 
their personality, some combination of curiosity, self-confidence, sociability, 
and energy.39 While Connectors typically establish both stronger and weaker 
ties, a critical review of Islamists’ network topology suggests that weaker ties are 
more important because these serve as bridges, linking closely-knit network 
segments, and it is through these weaker ties that the word-of-mouth epi-
demic spreads.
Just as there are people who connect people via an Islamist ideology, there are 
also people who could be termed religious information specialists. Gladwell 
calls these specialists Mavens. What is critical about Mavens is that they are 
not passive collectors of information but are individuals who, after acquiring 
particular knowledge, want to tell everyone else about it, too.40 Mavens are 
more influential than Connectors, due to their ability to make a particular 
case so emphatically that listeners take their advice. “A Maven is not the kind 
of person who wants to twist your arm. To be a Maven is to be a teacher.”41 
Prominent clerics can be termed Mavens. They have the knowledge and the 
social skills to start a word-of-mouth epidemic, though what really sets them 
apart is not so much what they know, but their desire to help others, which 
turns out to be a very effective way to gain others’ attention.42 Mavens and 
Connectors have different personalities and act for different reasons. But they 
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both have the power to spark a word-of-mouth epidemic.43 Mavens are data 
banks: they provide the message. Connectors are the social glue: they spread it.
A Maven or a Connector, however, is not is a persuader.44 Persuaders are the 
types Gladwell describes as Salesmen, who have the skills to persuade us when 
we are otherwise unconvinced about what we are hearing.45 They are able to 
quickly build trust and rapport among their audience, and thereby exert an 
enormous amount of influence over others.46 In UK Muslim communities, 
this category of people does not exist as a separate type. Rather, some of the 
individuals from the other two groups (Connectors and Mavens) undertake 
Salesmen-like tasks. Once recruits are indoctrinated, and as they adopt their 
new role as Islamists, they start canvassing as Salesmen. The radical organiza-
tion they join trains them in persuasion techniques. Those who do this job effi-
ciently later become Connectors, and some of these end up as Mavens as well.
The “Stickiness” Factor
According to Gladwell, exceptional people who are capable of starting word-
of-mouth epidemics can always be found. You just have to identify them. The 
same is true for stickiness. There is a simple way to package information that, 
under the right circumstances, can make it irresistible. By carefully structuring 
and formatting their material to enhance its attractiveness, people who want 
to spread a message engage in “stickiness engineering.” Islamists always try to 
come up with innovative ways to convey messages. When they cannot tamper 
with the message itself, they devise new propagation techniques. In Made to 
Stick, Chip Heath and Dan Heath identify six different tools that can be used 
to make a message stickier.47 I will use these to elaborate how Islamists make 
their message sticky.
The first is simplicity. Developing a succinct message requires stripping an idea 
down to its most critical essence. Many of Islamists’ sticky ideas are actually 
“generative” metaphors in disguise. Generative metaphors, like proverbs, 
derive their power from a clever substitution: they replace a complicated 
idea with something that is easy to understand.48 For example, “Islam is the 
Solution” and “Allah’s Law in Allah’s Land” offer the listener tangible, easily 
processed slogans that can be used for guidance in complex, emotionally 
fraught situations. Such simple ideas are especially helpful in guiding indi-
vidual decisions in an environment where people share common beliefs, by 
offering rules of thumb for expected behavior.
Unexpectedness is the next tool for making a message stick. How do we get our 
audience to pay attention to our ideas, and how do we maintain their interest 
when it takes time to get the ideas across? According to the Heath brothers, 
the most basic way to grab someone’s attention is to break a pattern. Our brain 
is designed to be keenly aware of changes. The Heaths say that smart designers 
are well aware of this tendency and make sure that, when products require 
users to pay attention, something changes.49
It is possible to use surprise—an emotion whose function is to increase alert-
ness and focus—to grab people’s attention. But surprise does not last. In 
order to ensure their idea will endure, Islamists generate interest and curiosity 
by making use of the Gap theory and arousing their audience’s curiosity. 
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According to the Gap theory, we need to open gaps in people’s knowledge 
before we close them. Islamists believe it is a mistake to give people facts 
right away. First, they make people realize they lack information by posing a 
question or puzzle that confronts the listener with a gap in his or her knowl-
edge.50 In 1994, the Hizb in the UK drew people’s attention by suggesting 
that something momentous was about to happen in the Middle East. They 
propagated the notion that the Khilafat (Caliphate) would soon be announced 
in some Arab country. For publicity purposes, they put stickers everywhere 
stating: “Khilafat—Coming Soon to a Country Near You?” The message 
attracted a lot of attention, and many people who otherwise would not have 
taken an interest wanted to know what this was all about.
Abstraction is the luxury of the expert. Concreteness, by contrast, is another 
technique to make a message stick among a broad audience. Concrete lan-
guage helps people, especially novices, understand new concepts. If you have 
to teach an idea to a roomful of people, and you are not certain what they 
know, concreteness is the only safe language to use because it helps you con-
struct building blocks out of people’s existing knowledge and perceptions.51
What makes a message “concrete”? Islamists always build their argument around 
some religious perception or set of fundamental Muslim beliefs. For example:
Allah is our Lord 
Mohammad is our Leader 
The Qur’an is our Constitution 
Jihad is our Way 
Martyrdom is our Desire52
If we analyze these messages, we will appreciate that most Muslims cannot 
object to any of them. Together they cover the entire spectrum of a Muslim’s 
life. They are easy to remember, because they are short and succinct, yet so 
meaningful that people can spend hours discussing each line.
What is it about concreteness that makes ideas stick? The answer lies in the 
nature of our memories. There are some terms that resonate with us and are 
saved in our minds, and any reference to these by others adds strength to 
those people’s arguments. For instance, the words jahilia, Kuffar, Mushriqeen, 
and Khilafat resonate deeply for most Muslims. Making such references 
creates a concrete shared “foundation” on which people can come together 
and collaborate. “Everybody feels comfortable that they are tackling the same 
challenge.”53
Credibility is the fourth tool that increases a message’s stickiness. How do we 
make people believe our ideas? If we are trying to persuade a skeptical audi-
ence to “buy” a new message, we are usually fighting an uphill battle against 
a lifetime’s worth of personal experiences and biases. In such situations, we 
seldom have an external authority who can vouch for our message; most of 
the time our message has to vouch for itself. It must have “internal cred-
ibility.”54 What is unusual about the Islamist case in the UK is that Islamists 
simply manipulate their message and package it in a wider belief system that 
people are already familiar with. In other words, Islamists’ message has 
automatic credibility due to its link to the audience’s existing beliefs.
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Another factor that makes Islamists’ message credible is the stature of the 
messenger. Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen in the Muslim community are 
people already trusted for their knowledge. Islamists who fill these roles use 
their networking ability to effect. What is more, the people who preach and 
invite others to engage in jihad are mostly those who themselves have expe-
rienced jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Iraq, which makes their credibility 
unimpeachable.
Once they have an audience’s attention, how do the Islamists get people to 
care about their ideas? Sometimes what is hardest about making a message 
sticky is to find the right emotion to harness. When people think analytically 
they are less likely to think emotionally.55 Hence, to influence people, we need 
to demonstrate how our ideas are associated with things that people already 
care about. “We appeal to their self-interest, but we also appeal to their identi-
ties—not only the people they are right now but to the people they would 
like to be.”56 Islamists do all this. Their messages are emotionally charged, 
intensely associated with things people already care about, and always carry 
an appeal to identity. For example, one of the leaflets being distributed by 
Hizbut-Tahrir in January 2009 declared: “Mobilising the troops for battle 
in response to Gaza slaughter is mandatory on the rulers, else it amounts to 
treason with Allah, His Prophet, and the Believers!”57
The oldest tool of influence in human history is to tell stories.58 An emotional 
idea makes people care, and the right story makes people act.59 People do not 
necessarily want more information. To borrow from Gladwell, people want 
faith—faith in you, your goals, your success, in the story you tell. Facts do not 
give birth to faith. Faith needs a story to sustain it—a meaningful story that 
inspires people to believe in you, and one that renews hope that your ideas 
indeed offer what you promise.60
Telling a story is a pull strategy.61 When you want to influence someone, trust 
becomes the connection that serves as a conduit for your message. Other 
methods of influence—persuasion, bribery, or charismatic appeals—are push 
strategies. Islamists understand that if their story is good enough, people of 
their own free will come to the conclusion that they can trust the storytellers 
and the message they bring.62
The Power of Context
Epidemics are sensitive to conditions, meaning the circumstances of the times 
and places in which they occur. Context—which can be defined as the whole 
background to a particular situation, issue, or problem—strongly influences 
participants. In The Medium is the Massage (sic), Marshall McLuhan writes: 
“Our environment compels commitment and participation. We have become 
irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other.”63 Pushing his argu-
ment further, McLuhan says that “the environment that man creates becomes 
his medium for defining his role in it.”64
Radicalism as an Epidemic
This idea of radicalization as an epidemic may seem a little strange. We can 
speculate that Islamists’ radicalism has proliferated like a contagion because 
the environment provides the necessary context, but it is not clear that 
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radicalization follows the same rules that fashions or fads do. Fashion trends 
involve relatively straightforward and simple things—a product and a mes-
sage. Islamists’ radicalism, on the other hand, is not a single discrete thing, but 
a phenomenon used to describe an almost impossibly varied and complicated 
set of behaviors. What is more, radical activists can face serious consequences 
for their actions, and what activists do often puts them at great personal peril. 
It does not seem that the psychological predisposition to break the law would 
be transmitted casually, from one person to another. Yet, somehow in the UK, 
this is exactly what has occurred. In the first half of the 1990s, the UK saw the 
spread of a wave of radicalism that reached its peak at the end of the 1990s 
and continued into the early 2000s. There were as many religiously inclined 
people living in the UK at the peak of this radicalism as there had been before, 
but for some reason a small number of these individuals suddenly dominated 
the environment.
The incidents that took place between 1990 and 2000 had a huge impact on 
Muslim society, and were a major factor in helping Islamists to propagate radi-
calism. The broader context for the British Muslim community’s discontent at 
the time included: hostility toward the Saudis for allowing the U.S. military 
and other “non-Muslim” forces to be stationed in the Kingdom—an act 
many considered to be a betrayal of Islam; hostility to the politics of Western 
governments and specifically the British government on domestic issues; and 
antagonism toward the British government for its refusal to ban novelist 
Salman Rushdie’s controversial book, The Satanic Verses. Additional sources 
of tension were Britain’s involvement in the first Gulf War, its rejection of 
military action to aid Bosnian Muslims, and its commitment to the United 
States’ Global War On Terror.
Broken Window Theory
According to social scientists James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, if a 
window is broken and left unrepaired, people walking by will conclude that 
no one cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken and 
the appearance of anarchy will spread from the building to the street, sending 
a signal that anything goes.65
This Broken Window theory can help us understand the UK Muslim commu-
nity’s radicalization. When people started displaying an unusual inclination 
toward religion in the 1990s by setting up exclusive foundations in mosques, 
canvassing on behalf of extremist positions, and openly espousing radicalism, 
the British government did nothing. As Ed Husain writes, “Britain offered 
the Hizb the freedom to express its ideas freely and recruit uninhibitedly. The 
Hizb was legal in Britain, but illegal in the Arab World.”66 As a result, people 
in particular Muslim communities thought their activism was the right way 
to publicly express themselves. When this public expression spread from the 
closed quarters of mosques to the streets without eliciting a response from the 
authorities, it sent the signal that “anything goes.” That signal in turn ren-
dered radicalism as contagious as urban decay, which can start with a broken 
window and spread through an entire community.
Malcolm Gladwell applies the Broken Window theory to what he terms 
the power of context. Both are based on the premise that “an epidemic can 
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be tipped, by tinkering with the smallest details of the immediate environ-
ment.”67 Both suggest that a radical activist is someone acutely sensitive 
to his environment, who is alert to all kinds of cues, and who is prompted 
to commit to Islamist theory (in our context) based on his perception of 
the world around him. For example, Ed Husain’s bias toward religion was 
grounded in his early home life. He moved along the path of radicalization 
slowly. Small incidents against Muslims kept reinforcing his belief that the 
West was in fact at war with Muslims. Consequently, Husain and many like 
him started idealizing those who had fought in the Afghan jihad. The UK 
government’s silence about jihadis from Britain encouraged the younger 
generation to follow the jihadis’ example. No one foresaw in the mid- and 
late-’90s that these trends one day would lead to violent radicalism.
Context of Narrative
When we are trying to make an idea, attitude, or product tip from obscurity 
to popularity, we are trying to change our audience in some small yet critical 
respect: we are trying to infect them, sweep them up in our epidemic, convert 
them from hostility to acceptance. That can be done through the influence of 
special kinds of people, people with extraordinary personal connections, such 
as Mavens. It can also be done by changing the content of communications, 
by making a message so memorable that it sticks in people’s mind and com-
pels them to action—this explains the importance of the Stickiness Factor. 
But we also need to remember that small changes in context can be equally 
important in tipping outbreaks into epidemics. Environmental tipping 
points are things that we can change.68 We can, for instance, thwart Islamists’ 
organizations and overshadow their message with our own message, and by 
shifting ground.
Reversing the Tide of Radicalism
As long as Muslims in the UK see other Muslims in different parts of the 
world being victimized in ways that may resonate with their own feelings of 
exclusion by the broader British society, they are apt to experience collective 
dissonance and a cognitive opening. Islamists have proved able to exploit this 
cognitive opening and push fellow Muslims toward radicalism. In that sense, 
radicalism itself acts much like an innovation, whose “newness” often amounts 
to simply seeing the same world (or set of problems) from a new perspective.
Gladwell’s concepts, substantiated through anecdotal evidence, provide a 
workable framework for understanding how the proliferation of radicalism 
has taken place among UK Muslim communities. By following the simple 
rules of marketing, a small number of Islamists made their message credible, 
persuasive, and stickier. Word of mouth and interpersonal connections were 
critical, as was context and the environment.
For almost a decade, a small percentage of British Muslims has been fol-
lowing the radicalists’ path. Today, however, the Islamists’ innovation of the 
1990s has come full circle, and has reached a point where its adopters have 
started to become isolated from the mainstream society. The violent ends 
of this innovation have created a distaste for it among its target audience. 
A number of British Muslims are now engaged in what Everett Rogers calls 
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a “discontinuance” phenomenon—a decision to reject an innovation after 
having previously adopted it.
This could be the result of the dissatisfaction that comes about when an 
innovation is inappropriate for most individuals and does not result in any 
perceived advantages over other alternatives. This state of dissonance that 
Muslims in the UK suffer from seems to be due to their frustration with not 
finding the right means through which to redress their grievances. Here, then 
is our cognitive opening. Here is a situation that we can potentially rescue by 
diffusing a new innovation.
Contours of a De-Radicalization Campaign
Two alternatives suggest themselves for helping to counter radicalization 
among Muslims in the UK. The first is to theologically propagate a softer 
image of religion—something along the lines of “Islamic Enlightened Mod-
eration.”69 The second is to help strengthen the Muslim community by rein-
vigorating family values. Both alternatives could be pursued independently or 
diffused side by side as described in this section.
A Theological Innovation—The Need for an Alternate Community
As we have seen, Islamists have an elaborate system by which they spread their 
message. The Mavens, Connectors, and Salesmen who assist with this are indi-
viduals who are not necessarily Islamists themselves, but almost all have a bias 
toward religion and being religious. They, like any good religious followers, 
adhere to certain beliefs that would be very difficult to alter.
Here I need to be clear. I am not suggesting that beliefs can never change. 
Instead, it appears to me that people’s religious beliefs evolve through a long 
natural process; the radicalization of a small segment of society simply hooks 
onto this. Hence, if we want to bring about some change in religious thinking 
among the UK’s Muslims, this too can only be done over a prolonged period 
and through inculcation of an altogether different mindset. To accomplish 
this will require an alternate community to support the proliferation of new 
theological ideas, and the creation or identification of such an alternate com-
munity would present major challenges.
For instance, enlightened moderation is the quality or state of becoming rational 
or having reasoning power, or being able to think clearly and make decisions 
based on reason rather than emotions. The concept of enlightened modera-
tion was proposed by the former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf. His 
premise is that enlightened moderation should apply to all spheres of life, but 
most importantly to the practice of Islam. The aim is that a moderate version 
of Islam should be practiced, as opposed to a fundamentalist version.
Presently, however, there are very few Mavens in the UK who could act as bea-
cons of Islamic enlightened moderation, and even if there were such experts 
somewhere and we parachuted them into the UK from abroad, imported 
Mavens would require time to establish themselves. As for Connectors, we 
are somewhat better off. But still, social networks among UK Muslims are 
dominated by those willing to promote the Islamist message. It would be 
futile to try to transmit an opposing theological message through these same 
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Connectors. Lastly, the most vocal and active Salesmen are already committed 
to the Islamists’ message. If they wanted to “sell” moderation, presumably 
they already would already be doing that. Besides, there is skepticism among 
Muslims regarding any new interpretation of Islamic teachings; it would be 
very difficult for the persuaders to introduce new theological reasoning.
Potential Pitfalls
Although poll results indicate that most Muslims in the UK espouse moderate 
religious views, any new religious interpretation would be looked at as an 
innovation in the field of theology and could prove counterproductive by ap-
pearing to promote fitna or bid’ah (heresy or innovation). Any new interpreta-
tion of religious thought, especially one supported by the UK government, 
cannot be expected to draw much of an audience. 
For an idea to spread we need a conducive environment; the Power of Context 
is important. In an environment where most UK Muslims still feel the West is 
hostile toward Islam, it would be a mistake to go forward with any plan that 
counts on a theological innovation—especially one that Islamists can construe 
as Westerners trying to change Islam. Just as no fashion store should expect to 
sell great coats with much success in the middle of summer, one must not try 
to sell a new idea about a theological reinterpretation in the wrong climate. In 
fact, doing so might give renewed energy and impetus to the Islamists’ fading 
narrative, especially in the absence of a robust alternate community to support 
or promote the new religious thinking. Hence, to counter radicalization our 
idea should not be one that the radicals can counter on theological grounds. 
Instead, it should be one that they cannot theologically dispute at all.
As part of the overall context, it is also important to understand how the 
British general public would view the promotion of enlightened moderation. 
Some segments of British society might not be comfortable with or supportive 
of the idea of sponsoring or spreading religious ideas. Britons might find these 
threatening. Islam, after all, remains a religion practiced by a thin minority of 
the population. Lending undue importance to Islam might create problems 
within British society, which strives to appear ecumenical and multi-cultural. 
Similarly, giving too much prominence to Islam might not be politically 
feasible for authorities, since there is already an argument made by many non-
Muslims that any concession in terms of religion might embolden Islamists 
and threaten the security of the UK government and the English people.
In other words, there is reason to believe that this counter-radicalization alterna-
tive might not only be hard to implement, but could well backfire. It is likely 
to be less successful than assisting with the reinvigoration of extended families.
Strengthening the Family
Family values are important to Muslims, especially to those from South 
Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, the push to strengthen the family as a 
basic building block of a non-violent community would not be considered 
incompatible with Muslim traditions. Families normally believe that when 
parents directly monitor and/or supervise their children’s interaction with 
peers, they facilitate and regulate the development of children’s social skills. 
Parents consciously and subconsciously influence whom their youngsters 
spent time with in an effort to shape their values and attitudes. Family elders 
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are certainly already apprehensive about the prospects of their children losing 
their forefathers’ traditions. For them, a call to rebuild Muslim society around 
families would be a welcome step. Also, since they themselves have experience 
living within tightly bonded families, it would be easy for them to adapt and 
organize their lives accordingly.
Tellingly, Islamists offer a sort of substitute family; they too use community to 
control and monitor their activists’ activities. As Ed Husain’s autobiography 
and other literature makes clear, the sense of belonging and warmth activists 
enjoy within their group is stronger than what they feel for their own families. 
This is primarily because parents are either too busy to spare sufficient time for 
young people, or parents are considered by their grown-up children to be too 
traditionalist. When parents are seen to be old-fashioned, they cannot provide 
the necessary guidance regarding day-to-day problems. Feeling neglected when 
it came to handling the challenges of adolescence, Ed Husain, for instance, 
sought guidance from Islamists—and later offered the same to other Muslims.
If the family system were reinvigorated and supported by the mosques, 
parents could win back control of their children from Islamists. A reinvigo-
rated family system would assist parents to monitor standards of acceptable 
conduct, maintain limits, and encourage participation in some activities and 
discourage participation in others. The aim here would be to bring Muslim 
children back into the fold of their parents’ tolerant and non-violent religion.
Reinvigorating and strengthening the extended family system would also 
provide social warmth. Belonging to an extended family would make children 
feel secure, not stifled. By encouraging more family-oriented events, the 
community would ensure that, with lots of cousins, aunts, and uncles nearby, 
youth never feel alone. In large extended families, everyone would be able to 
find a trusted confidante to turn to for advice and to share personal concerns. 
If every member found himself or herself occupying a place of value in a large 
welcoming family mosaic, much-needed harmony, which most young Muslims 
now miss, would be available. Also, and just as important, the more warmth and 
significance families retain, the less the lack of British society’s warmth should 
matter and, as a result, the less alienated Muslim youth should be feeling.
Not only would strengthening this family connectivity reduce Islamists’ ability 
to dominate the British Muslim community, but it would make the family the 
cocoon in which adaptation to living in the West is best handled—families 
make traditions together.
A vigorous family-based social life would also provide parents and other 
family elders an excellent means by which to engage youth and fully exploit 
familiarity and word-of-mouth persuasion techniques for raising respectful 
young people. Father, mother, elder brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins, 
and multiple sets of grandparents would all be there to provide the necessary 
support and guidance to the family’s adolescents. Indeed, the stretch (or 
breadth and depth) of extended families would ensure that the influence of 
adults could remain strong since parents would have other adults to rely on. 
They would be able to gather strength from numbers, which in turn would 
enable them to relax their individual vigilance. This should help ease tensions 
with their children. At the same time, more parental warmth and clearly de-
fined limits would let adolescents know their parents care for and about them.
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Non-Muslim Britons have an equal stake in containing this contagion of 
radicalization among young Muslims. Many Britons consider the decline of 
family values to be a national problem. One can assume that most Britons 
would support British government assistance to help revive strong families in 
Muslim communities. In fact, an argument could be made that the only long-
term approach to defusing racism—and even exclusion—would be for Britons 
to see that Muslim parents want their children to grow up well educated and 
well-mannered, able to participate comfortably in the broader UK society, 
while still retaining a proud but non-defiant sense of identity.
Potential Objections
Strengthening the family system might seem to run counter to fully merging 
Muslims into British society, because their attachment to tradition could ex-
acerbate the sense of exclusion. There is also the chance that, by strengthening 
traditional family bonds, Muslims in the UK might end up importing foreign 
influences from South Asia and the Middle East, where the mood is gener-
ally anti-Western and the environment is unstable. In Londonistan, Melanie 
Phillips describes how fears of these kinds of connections inflamed sentiments 
in the UK.70
For their part, those Muslims who belong to the second and third generations 
living in the UK might find family bonds too restrictive. The generation gap 
between these youth and their parents might also hinder any move toward 
making the family a building block of Muslim society. Most second and third 
generation Muslim children regard their forefathers’ home country traditions 
as being too orthodox and constraining. Consequently, a call to strengthen 
family traditions could aggravate the clash of values that already exists be-
tween parents and their British-born children. Another problem is that most 
Muslim families belong to the lower or lower-middle class. In such cases both 
parents work, often at odd hours. Parents in such families are so preoccupied 
with trying to make ends meet that it could prove too costly a luxury for them 
to spare sometime for themselves and family.
Constructing Suitable Narratives
What might help convince people that concentrating on rebuilding family 
could be a worthwhile investment? To propagate an innovation requires a suit-
able narrative. The most complex aspect of any de-radicalization campaign is 
to write or contextualize the narrative to support the innovation. This involves 
constructing meta-narratives, which act as overarching big themes that set the 
parameters for “stories” to be told at the individual, local, and community levels.
An example of a meta-narrative for strengthening family would touch on 
topics like forced marriages, drugs and criminality, employment issues, 
racism, political representation, faith, freedom, and the notion of home and 
belonging, all of which are among the problem areas that pop up frequently 
whenever one discusses the predicament of young British-born Muslims. To 
overcome these problems Muslims need to not only maintain their distinct 
identity, but to project themselves as useful members of the broader society. 
However, in order to ensure that members of the younger generation follow 
a more progressive path, become better human beings in terms of this world 
and the world to come, and do not get absorbed or seduced by the wrong 
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kinds of Western values, they must be plugged back into old, neglected 
traditional family values. 
Part of the pitch would be that British Muslims need a system that insulates 
their children from the wrong influences of society and provides them with 
the warmth they long for in an environment in which they often feel alien-
ated. Family offers this strength. Just as the strength of a building depends on 
its foundation—if the foundation is weak the building is going to crumble—
likewise, the Muslim community’s foundation rests on the family system, a 
vibrant home life, how parents bring up their children, and how connected 
parents and children stay throughout their lives.
The application of a meta-narrative demands the construction of many small 
narratives, which is a long-term process. At this point it might not be possible 
to correctly project how the “reinvigoration of family” innovation might be 
received. Some major sub-narratives can be identified, however, and these 
could be emphasized as areas to work on. These might include, for instance, 
the quality of family support structures; cohesion—the commitment of family 
members to one another; expressiveness—the degree to which family mem-
bers act openly and express feelings; conflict mitigation—addressing dispari-
ties among and between members of the family; the transmission of ethical 
standards from parents to children; daughters’ close positive relationship with 
their mothers; other relatives’ influence during adolescence; and so on.
Spreading the Idea of Strengthening the Family System
As for the social infrastructure that could be used to propagate the revival 
of families, one question that looms is: Would we need to identify new 
“influentials” in the community or are they already present? Thanks to the 
non-theological character of this innovation—in contrast to enlightened 
moderation—it would not be necessary to build an alternative community 
through which to spread the idea. In a system with traditional norms, the 
opinion leaders who favor old traditions are always present. This increases the 
probability of finding enough “influentials” who would carry the new “family” 
message. These persons could effectively spread our message through their 
social networks.
Mavens are the information specialists who are readily available to assist 
people with information sharing, and whereas the numbers of qualified people 
are limited when it comes to religion, those knowledgeable about social 
themes like “family” should know no such limits. The Mavens we would 
need can be identified in two different age groups: older people who enjoy 
respect and credibility for their insight and wisdom, and younger British-born 
Muslims who are viewed as successful. The message can also be propagated 
through religious channels since Islam itself places great importance on family 
values. Other Mavens from many other walks of life could include journalists, 
social workers, school teachers, or anyone with communications skills.
As people with a special gift for bringing the world together, Connectors are 
not particular or choosy about information, and enjoy passing on to others 
anything they find interesting.71 They are people who naturally occupy the 
hubs in multiple societal networks. In the case of “family” as an innovation, 
we would not require any separate set of Connectors. 
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Salesmen’s role will be the most critical to this process. Salesmen help reduce 
uncertainty about an innovation. These individuals must be clear in their 
own minds about what goals lie behind adoption of the innovation. Unlike 
Connectors who mostly help with propagating information, Salesmen are 
practitioners of innovation. Much of their credibility rests in their actions. 
Thus, to persuade people to adopt family values, Salesmen must show people 
the practicability and usefulness of adopting this innovation. They must walk 
the walk and not just talk the talk. 
Clearly, to transmit ideas to help this innovation take off, or tip, Mavens, 
Connectors, and Salesmen will have to use language that resonates with the 
experiences of Muslims in the UK. Because the message has to be engineered 
to appeal to both elders and members of the younger generation simultane-
ously, Salesmen will have a tough task. Old values will be acceptable to the 
elders, but to attract the attention of younger people old ideas may require 
some creative re-tailoring.
Another aspect that deserves consideration when creating stickiness in mes-
sages is sustainability. In order to reach a point that the new idea becomes 
institutionalized, an innovation should be open to modification to fit a 
wide range of conditions. Therefore, the tone of the message will have to be 
adjusted as behavior gradually changes. People are usually attracted to an 
innovation when they feel the need for a new alternative. This means creating 
awareness among people that it is in their interest to seek a stronger family 
system, given the dissatisfying environment in which they find themselves.
The psychological scars of racialism and disenfranchisement may take a long 
time to fade away in the Muslim community. But interestingly, this should 
help the acceptance of our innovation by providing the proper context. 
Under threatened and strained conditions, it is going to be easier to propagate 
counter-radicalization messages by stressing the need to pull together and 
look within, which is what a return to family offers. Nevertheless, overnight 
changes should not be expected. Ideally, family control over younger genera-
tions can, in the short term, slow down the process of radicalization. By 
reshaping the environment in this way, the plan would be to continue to steer 
Muslim society away from the Islamists’ path.
Conclusion
Perhaps there is something beyond family that would draw its strength from 
ideas that are non-theological in character, yet could undercut Islamists’ 
activism. But I cannot think of what that might be. On the one hand, the 
family environment significantly determines children’s social development. 
On the other hand, we live during a period of time when events in the wider 
world are bound to continue to provoke a sense of moral outrage at apparent 
injustices against Muslims, and when there is unprecedented media influence 
on adolescent identity. Accepting these two givens, the significance of family 
as an indirect tool for reversing the process of radicalization among Muslim 
diasporas in the UK seems unmatched.
Certainly, the terrorist threat to the UK is not new; between 1969 and 1998 
over 3,500 people died in the UK alone as a result of Irish-related ter-
rorism.72 Recent Islamist terrorism, however, is quite different. It is linked 
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to international terrorism and different militant groups that are spread 
throughout the Muslim world. At the same time, there is a domestic and 
homegrown aspect to this terrorism as well.
In 2009, the UK government revised and issued a detailed counterterrorism 
strategy called “CONTEST,” organized around four themes: pursue, prevent, 
protect, and prepare. My approach is fundamentally different. Instead of 
preventing terrorism from happening, I have proposed reversing the radical-
ization process itself. 
What Islamists have achieved is an innovation. That is why the best course of 
action for de-radicalizing British Muslims is to go well beyond using preven-
tion strategies; these are important, but far from sufficient. To trigger de-radi-
calization, we must encourage Muslims to seek a better alternative. Any effort 
to counter-innovate via religious thought, however, is likely to seen as abid’ah 
and will fail. Rather than contesting the Islamists on theological grounds, it 
makes more sense to reinvigorate “family” as a counter-radicalization tool. By 
pursuing this strategy, the UK government would avoid direct confrontation 
with Islamists on religious grounds. At the same time, it would be introducing 
a small change (a nudge, basically) that no theologian could argue against. In 
one package, making something of extended families could mitigate social 
strains, hamper Islamists’ mobilization mechanisms, and trump their methods 
of message propagation techniques based on both familiarity and word-of-
mouth persuasion. In other words, reinvigorating family would steal the 
stickiest of Islamists’ methods right out from under them and might even help 
strengthen the idea that family values are critical overall to a healthier British 
society. 
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The motto of the United States Army Medical Department, “To 
Conserve the Fighting Strength,” often conjures visions of field medics provid-
ing care to the injured on the battlefield or surgeons with blood-soaked gowns 
using skill and ingenuity to save patients from the grip of death. For some, 
the motto summons images of soldiers lined up for vaccinations or digging 
field latrines, thus preventing the diseases that are endemic to areas of conflict. 
There is little doubt that a robust medical support system directly affects secu-
rity force readiness, by preventing disease and injuries from sapping a force’s 
strength, and by restoring the injured to health. History is full of examples 
where illness and non-battle injuries caused by poor hygiene or environmental 
hazards decimated a military’s available combat power. 
But the motto also alludes to another aspect of safeguarding the fighting force: 
the psychological benefit for soldiers of knowing that competent care stands 
ready to serve them if they are injured. When security forces are risking injury 
or death in the performance of their duties, a competent medical system pre-
pared to care for the injured strengthens their resolve, supports unit morale, 
and increases the effectiveness of operations by mitigating the risk of injury. 
As states or international partners work to improve security institutions, they 
therefore must develop and resource the medical systems that support security 
forces as part of any security strengthening effort. 
Direct Benefits of a Strong Military Medical System
Legitimate governments must maintain a monopoly on the coercive use of 
force within their borders and abroad.1 How that force is used and who it 
serves speaks directly to the state’s viability and its acceptance by the popula-
tion and the international community. Without security, both internal and 
external, progress, growth, and development fail. The proper use of force, 
usually within the context of a legal system that prevents abuses of power, thus 
supports the legitimacy of a nation-state. At the most basic level, the members 
of the security forces must be willing to put their lives at risk to serve the 
state’s interests. 
A security officer’s willingness to provide effective security, however, varies 
according to the perceived risks, and the disconcerting risk of injury weighs 
heavily on the minds of those placed in harm’s way. While many factors 
influence the effectiveness of security forces (e.g., professionalism, leadership, 
legitimacy of cause, unit cohesion, doctrine, training, organization, and cama-
raderie), security force members also weigh the risk of injury as they work to 
improve or maintain security.2 If they deem the risk of injury to be too high, 
members of the security forces could, while appearing to be conscientious, 
reduce their risks by conducting operations in a way that ultimately has no 
substantial impact on security. One can easily predict the results: ineffective 
operations lead to a lack of real security, and a lack of security stalls stability 
and development.
The Role of Medical Development in Support of Security
LTC Ramey L. Wilson, USA, MD
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My research into this quandary explored the influence of medical support on 
security operations, and the role of developing medical systems and institu-
tions that support security forces as part of a state’s security-strengthening ef-
forts. A comparison of the productivity of security forces in over 150 countries, 
based on the availability of ambulance services in varying levels of violence, 
showed that security forces with access to pre-hospital medical care were more 
effective at doing their jobs. The application of game theory and utility theory 
to the data revealed that the availability of casualty and evacuation services 
had a direct influence on the willingness of security personnel to conduct 
effective operations. Together, these findings clearly suggest the influence of 
medical support on the behavior and effectiveness of security forces. Without 
a medical support system to provide care to personnel injured in the perfor-
mance of security operations, those operations were less effective.3 
The benefits of a strong medical system to support security operations may 
not initially be obvious. In stable areas with good security, the importance of 
a robust medical support system may not reveal itself until the risk of injury 
to security forces increases significantly, such as during an uprising or riot. 
While the risk of injury remains small, security forces place a low value on the 
presence or absence of medical support, and its lack has no appreciable impact 
on effectiveness. Once the risk of injury increases, however, the presence of 
effective medical support directly influences both the behavior of security 
forces and security. 
At its root, security force medical support is a form of insurance. If the state 
doesn’t perceive a need for it, the state is unlikely to invest the necessary 
resources to provide it. A robust medical support system, which is both 
technically demanding and potentially expensive, takes time and resources 
to develop. In the absence of a demand signal urging the development of 
medical support for security forces, it is understandable why many developing 
states fail to invest in this aspect of security development. As levels of violence 
increase and the need for medical support becomes clear, an unprepared 
medical system will not be able to adapt or develop fast enough to prevent 
the unnecessary loss of life or a decline in security effectiveness. The risk to 
the state, therefore, arises from its failure to both appreciate the importance 
of the medical system and invest the required resources to develop a medical 
capability before it is needed. 
As states proactively evaluate the current and future requirements of their se-
curity force medical systems, they must pragmatically consider the capabilities 
that will be needed during periods of increased violence, and balance potential 
future needs with current resources. Even in areas of instability and violence, 
the demand signal for medical support may be artificially low because security 
forces, in an effort to mitigate their risk in the absence of reliable medical 
support, have already adjusted their behavior or operations. The true need 
for medical support may not be known until the security forces aggressively 
conduct operations; they will, however, be less willing to do this without good 
medical support. States, therefore, must provide medical support based on the 
likely requirements if security operations were conducted effectively. This may 
involve temporarily increasing that support in specific areas until real security 
is established.
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Afghanistan provides an illuminating example of how the presence or absence 
of adequate medical support directly impacts security development. As U.S. 
military forces have provided the bulk of medical support to Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) for the past 10 years, U.S. forces have strengthened 
and girded the resolve of the Afghan forces. By providing medical support 
to the ANSF, the coalition secured the risk-mitigating benefits that medical 
support has on security operations. Providing this service external to the 
existing Afghan military health system, however, removed the demand signal 
for the aggressive development of indigenous medical support that could be 
sustained by the Afghan security forces once coalition forces depart. Instead, 
coalition forces spent more time assisting the public health departments to 
meet the medical needs of civilians as part of counterinsurgency strategies, and 
the ANSF medical system experienced only intermittent and uncoordinated 
development. With external medical support now decreasing as coalition 
forces draw down, the nascent ANSF medical support system cannot meet 
the casualty evacuation requirements generated by independent security 
operations. The lack of an adequate indigenous security force medical system 
threatens the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and their ability to operate 
independently.4
Indirect Benefits of a Strong Military Medical System
The benefits of a strong medical system to support security operations extend 
beyond the strengthening effects of tactical field care and evacuation. Such a 
system also provides indirect benefits to the security institutions, the public 
health sector, the state, and the region.
A strong, dedicated medical system incentivizes service in the security forces 
and supports recruitment and retention. In countries with a substandard or 
developing civilian medical capability but a good military system, volun-
teering for service provides individuals with access to competent and capable 
medical care for themselves and possibly for members of their family, and 
maximizes the value of training already invested in current personnel by 
keeping them healthy.5
By caring for the individuals in the organization, which is a fundamental 
component of leadership and professionalism, a competent medical system 
strengthens the professional milieu of the security organization, improves mo-
rale, and communicates to the individual and his or her family members that 
they are valued by the organization.6 For institutions that strive to inculcate 
their members with a service mentality and professional behavior, providing 
medical care models the values that the institution expects its members to 
embrace. If care is extended to family members, the medical system allows 
security personnel to focus on their duties rather than be distracted by family 
medical concerns.7
For the public health sector, the benefits of a competent security force medical 
system extend beyond the security sector. Security forces routinely operate in 
areas with stunted development and inadequate public services (e.g., poor or 
scarce public and private hospitals for the civilian populace). A strong security 
force medical system not only supports security operations under these condi-
tions, but also can be used to assist in providing care to the civilian populace, 
and to build local capacity to support the public health sector. With expanded 
The true need for medical 
support may not be known 
until the security forces 
aggressively conduct operations.
For institutions that strive to 
inculcate their members with 
a service mentality, providing 
medical care models the values 
that the institution expects 
its members to embrace.
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Regional medical interoperability 
has the potential to leverage 
the medical strengths 
of multiple states.
If done correctly and 
professionally, medical “civic 
action” missions connect the 
security forces to the population.
resources and the ability to operate in austere conditions, a robust security 
force medical system can provide medical care in areas where other govern-
ment entities cannot, thereby ensuring essential care until the civilian sector 
develops. The security forces, in turn, benefit by demonstrating their service 
to the population. If done correctly and professionally, medical “civic ac-
tion” missions connect the security forces to the population and demonstrate 
that the security forces are there to serve the people, and not the other way 
around.8 Security force capabilities in the areas of advanced communications, 
coordination, logistics, and transportation can also augment the delivery of 
civilian health care through partnerships with the public health sector. The 
current civilian aeromedical evacuation capability in the United States, for 
example, began as a joint partnership between U.S. government agencies and 
the military to improve traffic safety. The solution to a public health problem 
was facilitated by a robust and capable military medical system.9
For the state, a robust security force medical system can provide medical care 
to the civilian population when it is not available through the public sector, 
respond to disasters or emergencies when the civilian medical system is over-
whelmed, and partner with other government agencies to develop solutions 
to complex problems. Investment in the security force medical system also 
signals the degree to which the state values its citizens, especially those who 
serve on behalf of their state, and makes the state’s commitment clear to the 
population at large and to the international community. A capable medical 
system communicates the intent of the state to meet its ethical obligation 
to its security personnel and reveals the value that it places on service to the 
state.10
Just as a strong and capable national security force strengthens a state, a 
robust state has the potential to stabilize a region. When states partner with 
and strengthen their immediate neighbors, the region benefits from increased 
security through collaboration, dialogue, and reinforced support. Security 
cooperation facilitates regional security and enhances the ability of partners to 
respond in coordination. Regional medical interoperability has the potential 
to leverage the medical strengths of multiple states to create systems that en-
able them to solve challenging health problems and to contribute to regional 
security. During a regional disaster, medical crisis, or disease outbreak, state 
responses inevitably include security forces. When states have established and 
maintained prior working relationships with regional partners, they will form 
an accurate assessment of their partners’ capabilities and ability to handle 
crises. Established medical partnerships will expedite appropriate support 
integration during the response to a crisis.
Conclusion
Robust and capable medical support for security forces strengthens security 
operations by mitigating the inherent risk of injury to security personnel. 
While directly benefiting security operations, an effective and reliable military 
medical system has the potential to benefit the state beyond direct security 
support. As states evaluate their security forces and work to improve their 
effectiveness, they should include a pragmatic assessment of their medical 
support system in the analysis. If medical capacity is found to be lacking, 
the state must make the resources available to strengthen and develop the 
medical support system in coordination with other aspects of security force 
As states evaluate their 
security forces and work to 
improve their effectiveness, 
they should include a pragmatic 
assessment of their medical 
support system in the analysis.
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development (i.e., leadership, professionalism, logistics, the rule of law, 
tactical training, and proper utilization). Because of the technical nature of 
medical support and the time needed to build medical capability, efforts 
to strengthen medical support organizations must be initiated early in the 
effort to improve military effectiveness. Waiting to develop medical support 
capabilities until the security force is ready to conduct security operations will 
likely result in inadequate medical support and will directly impact security 
force effectiveness. 
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The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must 
suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.
 —Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), General, U.S. Army
Since the mid-1960s, the Republic of Colombia has suffered from 
an internal armed conflict against Marxist-Leninist narco-guerrillas, violent 
drug cartels, illegal armed groups, and criminal bands, most of whom support 
themselves through the production and trafficking of narcotics.1 This situa-
tion profoundly affected the stability of the country; more specifically, foreign 
investment dropped, international confidence in the country reached unfavor-
able levels, and several social and economic problems reached the boiling 
point. Nevertheless, despite the colossal tasks of the war against terrorism, 
drug trafficking, and a static economy, during the past decade the Colombian 
government has made steady progress through an ambitious and innovative 
approach that Time Magazine called “The Colombian Comeback: From nearly 
failed state to emerging global player—in less than a decade.”2
An important part of this strategy relies on the Armed Forces of Colombia. 
Despite the risks they faced, Colombia’s armed forces have established a more 
stable security environment so that citizens can live in peace and the govern-
ment’s programs can achieve their desired goals. Regrettably, the conflicts have 
exacted a terrible toll on armed forces personnel and civilians, many of whom 
have been wounded or killed by the terrorists. The Colombian National Army 
Aviation, eager to save the lives of all victims, including those of wounded 
terrorists, and to enhance national disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, 
created the Combat Search and Rescue Unit (CSRU) in 1997 as a decisive re-
sponse to the needs of the country within the field of human life and human 
rights protection.
This article describes the Colombian National Army Aviation’s system—called 
the Casualty Evacuation and Rescue Organization (CERO)—which was 
designed to save the lives of Colombian military personnel, civilians, and 
adversaries wounded in conflict zones. It explains the importance of the 
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Unfortunately, enhanced military 
operations have also impelled 
the weakened terrorist groups 
to use prohibited weapons, 
such as land mines and IEDs.
The enhanced capabilities of the 
services, specifically within the 
areas of aviation, intelligence, 
and SOF, boosted the number of 
successful military operations.
CSRU and the rationale behind its mission, and explores the common misun-
derstanding that confuses search and rescue with the function of personnel 
recovery. Finally, this article discusses the required doctrinal concepts that 
should be enforced to achieve both true interoperability among the military 
services and the maximum protection of human lives.
Background
During the past decade, the Colombian government and Ministry of Na-
tional Defense designed three strategic policies designed to bring an end to 
Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict, as well as guarantee economic and social 
development programs throughout the country. The Democratic Security 
Policy (2002–2005), the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Secu-
rity (2006–2009), and the Comprehensive Security and Defense Policy for 
Prosperity (2010–2014), backed by the United States–Colombia joint initiative 
“Plan Colombia,” maximized the Colombian armed forces’ capabilities and 
reduced terrorism, kidnaping, and drug-trafficking levels.
Along with the enhancement of interoperability among the armed services3 
and the acquisition of new equipment, these policies progressively increased 
the numbers of Colombian armed forces personnel; enhanced professionalism 
among the officers, NCOs, and soldiers; and improved the forces’ ability 
to fight terrorism and drug cartels across the country (see figure 1).4 These 
changes were accomplished in compliance with human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law. The enhanced capabilities of the services, specifically 
within the areas of aviation, intelligence, and SOF, boosted the number of 
successful military operations and subsequently citizens’ levels of security and 
confidence. This increased security served to bolster new economic and social 
programs and foreign financial investment. 
Better planned and professionally executed military operations have positively 
affected the morale of troops as the number of armed forces personnel killed 
in action has decreased significantly (see figure 2).6 Unfortunately, enhanced 
military operations have also impelled the weakened terrorist groups to use 
prohibited weapons, such as land mines and IEDs, in a desperate effort to 
hinder the operational effectiveness of the military. As a result, the numbers 
of those wounded in action during the same period notably increased (see 
figure 3).7 Recent studies have shown that Colombia, with an unfortunate 
average of 811 land-mine and IED victims per year (almost 39 percent of whom 




































































































Figure 1: Increase in Colombian Armed Forces Personnel per Year5
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Besides the casualties inflicted by IEDs and gunshots, a wide variety of tropical 
diseases such as leishmaniasis, malaria, dengue, and several other common 
pathologies demands a permanent tactical health care system with a high 
level of readiness to ensure the survivability of the more than 400,000 armed 
forces personnel permanently deployed across the country’s 1.1 million square 
kilometers. All of these challenges, combined with the extremely difficult geo-
graphical and meteorological conditions of the country, from dense tropical 
jungle to mountain ranges reaching 6,000 meters high, create a complex 
environment for the armed forces’ operations tempo.9 This situation forced 
the services to permanently revise their own policies, systems, and procedures 
in order to ensure that they could execute an appropriate medical evacuation 
of casualties within the “golden hour” of maximum survival.10 
The 2008 Colombian Ministry of National Defense’s Directive No. 001, 
Definition of Public Forces’ Tasks, and the 2009 Colombian Military Forces 
General Headquarters’ Directive No. 003, Military Forces’ Roles and Tasks, as-
signed responsibility to the Army, Navy (and Marines), and Police for casualty 
evacuation (CASEVAC) and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions at the 
tactical level; similarly, the Air Force was made responsible for such missions 
at the operational and strategic levels.11 Each service functions within a joint 
operations structure, but independently undertakes and supports its own 
operations guided by its own doctrine, regulations, and policies. This structure 
has permitted the creation and implementation of tailored tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) suited to the requirements of the respective service.
The Army is the tip of the spear of the Colombian military forces’ ground-
based strategy, as well as the service with the largest number of troops and 
rates of wounded and killed in action. The Army therefore required a precise 
system that would guarantee its troops’ lives, as well as those of the civilian 
































































































Figure 3: Colombian Armed Forces Personnel Wounded in Action per Year
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The Army’s ethos implies a 
moral commitment to armed 
forces personnel and their 
families that ensures maximum 
effort to protect lives.
it was necessary to take into account a broad spectrum of factors, including 
the reality and projection of the conflict, the lessons learned, and the means 
available. After a comprehensive analysis by the CSRU of the Colombian 
National Army Aviation, an effective solution was designed to provide the best 
support to the troops: the CERO (“zero” in English) system.
The National Army of Colombia’s Personnel Evacuation 
System
The National Army of Colombia is the largest service of the Colombian 
Armed Forces and is responsible, along with the Marines, for ground military 
operations against domestic or foreign threats. It is organized around eight 
territorial divisions and one special division: the Air Assault Aviation Divi-
sion (DAVAA). DAVAA is a one-of-a-kind military unit of combined arms that 
encompasses the Army’s Special Forces Brigade, the Special Counternarcotics 
Brigade, and the National Army Aviation, which operates the largest fleet of 
helicopters in the Colombian Armed Forces.
DAVAA is responsible not only for planning, executing, and coordinating spe-
cial operations and counternarcotics raids but also for providing aviation sup-
port to the eight divisions, through Mobility and Maneuver Army Aviation 
Battalions attached to each division, and tactical evacuation (TACEVAC) for its 
own troops, wounded adversaries, and civilians. TACEVAC is a comprehensive 
task designed by the National Army Aviation, and defined as a tactical mission 
performed by DAVAA’s CSRU, usually within a threat environment, using non-
dedicated, armed, and unmarked (no emblems of the International Red Cross 
are displayed) aerial, land, or maritime platforms to locate, evacuate, and 
provide pre-hospital care to wounded or injured individuals from the point of 
injury to the nearest medical facility.
TACEVAC is one of the most sensitive aviation missions performed by DAVAA; 
the Army’s ethos implies a moral commitment to armed forces personnel 
and their families that ensures maximum effort to protect lives. Still, the 
wide range of high-risk tasks assigned to the National 
Army of Colombia—such as the fights against ter-
rorism and drug cartels, the liberation of kidnapped 
personnel, the protection of national infrastructure, 
and the humanitarian land mine and IED clearance 
programs—assures a high rate of wounded and killed 
in action to be supported by DAVAA’s CSRU.
The Combat Search and Rescue Unit
The CSRU is the Special Operations Aviation unit 
responsible for the planning, 
coordination, and execution 
of TACEVAC aviation missions. 
Created in 1997, it has performed 
more than 12,000 missions 
and has saved more than 9,000 
lives, setting an unprecedented 
level of response to the needs 
44
CTX | Vol. 3, No. 4
CSRU’s primary responsibility is 
to provide CSAR and TACEVAC 
coverage for Army operations; 
its secondary responsibility is 
to provide humanitarian relief.
of the Colombian armed forces within the field of human rights protection. 
For the National Army of Colombia, combat search and rescue (CSAR) is 
an indispensable element of military operations implied within the Army’s 
responsibilities. CSAR is a military occupational specialty within the Colom-
bian National Army Aviation’s operations specialty, and CSAR operators are 
Special Operations Forces who form part of an Army aircrew. CSRU has five 
operational companies: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo. Each opera-
tional company consists of search and rescue operational teams (SROTs) that 
specialize in different search and rescue missions: SROT-A specializes in jungle 
operations; SROT-B in mountainous terrain; SROT-C in water rescue; SROT-D 
in urban terrain; and SROT-E specializes in extrication equipment. 
All CSRU troops are fully combat-experienced personnel drafted from the 
Army’s SOF units; once chosen, they are required to pass CSRU’s selection 
process and complete a three-month Military Rescuer course. This selection 
and training process guarantees that CSRU will accomplish its missions, for 
four reasons. First, CSRU personnel are completely capable of executing mis-
sions under fire and behind adversary lines due to their previous training and 
combat experience in SOF units—it has been shown repeatedly that combat 
training is not a replacement for combat experience. Casualties usually occur 
within a combat situation in high-risk surroundings; SROTs are fully competent 
to rescue wounded personnel under fire, fighting their way in or out as neces-
sary to evacuate the injured. When performing civil or military search and 
rescue, contingencies such as bad weather, mechanical failure, or tactical con-
siderations may impede the evacuation of the wounded from the field; in this 
case, SROTs can easily be attached to ground units, taking care of the casualties 
without being an obstacle or a risk for the combat personnel in the field.
Second, CSRU personnel entirely understand the relevant doctrine, the 
missions, the tactical situation, and the requirements of the troops because 
they previously were in the field as members of the units they now support. 
There is often an additional moral commitment involved, because the SROT’s 
members are generally rescuing and supporting friends and former comrades. 
CSRU’s primary responsibility is to provide CSAR and TACEVAC coverage for 
Army operations; its secondary responsibility is to provide humanitarian relief 
and assistance along with the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, 
military and civil search and rescue in coordination with the Colombian 




CSRU’s statistical analysis 
demonstrated that patient 
mortality usually decreases 
when TACEVACs are performed 
with SROTs that can provide 
specialized medical assistance.
Third, CSRU personnel, as part of the National Army Aviation, are completely 
familiar with the available aerial platforms and relevant regulations, thus 
creating a supportive environment for every mission. All SROTs’ equipment 
and TTPs fully comply with National Army Aviation flight regulations. In 
addition to receiving medical training in basic life support and other necessary 
medical evacuation protocols, SROT members will act as hoist operators and 
load masters where needed. Fourth, CSRU personnel take responsibility for the 
entire chain of evacuation procedures: they rescue the casualties from the field, 
receive and process the diagnostics and treatment plans given to them by the 
ground unit’s medics, provide tactical combat casualty care during transport 
to the medical facility, provide full information on each case to the receiving 
medical personnel, track the patient’s recovery, and integrally assess the whole 
process for lessons to be learned. In sum, CSRU ensures the survivability of the 
troops through a trusted chain of tactical health responders.
The CERO System
The CERO system is a comprehensive strategy designed by CSRU personnel, 
which aims to reduce to zero the mortality rate of wounded or injured 
individuals, including troops, civilians, and adversary personnel. It strives to 
fully report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate individuals through the 
maximization of DAVAA’s capabilities, and thus provide the National Army of 
Colombia with the most effective solution for TACEVAC missions. The CERO 
system is the result of a DOTMLPF12 assessment that included quantitative 
methods, comparative analysis, and common sense about the actual and 
projected scenario of a conflict; the doctrine, resources, and personnel avail-
able to fight; the lessons learned; and the approaches used by other countries’ 
armed forces.
A complete statistical analysis, using a primary dataset collected over the years 
by the CSRU along with official reports produced by the Colombian Ministry 
of National Defense, provided useful insights that supported the theoretical 
framework suggested by the CSRU’s CERO system. The four primary findings 
are as follows. 
First, seriously wounded or injured patients are 
most likely to die during the pre-hospital period 
of care,13 at the point where they were injured, or 
during transport to medical facilities. Despite the 
reduction in numbers of Armed Forces personnel 
killed in action during the past decade, the 
number of urgent and priority TACEVACs re-
quiring medical assistance by SROTs has increased 
(see figure 4). The statistical significance of this 
factor (R² = 0.6658) underscores the importance 
of providing medical assistance before and during 
TACEVAC missions, especially when handling ur-
gent and priority patients. CSRU’s statistical analysis 
demonstrated that patient mortality usually decreases when TACEVACs are 
performed with SROTs that can provide specialized medical assistance, versus 
general transport performed without health care. 
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y = 70.341x – 84.615
R  = 0.719632
Figure 4: TACEVACs Performed per Year by the CSAR Unit (2002–2012)
46
CTX | Vol. 3, No. 4
A 2011 survey by the U.S. Defense Health Board drew similar conclusions 
when analyzing tactical evacuation care improvements within the U.S. 
Department of Defense: “A retrospective cohort study … demonstrated 
that mortality was significantly lower when evacuation was performed by a 
U.S. Army National Guard Air Ambulance unit with formally trained CCFPs 
(critical care flight paramedics) compared to standard military air ambulance 
units, staffed with EMT-Bs (emergency medical technician-basics).”14
Second, the urgent and priority patients’ survivability could be maximized 
by providing them with proper basic life support (BLS) and pre-hospital 
trauma life support (PHTLS) in situ, to stabilize and prepare them for trans-
portation to a medical facility, rather than relying solely on access to scarce 
dedicated medical transportation platforms. Indeed, in Colombia, due to the 
scarcity of dedicated MEDEVAC platforms, the evacuation time has often been 
prolonged far beyond the golden hour. Frequently, the chain of command 
underestimates the importance of BLS and PHTLS, which provide patients with 
essential medical care prior to evacuation; this evacuation-dependent approach 
has been proven wrong by many successful strategies—such as the Ranger 
Casualty Response System—that have strengthened the medical skills of SOF 
troops and thus reduced their levels of mortality.15 Furthermore, a 2001 survey 
published by the U.S. Army Medical Department established that “transport 
from an injury scene to an intermediate level hospital for the purpose of ‘sta-
bilization’ prior to transport to a trauma center produced a delay in definitive 
surgical intervention that was, on average, 6 times (196 minutes) longer that 
the time it would have taken to have directly transported the patient to the 
trauma center (34 minutes).”16 Through SROTs, the CSRU ensures wounded 
personnel and their chain of command a high level of patient survivability 
despite the platform or means of evacuation used.
Patients’ survivability could be 
maximized by providing them 
with proper basic life support 
and pre-hospital trauma life 
support in situ, to stabilize and 
prepare them for transportation.
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Third, assigning dedicated aerial TACEVAC platforms is not a recommended 
solution for the National Army of Colombia because it reduces the availability 
of multipurpose aircraft that are used for a wide range of missions; further-
more, it is not a fiscally responsible solution because the funding required to 
procure the necessary dedicated aircraft is needed in other crucial areas. 
In order to ascertain the quantity of dedicated aircraft needed to meet the 
TACEVAC requirements of the National Army of Colombia, it is feasible to 
use the U.S. Army Table of Organization and Equipment and associated 
policies.17 The rules that allocate U.S. Army air ambulances established that 
each Army division should contain one aviation brigade with 12 aircraft. In 
the case of the National Army of Colombia, this would mean a total of 108 
aircraft (9 × 12), a number far beyond the reach of the service. Alternatively, 
CSRU’s CERO system uses all of the aerial, land, or maritime multipurpose 
non-dedicated armed platforms available to the National Army of Colombia 
and deployed across the country, adapting them for TACEVAC missions with 
modular medical packages and SROTs, thus guaranteeing a rapid response 
to save lives.18 This approach has been successfully proven by the U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Task Force, which in 2003 incorporated the concept of 
multipurpose aircraft fitted with “modular medical packages that would allow 
for the rapid transition of an armored, armed rotary wing aircraft, not dedi-
cated to TACEVAC missions, into a temporary designated CASEVAC transport 
vehicle.”19 
Fourth, an appropriate evacuation decision-making chain of command is 
needed to guarantee the effectiveness of the whole tactical care system. The 
worst possible case is to have multiple commands—sometimes from different 
services—each with different criteria, located in different areas, remotely 
handling a TACEVAC mission; unfortunately such missions have sometimes 
The CERO system uses all of 
the aerial, land, or maritime 
multipurpose non-dedicated 
armed platforms available to the 
National Army of Colombia and 
deployed across the country.
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occurred. The CERO system maintains that the only way to ensure adequate 
medical coverage is through the centralization of the TACEVAC mission 
requirements by the corresponding Mobility and Maneuver Army Aviation 
Battalion assigned to the jurisdiction, which, in conjunction with SROTs, 
plans and executes the mission based on a METT-TC20 matrix and risk as-
sessment. The CERO system’s goal is to coordinate the resources available to 
ensure a 60-minute time frame for TACEVACs, in correspondence with the 
standard mandated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.  
Rescue Missions: Different Approaches, Common 
Conclusions
Even though diverse doctrine and terminology are used by the different 
services of the armed forces, several common conclusions should be drawn to 
ensure true interoperability among them, especially in the area of TACEVAC 
missions, to avoid possible interference with each other’s mission and the loss 
of human lives. First, despite the many names given by the services to rescue 
missions, all the names refer to the same objective: to save lives. Combat 
search and rescue, personnel recovery, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, 
and non-conventional assisted recovery, for example, are all terms used by each 
service to describe how the same mission is executed based on the service’s 
own doctrine. The mission must be understood as the rescue of victims (one’s 
own troops, the civilian population, or adversary personnel), and this fact 
should not be confused by the names used within the services. 
Since the mid-2000s, the term personnel recovery (PR) has been commonly 
used by armed forces globally to describe the sum of military, diplomatic, and 
civil efforts to execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel;21 
personnel recovery, however, includes a wide range of methods that require 
an extremely high degree of combat experience, means, and capabilities. It is 
a common mistake to assume that military units responsible for CASEVAC, 
MEDEVAC, and TACEVAC missions are capable of performing PR missions. 
Consequently, senior military commanders and decision-making officers 
should carefully consider the inconvenience of giving military units without 
full PR capabilities such designations and related responsibilities. In the 
specific case of the National Army of Colombia, DAVAA is fully capable of 
performing all PR methods because it integrates the SOF units and a CSAR unit 
for the full range of rescue missions.    
Second, a key factor that guarantees coherent interoperability among the ser-
vices is a unified activity that allows each service to plan and execute its own 
operations and missions with total independence within its responsibilities. 
Interoperability is not only the joint execution of operations in a common sce-
nario but also the understanding of other services’ missions and requirements, 
as well as tailoring effective and appropriate options collectively to accomplish 
a final objective. Third, forces specifically trained for rescues are responsible 
for accomplishing the mission; therefore, the selection process, training, and 
TTPs should be adjusted to meet the requirements of the services, with the 
emphasis on the survivability of the troops and nothing else.
The CSRU’s CERO system described in this article is a reliable, combat-proven 
system for TACEVAC missions. CERO has continually confirmed its efficiency 
Interoperability is not only the 
joint execution of operations in 
a common scenario but also the 




and value in Colombia’s ongoing internal conflicts. The CSRU, as part of 
the Air Assault Aviation Division, will always strive for the modernization 
of policies, procedures, technology, and coordination with other services or 
government agencies, to provide our troops with the best possible guarantee 
for their lives. 
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It gave a tremendous level of self-confidence, that through 
exploration and learning one could understand seemingly very 
complex things in one’s environment.
 —Steve Jobs
In early March 2013, Dr. Sugata Mitra, one of the pioneers in 
online learning (also known as e-learning), was awarded the TED Prize, which 
comes with a $1 million check and the commitment of millions of TED com-
munity followers to help fulfill a wish of the winner.1 Dr. Mitra’s vision forms 
the first step toward what is being called in the education community “Online 
Learning 2.0.” Dr. Mitra’s ideas are clearly pushing toward the day when 
access to education will become far easier and considerably less expensive than 
it is now, ideas that are very much in line with NATO’s current force education 
efforts as well. Programs like Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initia-
tive (CFI) offer NATO member states innovative solutions in many areas of the 
defense industry, particularly in the areas of training and education.2
An Education Revolution
Whether we realize it or not, education systems as we know them are changing 
at lightning speed. Critics declare that the time-honored liberal arts model of 
a broad classical education may be an expensive anachronism, while others 
observe that the lives of entrepreneurial heroes such as Steve Jobs suggest that 
accomplished and creative high school students may be better off avoiding 
formal post-secondary studies altogether. In a thought-provoking piece for The 
Awl, however, Maria Bustillos argues that the rise of so-called massive open 
online courses (MOOCs) may not bode well for the quality of higher educa-
tion.3 She and others question the wisdom of moving scarce public funding 
away from public education, where it is desperately needed, to for-profit 
MOOCs. Rather than leveling the educational playing field for those who can’t 
afford to attend a four-year college, these critics warn that it will create a two-
tier education system in which the well-off continue to get the full benefit of a 
traditional Socratic education while everyone else makes do with videotapes of 
varying quality, and occasional email chats.4
Proponents of online education have long branded it as a way to bring free 
knowledge to the masses. In a world trying to recover from an economic crisis, 
where every organization is looking for smart solutions, it is not surprising that 
one of the main drivers behind the debate on education is cost related. Early 
adopters of the new educational model imagine that in the near future, all stu-
dents will enroll online and create a personalized plan of study from courses 
that cover a vast array of subjects, delivered by the world’s best lecturers. Mitra’s 
vision sees even beyond this; among several of his bold assertions about online 
education, three in particular deserve further exploration.
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Schools are obsolete and outdated. Mitra understands that great teachers can 
inspire students and help them find their passion, and foster a culture of 
high expectations that pushes students to excel. His declaration that schools 
are obsolete assumes that the more students who can be exposed to these 
outstanding teachers through online lectures, the better. What he fails to take 
into account are the value of the interpersonal relationships that teachers and 
their students develop in the classroom, and the mentoring and collaboration 
that often last well beyond graduation.   
Give students a problem and then let them go figure it out for themselves. This 
idea reflects the age-old dilemma of giving someone a fish versus teaching 
that person how to fish. It also attempts to put to rest the concern that online 
learning is no more than a videotaped lecture. Many people believe that 
online courses are an essentially authoritarian structure, a one-way process in 
which the student is a passive recipient of bestowed learning, but digital com-
munications offer many means for online interaction between teachers and 
students. It is important to make a distinction in this regard between certain 
skill sets that need to be taught and practiced over and over again to inculcate 
them, for which online education is well-suited, and the kind of knowledge 
that requires association and extrapolation.
Knowledge is obsolete. This might be one of the boldest of Mitra’s statements. 
His point is that students can look anything up on the internet, so the value 
of memorizing facts is low. This, combined with the fact that students have 
different abilities and learning styles, makes it easy to understand why Mitra 
champions the kind of personalized study plan that online learning makes possible.
Two MOOC providers, Udacity and Coursera, have gained most of the atten-
tion recently.5 In January 2013, the very large, financially troubled California 
State University system swung open the digital gates by piloting a few online 
courses for credit, at the remarkably low cost of $150 per course. Many might 
be tempted by this news to predict that Udacity has the potential to expand 
radically and replace most of the physical college classroom experience. 
Just three weeks after the California State University’s announcement,6 the 
American Council on Education, a consortium of roughly 1,800 accredited 
universities, announced it was also piloting inexpensive online science courses 
at three more universities, including Duke and the University of Pennsylvania. 
Perhaps most disruptive of all, the University of Wisconsin is offering a fully 
accredited bachelor’s degree without any in-class time required.7 As long as 
students can pass the class exams (and pay the associated fees), they can learn 
from anywhere in the world.
Stanford professors Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng launched Coursera last 
year to give anyone and everyone access to courses from top-tier universi-
ties for free, online. At launch, the start-up offered courses from a mere three 
institutions, but Coursera’s platform now hosts over 200 courses from 33 top 
international and domestic schools, and reaches over 2 million students around 
the globe.8 But Coursera and Udacity are not the only two choices for distance 
learners.9 In fact, the number of options has grown considerably. Last May, for 
example, Harvard and MIT teamed up to launch edX—their own, high-profile 
response to the online wave transforming higher education—and MIT’s Open-
CourseWare project quickly expanded to 1,700 courses over three years.10
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Educators knew the online revolution would eventually envelop the physical 
classroom, but this torrent of near-revolutionary developments in 2013 is 
proving that change is coming quicker than anyone imagined. In the course 
of one month, the largest school system in the U.S. began offering credit for 
online courses, a major university began awarding degrees without any class 
time required, and scores of public universities began moving their courses 
online.11 Clay Christensen, who is considered to be an expert on disruption, 
talks about where the disruption to traditional education fueled by the web 
is going to strike next.12 When it comes to education, Christensen suggested 
that the availability of fairly high-quality online learning would be the 
disruptive force because “it will take root in [the education system’s] simplest 
applications, then just get better and better.”13
NATO SOF Education Initiatives
NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) leads continuous NATO 
military transformation experiments to enhance effectiveness in current 
and future operations through the innovative development and delivery of 
training, education, capabilities, doctrine, and concepts. NATO forces are 
facing many challenges in the field of training and education, as the Alliance 
completes its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 2014 
and prepares to shift over the coming years from a campaign to a contingency 
posture requiring ready, flexible, robust, and interoperable NATO forces. One 
of the key elements of this transformational effort is the CFI. The CFI was 
developed to maintain the allied forces’ cohesion, and ensure that the needed 
military capability will be available to support political decisions. Its main 
priority is to support the readiness and interoperability of NATO forces, in 
close collaboration with Allied Command Operations, by leveraging ACT’s 
reinforced and consolidated responsibilities in education and training, in-
cluding exercises. 
Because the operational tempo for NATO members will most likely slow 
down post-Afghanistan, working together will mean “educate, train, and exer-
cise together” to retain interoperability and readiness. ACT’s new training con-
cept also promotes a more integrated, coherent, and global approach across the 
Alliance. As part of this effort, ACT Joint Force Trainer has been promoting 
the Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) network as the main tool for NATO 
forces’ future education. NATO, like other institutions, appears to be on the 
brink of an educational evolution, and changes are inevitable if the Alliance is 
going to be able to fulfil the requirements of the post-Afghanistan era.
Just like NATO forces in general, over the last decade the SOF of NATO 
member nations have been engaged almost continuously in out-of-area, ex-
peditionary operations in geographic areas of economic and political interest 
to their parent nations, including the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
elsewhere. These SOF units have successfully performed a wide variety of 
missions, unilaterally or in combination with the SOF of other participating 
nations, under circumstances not envisioned when most of these SOF units 
were organized, trained, and equipped as national strategic assets during the 
Cold War.
Addressing this situation in 2006, the North Atlantic Council approved the 
NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) to increase the ability of NATO 
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SOF to train and operate together.14 NSTI could be viewed as an initial experi-
ment for the CFI. 
The Alliance also highlighted the importance of a collaborative network with a 
recent communiqué on “The Connected Forces Initiative—Recommendations 
to Enhance SOF.”15 With this initiative, the NATO Special Operations Head-
quarters (NSHQ) is planning to establish a SOF-specific mid-level professional 
military education course titled “Catalyst for Change—SOF Adaptability to 
21st-century Operations.”16 It is also working to improve SOF-specific medical 
interoperability, capability, and survivability across the Alliance with the NATO 
SOF Medicine Development Initiative, which consists of SOF medical courses 
and workshops, along with the creation of a NATO SOF medical education 
center. The NATO SOF air warfare initiative will help facilitate and hasten 
the development of interoperable SOF-specific aviation through the NSHQ’s 
future Air Warfare Centre. Also in the works is a better defined potential role 
for SOF in support of broader NATO operational capabilities in environments 
degraded by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
The center of gravity of the NSHQ is the human network, comprising SOF 
commanders, staffs, and special operators from member nations, as well as the 
conventional force expertise that provides invaluable knowledge and experi-
ence at the NSHQ, in Afghanistan, and across the force. The relationships 
among members of the NATO Allied and Partner SOF Collaborative Network 
in turn are the center of gravity for the international SOF community, and 
modern education is vital for these personnel to successfully execute joint 
future operations.
U.S. SOF Education Initiatives
General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote 
in a 2012 white paper titled Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 
2020 that U.S. forces need to evolve regarding the field of education.17 As he 
pointed out: “We must review our joint education objectives and institutions 
to ensure that we are developing agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite 
values, strategic vision and critical thinking skills necessary to keep pace with 
the changing strategic environment.”18 The white paper also stresses the 
military’s need for agility and flexibility as the United States faces unclear and 
unknown threats in the future.19 At the heart of Capstone Concept for Joint 
Operations is an idea called globally integrated operations, which will be used 
to build and organize Joint Force 2020. This vision is similar to NATO’s CFI 
concept.
Based upon this guidance, USSOCOM Commander Admiral William 
McRaven has also emphasized SOF education as a major part of the future 
USSOCOM strategy.20 According to McRaven, USSOCOM must become more 
intellectually agile and better prepared to operate in a complex environment. 
His strategic guidance focuses on building an educated force for all ranks of 
the U.S. SOF community; to carry out this guidance, he established the Force 
Management and Development program within USSOCOM. McRaven’s vision 
includes accreditation for the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 
and its new Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, as well 
as SOF education teams for Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) 
education.21
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These steps would enable U.S. SOF to become the best educated force within 
the U.S. Department of Defense. JSOU is currently planning a new facility to 
enable it to fulfill this expanded role as the hub of future U.S. SOF education, 
and is also planning to develop a SOF-focused think tank that will provide 
instruction, research, and publication opportunities in national security, 
military strategy, and regional studies. 
To implement Admiral McRaven’s concept, it also will be necessary to unite 
the current U.S. SOF-related educational institutions toward this common 
goal.22 Apart from the more prominent service educational institutions, there 
are a number of training establishments out there with an abundance of 
knowledge on Special Forces.23 This U.S. SOF education concept provides op-
portunities for USSOCOM personnel attending intermediate- and senior-level 
military colleges to advance their knowledge, skills, and value well beyond 
what is currently available. It also offers academic certification programs 
that enhance regional, cultural, and geopolitical understanding, and places a 
special emphasis on foreign language education.24
Connecting the Dots
The first question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF 
education is, why is it necessary to revolutionize SOF education? It is easy to 
see that both the NATO and U.S. visions for SOF are emphasizing the ability 
to better understand the security environment and to deal with surprise and 
uncertainty. Developing the ability to recognize change as it unfolds and 
lead logical, measured transitions and transformation is a main goal of these 
concepts. Adaptation to prepare for future challenges is a major driver of 
study and research in high-profile organizations, and education is an integral 
part of this adaptation process. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. and NATO SOF visions for education are somewhat 
limited because they do not recognize the full potential for global SOF educa-
tion, and they underestimate the advances of the online educational revolu-
tion. More and more SOF deployments are international gatherings of allied 
SOF personnel from around the world (the recent deployment in Afghanistan 
is an excellent example), and a widely supported and internationally agreed 
program for SOF education would support the NATO requirement of interop-
erability. Interoperability for SOF is not only a buzzword, but a bottom-line 
requirement. 
Most of the time, SOF training includes known scenarios, and some of the 
more sensitive aspects of this training will always be a national, rather than 
group, responsibility. Through this training, SOF personnel learn the science 
of war. But in the context of new complex challenges, we also need to educate 
our SOF personnel at all levels in the art of war. This kind of thinking interop-
erability is not just about absorbing more tactics, techniques, and procedures, 
but rather is a common way to think and learn from each other, and educa-
tion is the best tool to achieve this. International allies have a much better 
opportunity to define common ground within the field of SOF education than 
through training alone. International education also has the possibility to 
create a myriad of other opportunities, such as offering a common platform 
for concept development to support a worldwide, networked SOF community. 
For all of these reasons, I advocate the development of global sOF education.
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The second question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF 
education is how to develop this vision of global SOF education. The interna-
tional approach toward such a plan must support international participation 
through SOF schools and the TSOCs. The NSHQ and JSOU have the potential 
to serve as the hubs for this online education activity, and to coordinate online 
education throughout the global SOF enterprise. This approach also makes 
it possible to access the accredited online portion of the education portfolio 
anywhere on the globe. With a well-planned access and crediting system, SOF 
personnel could join any of the international educational institutions and 
collect credit points toward their required educational goals.
It must be said, though, that technological educational revolution is in some 
ways a double-edged sword. It is true that for most SOF personnel, there is 
no time to sit through an 18-month course at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
because current operational tempo requires them to be deployed most of 
the time. The temptation of online education is that its flexibility makes it 
possible for everyone to gain the required knowledge at their own pace and 
time, adjusted to current operational tempo. The implementation plan needs 
to clarify the ways in which the SOF network connects (e.g., VTC, JKO Portal, 
or Blackboard, or for NATO, ADL, and the Battlefield Information Collection 
and Exploitation System [BICES]), and the reasons and benefits for maximizing 
technology as an educational tool. These educational tools must be not only 
interconnected, but also based on a common platform, which can be an 
obstacle in itself. 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that online solutions are not the 
holy grail of SOF education. Online education has its limits and cannot be 
seen as the only solution to the needs of SOF education. SOF personnel are 
quality people, and the quality of education entirely through online tools is still 
questionable. A personal relationship with professors at a physical educational 
institution has real value, and we need to make sure that we have the cor-
rect balance between online instruction and face-to-face education. Existing 
educational institutions can play a major role here, and this brings up our 
third question.
The third question we need to answer when talking about the future of SOF 
education is, who has the ability to contribute toward this vision of global SOF 
education? There is already an abundance of knowledge out there that needs 
to be compiled and distributed, and it would be very beneficial for all allied 
nations to ensure that their service personnel interact with other nations’ rep-
resentatives. For SOF this is not only a possibility but a must. The technology 
to achieve this kind of knowledge fusion is already out there, and it is logical 
that SOF educators should continue their tradition as innovators to become 
leading experts in the field of military education.
The U.S. SOF educational vision is very U.S.-centric; it should be extended 
to better leverage international educational institutions within the Alliance 
(and in some partner countries as well). The George C. Marshall European 
Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; the NATO 
School in Oberammergau, Germany; and the NATO Defense College in Rome 
are excellent educational hubs with strong knowledge bases that should be 
made widely available. Moreover, the NATO Centres of Excellence (such as the 
Centre of Excellence–Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, the Counter IED 
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Centre of Excellence in Madrid, and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence in Tallinn) are among many others that could also contribute 
toward a global vision of SOF education. The NSHQ facilities, for example, are 
custom-built to welcome and educate SOF personnel from all around the world.
What Does the Future Hold?
Ken Robinson, a specialist in education and creativity, gave a TED speech 
called “How to Escape Education’s Death Valley,” in which he made some 
interesting points that are applicable toward SOF education as well.25 One 
of his main points was that many of those who attend school are disengaged 
from it and do not get any real benefit from being there. The reasons, says 
Robinson, are threefold. 
First of all, human beings are naturally diverse and learn in different ways. 
This is true with the SOF community as well. If we are thinking of developing 
a vision for global SOF education, we need to take account of the fact that SOF 
personnel are a special breed of characters, as anyone who has interacted with 
us can tell. Add to this mix a wide array of cultural differences and we have a 
level of diversity that needs to be directly addressed in any planning for global 
SOF education.
The second principle that allows human life to flourish is curiosity, a funda-
mental quality that standard education too often ignores. The best educators 
focus on facilitating learning as a tool for discovery and less on testing stu-
dents’ memories. Education for a global audience must address this principle. 
SOF selection (in most places) makes sure that those who make the cut are 
not only physically and mentally tough, but are devoted to lifelong personal 
development and learning as well. Educators in the SOF education system 
must understand and leverage these qualities. It is not enough to pass on 
knowledge; educators also need to mentor, stimulate, provoke, and engage 
those who participate. This is one of the reasons why online education alone is 
not enough. The mentoring role of educators at all levels of SOF education is a 
vital component of the whole system.
The third principle is that humans are inherently creative. SOF operations in 
most cases are the most innovative and creative military operations. This cre-
ativity enables the SOF community as a whole to always stay one or two steps 
ahead of the conventional forces. By constantly venturing out of our zone of 
comfort, we can develop our personalities, and through a restless process of 
thinking out of the box, imagine new alternatives and possibilities. The role 
of education should be to foster this kind of attitude, and SOF education can 
go one step further by teaching SOF personnel the kind of unconventional 
leadership skills that can be used in asymmetric conflicts with great effect.26 
This kind of unconventional education will enable SOF to become a learning 
organization.
There are a lot of considerations related to designing a global SOF educa-
tion system that can address all of the previously mentioned issues. First of 
all, individualizing education is difficult, but if we use the principle of 
slicing rather than simply layering knowledge onto students when designing 
the building blocks, we can achieve this goal.27 The system must engage its 
participants to make sure that their individuality, curiosity, and creativity are 
fully activated. Therefore, the next hurdle is that these goals demand the very 
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best teachers. Investing in “rock star educators” is vital for SOF, and selecting 
the teacher cadre is probably the most important decision that has to be made. 
The third consideration is incentives. Those who go through this specialized 
education system must be incentivized not only with career advancement, but 
also with the knowledge that much of what they learn through SOF educa-
tion is applicable in their everyday professional work and other areas of life as 
well. Finally, SOF education needs to concentrate on developing leaders—not 
just the leaders we need today (command and control) but also the leaders 
we will need in the future (climate control). Unconventional leadership can 
enable SOF personnel to create a climate of possibility, and if we can provide 
that leadership, SOF forces will step up to the complex problems we have to 
face every day and fulfill missions that were unanticipated and appeared to be 
unachievable.
The demands put on organizations now require learning to be delivered faster, 
cheaper, and more effectively. Some organizations conduct business with 
an “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it” attitude, until one day they find that they 
have to make major changes in their organizations to continue to compete. 
A learning organization is one that continually expands its ability to shape its 
future. For a modern SOF to thrive, learning and education must be linked to 
the strategic goals of the organization, so that continual learning at all levels 
becomes a way of organizational life.
According to Peter Senge, a leading expert in the field of organizational man-
agement, systems thinking is the single most important learning discipline for 
any organization if it wants to adapt, change, and thrive.28 In a learning orga-
nization, members understand that changes intended to improve performance 
in one part of the organization can affect other parts of the organization in 
surprising ways. It is also important for the organization as a whole to have a 
learning perspective. In the past, education ended when an individual received 
credentials. Now, education is becoming continuous, deliberate, and orga-
nization-wide. Developing organizational learning is an emergent process in 
the sense that its outcome is not predictable and it is more than the separate 
contributions of individuals. If individuals and teams are encouraged to be 
innovative and think creatively, some of those proposed alternative approaches 
will entail inherent risks, and not all of them will succeed. To achieve constant 
self-transformation, this is a painful and necessary aspect of the process that 
the members of the global SOF community must accept if they want to stay 
ahead of the game and transform SOF into a learning organizational system.
Final Thoughts: The Balanced Approach
The alarming aspect of recent technological advances and the online edu-
cational revolution is that we seem to be acting more quickly than we’re 
thinking. It can take years, if not decades, to fully assess a single course, let 
alone an entire restructuring of the education system. Therefore, the accredita-
tion process for JSOU and the fusing of the already existing SOF institutions 
will be a lengthy and frustrating process—an adaptive challenge in itself.29 
The best way forward is to establish a baseline and build upon the existing 
capabilities. 
For example, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School already has an established 
and accredited, internationally recognized graduate-level program for SOF 
personnel. Optimal utilization of this program, on the one hand, can be an 
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important piece of the education puzzle. We should never underestimate the 
benefits of face-to-face discussion and collaboration that come with classroom 
attendance! In institutions such as this, the “traditional” means of instruction 
must be encouraged, including professor-student interactions, mentorship, 
and long hours spent in the campus library. 
On the other hand, parts of the educational domain must be more “virtual”: 
providing online courses (MOOCs) for SOF personnel all around the world, 
creating a SOF professional reading list with downloadable audio books that 
are available for SOF personnel anywhere, and offering a common virtual place 
for the international SOF community to discuss new ideas, in the think tank 
model described earlier.
Between the physical classroom and the virtual one, a cadre of mobile educa-
tion teams (METs) can be utilized as a means to export quality education to 
wherever students need it the most. This kind of activity must be linked to the 
TSOC concept. We also need to combine two bodies of theory to understand 
how this process might unfold and support a balanced approach. The current 
education market overall clearly seems to fit Clayton Christensen’s disruption 
theory, but we need to complement this view with another body of theory 
that suggests that education is basically knowledge sharing.30 In a much-cited 
article on education written a decade ago, the authors argued that different 
kinds of knowledge require different kinds of sharing approaches. If their 
analysis is right, then maybe just 10 percent of the executive education market 
is safe from the online onslaught, but my personal opinion is that a consider-
ably bigger percentage of classroom time must be preserved and protected 
when we are planning global SOF education.
If the proposed goal of the new form of virtual education for SOF is actually to 
create a viable online education model (not just a poor man’s alternative) and 
transform SOF into a learning organization, traditional SOF educational insti-
tutions (the brick-and-mortar hubs) need to produce some sort of a return on 
investment. Because traditional education is the most costly, it makes sense to 
have them focus on the most beneficial disciplines—those that foster creative 
thinking—and be the main source for degree credits. In turn, while MOOCs 
are great for distance learning and for those who are pursuing pure mental 
development, most such platforms should not be credit-bearing but should 
serve only informational purposes. In other words, online courses don’t lead to 
diplomas, but help develop SOF personnel into better leaders. 
To summarize, we have almost no idea how the educational revolution will 
affect the SOF educational ecosystem. What we do know is that the unknown 
is coming at us very, very quickly, and SOF has to be ahead of other services to 
build on these changes. 
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In addition to its unique terrain, RC-East had the Haqqanis. 
 —General Stanley McChrystal, USA1
The intersection of tribes, corruption, insurgency, poppy, tyr-
anny, family feuds, and loyalties makes conducting counterinsurgency in 
eastern Afghanistan highly complicated.2 Few terrorist organizations in this 
region have had the kind of sustained success over a period of years and the 
ability to adapt and increase their threat as the Haqqani Network (HQN). 
From its beginnings as a subgroup in the Afghan insurgency with ties to 
al Qaeda, the network has risen to become one of the most effective, feared, 
and hard-core elements of the Afghan Taliban insurgency.3 When counterter-
rorism and counterinsurgency strategists categorize the HQN as a transnational 
jihadi group, however, their well-intended countermeasures often fuel the 
network instead of defeating it. The overall goal for the HQN is to tie the 
region together in a financial web, using every aspect of the black, white, and 
grey markets to benefit the HQN organization in ways not necessarily related 
to jihad. Therefore, it’s important to make a distinction between the HQN 
financial structure and its ideological ambitions. This article makes the case 
that HQN disguises its financial motivations with nationalist jihadist rhetoric 
primarily when doing so fits the leadership’s purpose.4 
Background
As one area expert has noted, “Many of the most prominent jihadi groups in 
the world today are nationalist in their orientation, framing their irredentist 
struggle as being one of regaining lost lands from a foreign (usually infidel) 
occupier. Because they are essentially nationalist groups, these jihadi organiza-
tions tend to have significantly higher levels of popular support.”5 The fighters 
who eventually joined the HQN first fought as mujahedeen following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1981, operating in eastern Afghanistan along the 
Khost-Miranshah corridor into Pakistan. These men were regarded as some 
of the fiercest and most dedicated fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet 
occupation. Jalaluddin Haqqani, a top mujahedeen leader who had ties to the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), met in the early 1980s with U.S. CIA 
agents on the Afghan-Pakistani border, in a bid to win their support against 
the Soviet invaders. Looking for ways to connect with the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan, the CIA had turned to the ISI for help and were offered Jalaluddin, 
by then a respected and trusted leader within the ISI who could be relied on to 
“deliver” when asked. Jalaluddin became a prominent leader among the muja-
hedeen in eastern Afghanistan for several reasons. Initially, he was a nationalist 
and a royalist who sought to reinstate Mohammad Shah, the deposed king, as 
the rightful leader of Afghanistan. In addition, as a nationalist and Pashtun, 
he was outraged by the brutal repression imposed by the Soviet occupiers, 
and their violations of Muslim traditions and norms. This nationalist stance 
sparked wide support among the Zadran tribe, which is the dominant tribe in 
the Afghan-Pakistani border area and the tribe of the Haqqani family. 
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Soviet efforts to impose a communist system on the tribal culture in Afghani-
stan sparked wide resistance, not only in Afghanistan but also internationally. 
Muslim culture, values, and traditions were important and brought different 
families and tribes together in every part of Afghanistan in a unified fight against 
the Soviet invaders. It was natural for the Zadran tribe to organize themselves 
under Haqqani leadership due to their demographics, tribal structure, and 
strong family ties. Jalaluddin was the family elder and tribal leader among the 
different Zadran families. He also had support and funding from different 
foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and the ISI, which gave him sig-
nificant power and influence compared to other potential mujahedeen leaders. 
After successfully defeating the Soviet occupation in 1989, the mujahedeen 
maintained strong relationships among their different groups. HQN members 
had established a reputation as fighters and loyal jihadis, which gave them 
access to money and support far beyond the border area where they lived. 
Jalaluddin and his close associates in the HQN had increased their personal 
credibility and status as well, both within the Zadran tribe and among their 
different international supporters. Now that the war was over, however, the 
HQN needed to create new and different business opportunities to keep 
money flowing and build resiliency into the organization. Jalaluddin used his 
influence and leadership to transform his mujahedeen and military organiza-
tion into a political and economic franchise. By 1994, the HQN was recognized 
as a tanzim, or distinct Muslim organization, by foreign jihadis. Today the 
HQN consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters, and is viewed as a 
sophisticated and highly respected organization by the ISI and supporters on 
the Arabian Peninsula.6 
Ideology and Finance 
Although some experts argue that the HQN is a transnational jihadi group 
along the lines of al Qaeda, the official HQN ideology is to ensure a secure 
Afghan state under shari’a rule and establish a reformed, nationalist Afghan 
government.7 The unofficial HQN economic agenda is to keep the network 
flourishing by promoting growth and resiliency in the black, grey, and white 
markets. At the same time, the HQN will look to develop new ventures in any 
segment where economic opportunities arise, not only in South Asia but also 
in Africa, South and Central America, and Europe. The top tier of the HQN 
organizational structure reflects this focus.8 Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin, is 
currently the undisputed leader. Under him, Nasiruddin (also a son of Jalalu-
ddin), Khalil (brother of Jalaluddin), and Ibrahim (brother of Jalaluddin) are 
all primarily involved in financial matters. Only Badruddin Haqqani (another 
son of Jalaluddin, now deceased) was mostly involved with military opera-
tions. For example, Badruddin was actively involved in directing and advising 
the terrorists who attacked the Intercontinental hotel in Kabul in 2009, an 
operation that was probably funded at least in part by outside Arab support. 
Most of the HQN’s terrorist operations come at a low cost for the network 
due to their use of highly motivated local fighters. The three family members 
involved in financial matters seem less interested in directly supporting jihad 
than in building a financial empire similar to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra.9
HQN founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, now a senior mentor to the organization, 
and his son Siraj have sworn faithful support to the Taliban and Mullah 
Omar.10 That does not mean, however, that they necessarily share the same 
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goals or ideology. The groups have agreed to not fight each other, divided up 
areas of operations, decided who will be involved in the different business 
ventures, and pledged to support each other when it is operationally and 
financially beneficial to them. The pact between the Kandahari Taliban and 
the HQN on drug smuggling in eastern and southern Afghanistan might be 
such an agreement.11
The HQN modus operandi seems to indicate that the HQN plays a specific role 
in the Taliban-led insurgency. 
When a terrorist group functions alongside a well-established guerilla group, 
it can play an even more important role. In such instances, terrorists func-
tion for guerilla movements almost as special operations forces do for regular 
armies. Terrorists can destroy a rival’s command and control structure. They 
can provide logistic and financial support for guerillas. Perhaps most impor-
tant, they can also threaten individuals who collaborate with a regime, making 
it hard for a government to elicit regular and reliable intelligence about a 
guerilla movement.12  
The HQN’s Foreign Fighters (FF) units,13 ISI support, safe houses, facilitators, 
and infiltration routes from Miranshah to Kabul all serve as valuable force 
multipliers for the Taliban in Afghanistan. At the same time, these assets 
indirectly support the group’s long-term financial goal, which is to develop a 
resilient regional economic base in both the legal and illegal sectors, so that 
the HQN can live on. By keeping significant pressure on Kabul with high-
profile terrorist attacks, the HQN helps to emphasize the Afghan government’s 
lack of control over the country and diminishes the ability of the Afghan Na-
tional Security Force (ANSF) to uphold the law and fight crime. The strategy 
of the HQN is a mix between attrition and intimidation. Both the Taliban 
and the HQN embrace attrition as their overall strategy in their fight against 
the central government and its international backers for two reasons. First, 
attrition makes it costly for both the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the ANSF to stay in the region. Second, the attrition strategy seeks 
to change the government in Afghanistan into a reformed and nationalistic 
government under shari’a law. 
The most important task for any terrorist group is to persuade the enemy that 
the group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the 
enemy yields to the terrorists’ demands. The attrition strategy is designed to 
accomplish this task. In an attrition campaign, the greater the costs a terrorist 
organization is able to inflict, the more credible its threat to inflict future 
costs, and the more likely the target is to grant concessions.14 
In Afghanistan where the government is struggling with legitimacy, corrup-
tion, and its inability to provide substantial security for the population, an 
attrition strategy works well.  
The other strategy that the HQN uses is intimidation. 
Intimidation is akin to the strategy of deterrence, preventing some undesired 
behavior by means of threats and costly signals. It is most frequently used 
when terrorist organizations wish to overthrow a government in power or 
gain social control over a given population. It works by demonstrating that 
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the terrorists have the power to punish whoever disobeys them, and that the 
government is powerless to stop them.15 
This fits the picture of how the HQN conducts operations in Kabul. The city 
of Kabul has no particular historical value, but as the capital, it is the center of 
gravity for the ANSF and the national government led by Hamid Karzai. If the 
ANSF is unable to secure even Kabul and its population, it will lose credibility 
among its own population and the international community, who might 
begin to believe that they would be better off with another government—
presumably one that is pro-HQN and Taliban. Even as ruthless as the Taliban 
was when in power, it was able to provide some security for the population 
through shari’a courts, and most Afghans will put their trust in whoever can 
provide security for tomorrow. 
The HQN’s Pakistani and Arab Connections
The cities of Khost in Afghanistan and Miranshah in Pakistan, which lie about 
40 km apart on either side of the mountainous border, are important to the 
HQN, and are under strong influence from the network. One reason for this 
is the deep ties to the Zadran tribe in these areas, along with the nationalist 
jihad ideology that has been passed from father to son since the Afghan-Soviet 
war. In the Pakistani tribal areas, the central government’s law and authority 
have little importance. Tribal ties are strong, and loyalty to one’s tribe is more 
important than loyalty to the state. The HQN’s operational security against 
spies and journalists is dependent on this tribal relationship. The support that 
the HQN is enjoying in the province of Khost is unique even given the strong 
pressure being put on this area by the ISAF and ANSF. Jalaluddin Haqqani and 
his men became heroes and liberators for the people in and around Khost, 
and are still considered heroes there today. The locals in Khost see both the 
ISAF and the ANSF as just more intruders that the HQN eventually will defeat. 
The HQN is known to have mobilized as many as 500 local fighters to launch 
large-scale attacks on government buildings in and around Khost, such as the 
one that took place in May 2009, when HQN fighters staged a complex, multi-
staged attack on the Khost City provincial governor’s compound, the police 
headquarters building, and a nearby administrative building.16
The Foreign Fighters’ Units 
The differences in goals between the HQN and the Taliban have occasionally 
led the HQN to accuse the Taliban of being too extreme in their ideology. 
Disagreements have arisen over the games children are allowed to play, the 
Taliban’s ban on music, and whether girls should be allowed to go to school. 
Operational disputes have been reported as well. HQN leaders have con-
demned the Taliban’s and FF’s excessive use of violence in operations that have 
killed several innocent civilians, including children. Local fighters in the tribal 
areas often object to the FF units coming into their area because the members 
of the FF bring tactics and attitudes that conflict with local tribal customs. 
Although Pakistanis mainly comprise the FF, North Africans, Arabs, Euro-
peans, Uzbeks, and Chechens have been identified as FF members fighting in 
Afghanistan as well. 
A considerable number of FF members who come to Afghanistan from the 
Arabian Peninsula rely on HQN support. Their need for safe houses, guides 
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for crossing the border, and facilitators who provide equipment for opera-
tions makes HQN support for the FF essential. Jalaluddin traveled frequently 
during the Soviet-Afghan war and made strong connections with supporters 
of the Afghan jihad on the Arabian Peninsula. It is reasonable to assume 
that Arab sponsors offered the HQN both money and eager, dedicated jihadi 
fighters who wanted to gain combat experience while fighting for the cause in 
Afghanistan. Once this pipeline was established, the HQN’s canny marketing 
of its operations has kept the flow of money and fighters coming. In addition, 
Jalaluddin’s second wife is from the United Arab Emirates, and her marriage 
with the Haqqani leader helped establish credibility and trust between the 
HQN and potential Arab beneficiaries. It is reasonable to assume that she had 
an important role in connecting the HQN with the Arabian network.
The FF brings valuable experience and weapons such as modified IEDs that have 
proven effective in other conflicts. “Intelligence analysts believe this is evidence 
of an AQ [al Qaeda] affiliated information network linking Jihadist movements 
in multiple theaters of operation with loose operational coordination on a global 
scale and of a capability to move at least small numbers of personnel from one 
operational theater to another.”17 This does not mean, however, that the HQN 
is part of a larger transnational network of jihadis, but rather that it uses the 
existing information and personnel networks for its own benefits.
Operations and Activities
While the Taliban is fighting the ISAF and ANSF primarily in the valleys and 
the rural areas, the HQN focuses its attacks on Kabul. Between 2002 and 
2004, the HQN reconstituted its operations in its historical stronghold of 
Loya Paktia, which encompasses the provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika 
in southeastern Afghanistan. During this period, loyal supporters and spon-
sors reemerged to support the nationalist jihad and the HQN. Between 2005 
and 2009, the HQN was able to expand its influence beyond Loya Paktia 
towards Kabul, which gave the network the ability to execute attacks in 
Kabul itself. “From 2008 to 2009, the network launched an offensive aimed 
at strengthening their positions in Loya Paktia, while projecting suicide 
bombers into Kabul to launch some the most lethal attacks of any insurgent 
group in Afghanistan.”18 It may be that this division of activities was worked 
out between the HQN and the Taliban to maximize the effect of the larger 
insurgency. Similar agreements among insurgent factions regarding operational 
areas are well known, such as that between the Kandahari Taliban and the HQN 
regarding the smuggling of opium and the chemicals used to process narcotics.
The HQN leaders, and Jalaluddin in particular, are well known for exploiting 
the media to their advantage. The HQN produces a significant amount of 
propaganda from its operational successes; this material is translated into Pashto, 
Dari, and Arabic to market the HQN and gain support and recruits. Attacks in 
Kabul give the group a significant advantage when it comes to getting the news 
media’s attention, due to the number of media companies located in the capital.
Extortion and assassinations are also among the HQN’s tactics. In September 
2006, HQN operatives assassinated Paktia’s governor, Hakim Taniwal. At 
Taniwal’s funeral a couple of days later, another bomber sent by the HQN 
detonated his device, killing 39 and injuring four of President Karzai’s 
While the Taliban is fighting 
the ISAF and ANSF primarily 
in the valleys and the rural 
areas, the HQN focuses 
its attacks on Kabul.
It is reasonable to assume that 
Arab sponsors offered the HQN 
both money and eager, dedicated 
jihadi fighters who wanted 
to gain combat experience.
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ministers.19 In Kabul the HQN is using Fedayeen tactics, based around mobile 
attack teams. The Fedayeen (“those who sacrifice themselves”) originally were 
Palestinians operating from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon who, after 1948, 
formed small, autonomous teams to attack Israeli targets. Their tactics, which 
can but don’t necessarily include suicide bombs, have since been modified 
and adapted by several terrorist and insurgent groups around the world. The 
Fedayeen model is based on a small team of several terrorists, each with 
a specific task, who launch a coordinated attack on an identified target. The 
HQN used something akin to Fedayeen tactics when they attacked the Kabul 
Serena Hotel in 2008, the Afghanistan International Bank in 2009, the Hotel 
Inter-Continental Kabul in 2011, and the Spozhmai Hotel in 2012 (all located 
in Kabul). The FF units bring valuable experience to these command operations 
and often work as force multipliers together with the local fighters. 
The HQN and the ISI 
The strong ties between the HQN and Pakistan’s ISI remain intact today.20 
Pakistan needs a means to influence the political situation in Afghanistan. The 
Pakistanis fear that a strong and nationalistic Afghanistan will put Pakistan 
in a squeeze between Afghanistan and India. As long as it is receiving money, 
weapons, and intelligence from the ISI, the HQN will keep launching high-
profile attacks in Kabul intended to destabilize the government.21 This is in 
accordance with nationalist jihadi ideology: to fight the near enemy. At the 
same time, the situation enhances the HQN’s financial ambitions, because 
an unstable Afghanistan attracts international support that helps the HQN 
business empire to expand. Millions of dollars are flowing into Afghanistan 
for counterinsurgency projects such as reconstruction, road building, digging 
wells, providing schools, and so on. HQN front companies often win these 
contracts, or HQN fighters protect the workers from attack (or both). Either 
way, the HQN profits directly from these projects, not unlike the Italian 
Mafia’s control of trucking, construction, and garbage disposal in southern 
Italy. Everybody knows who is running these businesses, but it is very hard to 
stop them without causing even greater problems.
A weak and corrupt central Afghan government also makes it easier for the 
HQN to deal profitably in the grey and black economic markets. ISI support 
to the HQN is not limited to support inside Afghanistan, however; the ISI 
also protects financial interests for the HQN in Pakistan. By helping to facili-
tate the export and import of resources and products for the HQN, the ISI 
plays an important part in the larger HQN business empire. Two examples of 
this are the import of chemicals to process narcotics and fertilizers for bomb 
making. Normally the export and import of these kinds of dual-use precursor 
chemicals are controlled under international trade regulations. When a 
known terrorist group like the HQN is able to engage in this trade, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the ISI is helping the HQN avoid normal import 
controls and customs checkpoints. 
The HQN also relies on ISI support when its members travel to other countries 
for fundraising: the ISI sees to it that HQN leaders slip through security check-
points at Pakistani airports, and lets them travel on fake passports around 
the world.22 Arguably, ISI support is one of the reasons why the HQN is more 
sophisticated and violent than any other group in Afghanistan. At the same 
As long as it is receiving money, 
weapons, and intelligence 
from the ISI, the HQN will 
keep launching high-profile 
attacks in Kabul intended to 
destabilize the government.
 In Kabul the HQN is using 
Fedayeen tactics, based 
around mobile attack teams.
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time, HQN leaders have successfully exploited the weakness of the Pakistani 
government and been able to establish safe havens on the Afghan-Pakistani 
border. 
A Financial Empire
The HQN’s financial interests are far more impressive than the group’s terrorist 
acts, but draw less attention. The business side, comprising both legal and 
illegal ventures, involves more people and operations than the jihadi side, 
and stretches into the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and Europe. HQN businesses 
range from illegally exporting high-value minerals like chromite to China to 
legally investing in real estate all over Asia and the Middle East. Besides the 
chromite, the HQN gets much of its revenue from the smuggling of precious 
jewels and other metals, and from timber smuggling.23 Extortion of local and 
regional businesses is another important source of income for the HQN. Those 
who fail to pay are punished, in classic gangland style. 
Fundraising in the Gulf Region, and the support of wealthy donors, going 
back 30 years to Jalaluddin’s early fundraising trips to the Arabian Peninsula, 
remain very important to the HQN. These sponsors help raise money for the 
HQN and at the same time reward the leadership for conducting high-profile 
attacks in Kabul. Madrassas and mosques in Loya Paktia also do fundraising 
for the HQN. The imams and clerics preach jihadi ideology supporting HQN 
activities, and help with community support and recruitment to the jihad.24
The group also takes part in drug trafficking, but not in the same way as 
the Taliban. The HQN is cleverly organized to deal only with the precursor 
chemicals used for processing raw opium into heroin.25 These same chemi-
cals can be used in legal pharmaceutical manufacturing and in hospitals as 
well, which gives the HQN both great cover for buying these products and a 
secondary market for their resale even when heroin production is low. In this 
way the HQN avoids being harmed by fluctuating opium prices. Kidnaping 
for ransom is another HQN business venture. By kidnaping people like David 
Rohde (a New York Times journalist), Bowe Bergdahl (a sergeant in the U.S. 
Army), and Abdul Khaliq Farahi (an Afghan diplomat to Pakistan), the HQN 
has gained credibility within the Afghan insurgency because of the media 
attention these cases receive. Smuggling and taxation of people in the border 
area are common ways of gaining income for the lower ranks of the HQN. 
As mentioned earlier, the HQN financial structure is not made up solely of 
illegal activities. Like other mafia-style ventures, the HQN needs legal en-
terprises to launder money and ensure resiliency in its business structure.26 
Examples of this legal side include supporting and running hospitals and 
madrassas in the border areas, and real estate development projects in Dubai. 
Classic mafia-friendly enterprises like the trucking and transportation com-
panies that operate daily across Afghanistan and Pakistan are also part of the 
HQN legal/illegal economic structure. HQN-affiliated construction companies, 
which are primarily contracted by the ISAF, are another such scheme; in 
this case, by hiring these contractors, the ISAF is directly fueling the HQN 
structure. Many of these HQN companies have shadow structures, so it is hard 
to directly trace them back to the HQN. According to Gretchen Peters, who 
lived in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan for five years, the 
HQN businesses range from 
illegally exporting high-value 
minerals like chromite to China 
to legally investing in real estate 
all over Asia and the Middle East.
SGT Bowe Bergdahl
68
CTX | Vol. 3, No. 4
HQN controls between 10 percent and 25 percent of all the business conducted 
in their area, legal and illegal. Of the total amount of money spent on the 
Gardez-Khost Road, for example, about US$12 million to $30 million ended 
up in HQN-affiliated bank accounts. At the same time, the ISAF relies on 
these companies because they are an important part of the legal economy that 
people in the region are dependent on. The instability in Afghanistan benefits 
every part of the HQN business empire, and as long as instability is in its favor, 
the HQN will continue the fight.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The HQN is a subgroup in the broader Afghan Taliban insurgency, but it is far 
more financially sophisticated and economically motivated than the other 
jihadist groups, and resembles a mafia organization in this regard. Going 
after the HQN financial structure would therefore likely be a more effective 
counterterrorist strategy than using a classic counterinsurgency strategy. An 
information operations campaign should target the HQN’s financial network 
and highlight its less ideological reasons for fighting in Afghanistan. This 
might help drive a wedge between the different jihadi groups fighting the ISAF 
and the Afghan government. The HQN has specialized in spectacular attacks in 
Kabul while leaving the countryside to the Taliban, a “division of labor” that 
must be taken into consideration when countermeasures are planned.
What Can Be Done
ISAF-ANSF information operations should reflect the fact that the HQN’s 
high-profile attacks in Kabul are conducted for economic reasons rather than 
for defensive jihad, and that sponsors and supporters pay for these operations. 
HQN leaders know that they can play on the nationalist jihadi ideology to gain 
support in Afghanistan and other like-minded countries. In the Gulf Region, 
wealthy private sponsors, who want to see the apostate Karzai government 
in Kabul crippled and rendered ineffective, support jihad around the world 
by sending money to groups like the HQN. A way in which the allies who 
are fighting to stabilize Afghanistan can counteract these forces is to drive a 
wedge between the local fighters and the HQN leadership. This can be done by 
highlighting the fact that it is financial motivations rather than ideology that 
drive the HQN’s top-level decision making. A cleverly planned information 
operation designed to expose the true identity and motivations of the HQN 
leadership would be one way to create this wedge. Another way to weaken the 
network is to reduce the support coming from wealthy Arab benefactors, not 
only by informing them of the Haqqanis’ avarice, but by focusing at the same 
time on ways to trace and target the money coming from these sponsors. 
The continued failure to recognize the fact that the HQN is not a transnational 
jihadi organization but rather a nationalist, mafia-style group can serve to 
enhance the network instead of harming it. Traditional development and 
reconstruction projects often indirectly and directly benefit the HQN. Targeting 
the financial structure and revenues of the HQN would cripple the group 
more than traditional counterinsurgency operations. As it is, doing no 
development work in Khost would be better than the current ISAF strategy of 
project building, because a lot of the funding coming from the ISAF is directly 
fueling the HQN. To counter extortion, the ISAF should develop a corps of 
engineers within the ANSF. The ISAF would then be channeling money in the 
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right direction, and the ANSF would have an opportunity to win the trust of 
the population while at the same time reducing the influence of the HQN. 
The main problem for the HQN is that it is running out of time. The popula-
tion that is loyal to the Haqqanis is getting tired of war. Presenting the HQN 
leadership as primarily motivated by money could cause its ideology-based 
relationships with both fighters and wealthy donors to suffer. 
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NOTES
The Dilemma: Over the past decade, the Mexican government 
has spent prodigious resources attempting to halt the increasing power and 
influence of drug cartels throughout the country. An offshoot of the grow-
ing power of cartels is their ability to threaten businesses through the illegal 
enterprise of extortion. Mexican authorities have seen an exponential increase 
in reported threats and extortion rackets throughout the country.1 As a result, 
local business owners face a deadly dilemma: if cartels seek to extort their 
business, should owners cooperate by overlooking illegal activity and paying 
extortion fees? Or should business owners stand up to the cartels by refusing 
to pay extortion fees and notifying the authorities of the cartels’ illegal activ-
ity? Through the use of game theory under current security conditions, this 
article shows that business owners achieve their best outcome by organizing a 
fierce, unified resistance against the cartel’s efforts to extort. This united resis-
tance ultimately allows local business owners and the cartel that is threatening 
them to reach an agreement whereby the cartel promises not to pursue extor-
tion while the business owners promise to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking 
and other illegal activities. In the absence of effective law enforcement, the 
resulting decrease in local violence and economic damage from such a “truce” 
can be seen as the community’s best outcome as well. 
The Game 
Figure 1 depicts the extortion dilemma using ordinal rankings (where “4” is 
best and “1” is worst) with two players, a business owner and the cartel:
AC
A business owner is willing to pay “protection” fees and turn a blind eye to 
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Cartel: This is the best scenario for the cartel, because it receives 
revenue without any resistance from the business owner and 
without fear of police interference. 
Business owner: This is the third best (i.e., next to worst) scenario 
for the business owner. Although he is willing to pay fees and 
turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities in exchange for relief 
from violence, he surrenders his profits and ultimately resides in 
a threat- and crime-filled environment.
BC
The cartel attempts to extort a local business owner but meets staunch 
resistance: the business owner refuses to pay extortion money and notifies the 
authorities. 
Cartel: This is the second best scenario for the cartel. Although the 
cartel has to use threats and violence against the business owner, 
in the absence of effective police action it still gets its money. 
Business owner: This is the worst scenario for the business owner, 
because in much of Mexico, the local authorities typically cannot 
match the power and influence of the cartels. As a result, the 
cartel is still able to extort the business owner, but does so through 
violence and punishment.
AD
The business owner is willing to pay fees and turn a blind eye to cartel activi-
ties, but the local cartel does not have any interest in extortion. 
Cartel: This is the third best scenario for the cartel. On the one 
hand, it willingly chooses to forgo a significant source of income 
from extortion; on the other hand, it still has the freedom to 
conduct other illegal activities without the risk of locals notifying 
the authorities.
Business owner: This is the second best scenario for the business 
owner, because he is able to maximize his profit without the need 
to pay the cartel for “protection.” By turning a blind eye to other 
crime, however, he has to operate his businesses in a crime-ridden 
environment that affects overall sales.
BD
The business owner vows to resist the cartel’s presence in his town and works 
with the authorities to stop the cartel’s illegal activities, even though the cartel 
does not try to extort money from any of the local business owners. 
Cartel: This is the worst scenario for the cartel. It chooses not 
to extort money but the business owner is not content with the 
cartel’s other illegal activities in the town and assists authorities 
in identifying and arresting cartel members.
Business owner: This is the best scenario for the business owner 
and the town because everyone can run their respective businesses 
without the threat of criminal extortion. They also assist authorities 
In much of Mexico, the 
local authorities typically 
cannot match the power and 
influence of the cartels.
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Since the cartel has a dominant 
strategy of extorting money, 
the best outcome that the 
business owner can secure is 
the third best scenario: pay 
extortion fees and turn a blind 
eye to illegal cartel activities.
Although no reasonable 
business owner would like to 
pay extortion fees, the threat 
of violent consequences from 
resisting is less desirable than 
simply appeasing the cartel.
in weeding out crime, thereby attracting greater business from 
outside areas.
Nash Equilibrium 
Figure 2 identifies a Nash equilibrium2 at the point (AC)—the cartel extorts 
the business owner, who decides to pay fees and turn a blind eye to illegal 
cartel activity. In addition, the illustration shows that the cartel has a domi-
nant strategy to extort the local business owner regardless of the business 
owner’s decision to cooperate or resist. Although no reasonable business owner 
would like to pay extortion fees, the threat of violent consequences from 
resisting is less desirable than simply appeasing the cartel by paying the fees 
and turning a blind eye to illegal activity. 
Strategic Moves 
This section examines strategic moves by the cartel as well as the business 
owner. It considers potential consequences associated with each decision.
First Move
Business owner: If the business owner decides to make the first 
move, he determines that since the cartel has a dominant strategy 
of extorting money, the best outcome that the business owner can 
secure is the third best scenario at (AC): pay extortion fees and 
turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activities.
Cartel: If the cartel decides to make the first move, it determines 
that by choosing to extort money, the local business owner will 
prefer to pay and turn a blind eye rather than resist the cartel and 
risk violence. By making the first move, the cartel can secure its 
best scenario at (AC): charge extortion fees from a cooperative 
business owner.
Regardless of who makes the first move, it is reasonable to assume that under 
these conditions, the cartel will seek to extort money while the local business 



































Business owner: The business owner can threaten to resist the 
cartel and notify authorities if the cartel pursues extortion. His 
intent is to persuade the cartel to cease extortion efforts against his 
business. Under the conditions of this game, the cartel still prefers 
to extort money from the business owner, even if he resists. As 
we pointed out earlier, this is the worst scenario for the business 
owner, because his counter-threat does not work and the cartel 
takes his money through violence.
Cartel: With a dominant strategy of extortion already in place, 
the cartel does not have a further threat.
Promise
Business owner: Similar to a threat, the business owner also has a 
promise to offer. In this scenario, the business owner can promise 
to turn a blind eye to illegal cartel activity as long as the cartel 
agrees to avoid any extortion of his business. Under the current 
conditions of this game, the cartel achieves a better outcome by 
extorting the business anyway. As a result, even though the business 
owner agrees to turn a blind eye, the cartel continues to extort 
money from him. The promise does not work. 
Cartel: Under the game’s current conditions, the cartel can 
promise the business owner that it will not extort money if he turns 
a blind eye to illegal activities. While this is a reasonable promise, 
it is still worse than the likely first move. As a result, the cartel 
is better off without offering any promise to the business owner.
Combination 
Business owner: A combination of threat and promise is a po-
tential point of negotiation for the business owner. In a combina-
tion strategic move, the business owner can threaten to resist and 
notify authorities if the cartel seeks extortion, but promise to 
turn a blind eye to illegal operations if the cartel avoids extortion 
activities. Under the pure conditions of the game as I’ve labeled 
them, the cartel would reject this offer and prefer extortion. The 
following section explores scenarios in which such an offer might 
be acceptable to the cartel. 
Cartel: The cartel does not have a combination strategy.
Security Levels/Prudential Strategy
Security Levels 
Figures 3 and 4, respectively, identify each player’s security level. In a two-
player game, a player’s security level is his maximum gain after his options 
have been minimized by the other player’s actions. Consider, for example, 
the business owner’s preferences. Using the preferences listed in figure 3, 
the business owner can achieve a 2 or a 3 if he decides to turn a blind eye to 
the cartel’s crimes. Knowing this, the cartel minimizes the business owner’s 
security through the use of extortion (2 < 3). Conversely, the business owner 
can achieve either a 1 or a 4 if he decides to resist payments and notify the 
A combination of threat 
and promise is a potential 
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Authorities suspect that a 
significant number of additional 
extortions occurred that 
simply were not reported 
to local police, probably 
for fear of reprisal.
authorities. Knowing this as well, the cartel again minimizes the business 
owner’s security through extortion (1 < 4). The cartel’s commitment to ex-
tortion effectively minimizes the business owner’s well-being, and restricts the 
maximum gain the business owner can achieve. Knowing this, the business 
owner prefers to turn a blind eye (settling for a 2) rather than resist payment 
(resulting in a 1). Thus, the business owner’s security level is 2. 
Figures 3 and 4 identify each player’s security level by maximizing each player’s 
own gain while minimizing the gain of the other player. 
Business Owner’s Security Level: The business owner’s security 
level is 2 (see figure 3). This means that in the worst case, the 
business owner can guarantee what he considers to be the third 
best scenario: the cartel pursues extortion, and the local business 
owner agrees to pay fees and turn a blind eye to illegal activity.
Cartel’s Security Level: The cartel’s security level is 3 (figure 4). 
This means that in the worst case, the cartel can guarantee what 
it considers to be its second best scenario: although the busi-
ness owner resists, the cartel uses threats and violence to pursue 
extortion.



















































Figure 5 illustrates that using both security levels, the status quo is found 
at (2,3), a situation much more favorable to the cartel than to the business 
owner. The status quo describes the existing state of affairs in a disturbingly 
large number of towns throughout Mexico. The Washington Post recently 
noted that in 2012, reports of extortion doubled in Mexico while most other 
types of crimes declined.3 In addition, authorities suspect that a significant 
number of additional extortions occurred that simply were not reported to 
local police, probably for fear of reprisal.4 Nash’s game theory provides an 
accurate reflection of this unfortunate state of affairs.
Both solutions are found in pure strategies, suggesting that in order to meet its 
guaranteed minimal payoff, the cartel should always pursue extortion, while 
the business owner will suffer the least by cooperating with the cartel, paying 
extortion fees, and turning a blind eye to the cartel’s other illegal activities. 
How to Resolve the Extortion Dilemma 
Presumably, there is no rational business owner who prefers to pay extortion 
fees. I make the assumption that rational business owners, whether actively 
or passively, will search for a solution to eliminate extortion payments. This 
section considers several actions that might alter the preferences of either the 
business owner or the cartel, and how those changes ultimately affect each 
side’s strategy. It suggests a strategy where the business owner is better off than 
Mexico’s current status quo. 
Increased Security Presence 
Most logically, the business owner would benefit from a more robust 
and effective police force that has the strength to overwhelm and defeat 
the cartel. In this scenario, the effectiveness of the police force serves 
as a deterrent to extortion practices. The cartel’s preference shifts as a 
result: now the cartel’s second best preference is not to extort if the 
business owner turns a blind eye to illegal activities (AC). Conversely, 
the cartel’s option to extort money from the business owner who will 
resist and notify authorities (BC) becomes its third best preference. All 
other preferences remain the same. 
Figure 6 illustrates the new preferences and corresponding Nash 
equilibrium.
Rational business owners, 
whether actively or passively, 





















Figure 5: Security Level Status Quo in Mexico
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The drug cartels have grown 
so strong that in some areas 
of Mexico, they frequently 
outgun and outmatch the 
government forces.
Without communication between the business owner and the cartel, how-
ever, nothing changes for the business owner. The cartel still has a dominant 
strategy in pursuing extortion. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium remains 
where the cartel extorts while the business owner pays and turns a blind eye to 
illegal activity. What has changed is the business owner’s leverage in strategic 
moves. If effective police operations increase a business owner’s leverage, the 
business owner can offer the combination of a credible threat and promise to 
improve his outcome. 
Solution: Should the cartel pursue extortion, the business owner can threaten 
to resist and notify the authorities (eliminating AC). This threat does not work 
alone, however. Game theory suggests that the business owner would also 
have to promise to turn a blind eye to the cartel’s illegal activity (eliminating 
BD). By combining the threat and promise, the business owner can secure 
an agreement: the cartel will not extort in exchange for the business owner’s 
blind eye to other illegal activity (AD). 
Community Organization against Crime 
In an ideal world, the Mexican police forces would maintain the trust of the 
people and wield the strength to defeat the drug cartels that are terrorizing an 
increasing number of businesses and communities throughout Mexico. Un-
fortunately, the reality is that widespread corruption within the police forces 
leads many business owners to question police motives and to hesitate to call 
on them for help. Furthermore, the drug cartels have grown so strong that in 
some areas of Mexico, they frequently outgun and outmatch the government 
forces that are tasked to protect the population.5 In some instances, Mexican 
business owners have grown tired of the status quo and have sought ways to 
mount a collaborative effort among themselves against cartel activity.
Figure 7 illustrates the preferences and corresponding Nash equilibrium if 
business owners collectively decide to resist the cartel rather than cooperate 
individually with extortion and other criminal activities.
In this scenario, the game changes in that the single business owner 
is replaced by a collective group of business owners with a common 
preference. It is apparent that a simple shift in the business owners’ 
preference to resist and notify authorities has little effect on the cartel’s 
actions. The cartel maintains a dominant strategy to extort businesses 
through any means necessary, and the resultant Nash equilibrium shifts 
to BC: extortion against a resistant community. This scenario is likely 
to result in the most chaotic, violent environment of any of the prefer-
ences. Furthermore, the business owners pin themselves in a corner 
where neither threat nor promise will persuade the cartel to change 
its activities. So, how can business owners create an incentive where 
resistance to cartel activity might cause the cartel to change its strategy 
and eliminate extortion?
One suggestion is that any organized resistance must be conducted with total 
commitment against the cartel. As mentioned previously, a simple shift in 
the business owners’ preference to resist is not enough to eliminate extortion. 
Business owners must form a resistance so unified and fierce that it shifts the 
preference of the cartel as well. Specifically, the cartel would prefer to simply 
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Figure 7: Business Owners Join 
Forces to Resist Extortion
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conduct its illegal activities without extortion in exchange for a blind eye 
from the business owners (AD) rather than trying to extort a fiercely resistant 
community (BC). Figure 8 illustrates the new preferences and corresponding 
Nash equilibrium.
Solution: While the Nash equilibrium remains at BC, strategic moves now 
suggest that both sides have a promise that would make the outcome more 
preferable for both parties. The business owners promise to turn a blind eye 
if the cartel does not extort their businesses. Similarly, the cartel promises to 
cease extortion if the business owners agree to turn a blind eye to the cartel’s 
other illegal activities. In this classic prisoners’ dilemma, game theory suggests 
that the resultant outcome would be at AD, the second best outcome for both 
parties. Unless police and military forces can make strong gains against cartel 
activity, it is arguably in the best interest of Mexican business owners to work 
together to take resistance efforts into their own hands (figure 9).
Case Study: Ayutla, Guerrero, Mexico 
The past few years have seen an increase in the formation of various vigilante 
groups throughout Mexico that are focused on resisting the violent drug 
cartels. One news source recently reported that in the southern Mexican state 
of Guerrero, “a vigilante movement [was] born of frustration at extortion, 
“In less than a month, [the 
vigilantes] have done something 
that the army and … police 






















































Figure 9: Most Desirable and 
Least Desirable Outcomes
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killings, and kidnappings that local police are unable, or unwilling, to stop.”6 
No one, from the store owner to the bus driver, seemed to be exempt from the 
protection payments demanded by cartel members. Initially, business owners 
preferred to cooperate with the cartel and resorted to raising the prices of their 
products and services to make up their losses. “When they extorted money 
from the rancher, he raised the price of beef, and the store owner raised the 
price of tortillas,” explained a local vigilante in the town of Ayulta.7
The rise in intimidation and extortion by the cartel ultimately pushed the 
citizens of Ayulta to their limits; in January 2013, the town created the Las 
Mesas vigilantes. The business owners reached the point where they preferred 
to resist rather than passively comply with cartel demands. According to the 
Las Mesas commander, drug activity is frowned upon by locals but is not the 
target of this upstart resistance movement. “We are not against those who 
are distributing drugs. That’s a way for them to earn a living. …What we are 
against is them messing with the local people,” explained the group’s com-
mander.8 The result has been growing support, both active and passive, from 
the local population for increased resistance against unpopular cartel intimi-
dation. One local resident explained, “In less than a month, [the vigilantes] 
have done something that the army and … police haven’t been able to do in 
years.”9 One might suggest that in line with the game theory model, the cartel 
is beginning to shift its preference: it now prefers to stop extortion in return 
for the community’s blind eye to drug activity, rather than try to continue 
extortion efforts against an armed, strongly resistant community.
Conclusions 
Mexico continues to have a significant problem with powerful, violent, and 
influential drug cartels. Although cartels do not plague the entire country, 
many areas are severely affected. While security forces continue the fight, 
internal corruption and lack of resources have made it difficult for them to 
garner the trust and support they need from affected populations in local 
communities. As extortion efforts have increased, local business owners have 
helplessly obliged the cartels’ demands and suffered the economic conse-
quences. Growing discontentment with the status quo has led to an increase 
of popular resistance against cartels across Mexico. Business owners are 
increasingly exasperated with the security situation and have decided to col-
laborate in efforts to eliminate the cartels’ impact on their local communities. 
While most business owners would prefer to turn the responsibility for security 
over to a trustworthy police force with the capability to eliminate extortion 
and other cartel activity, few perceive this as a serious option for the near 
future. Instead, business owners need strong resolve to shift their preference 
and resist extortion rather than accept it as an inevitable way of life. Resistance 
must be strong enough to shift the cartel’s preference as well. Once the cartel 
sees greater benefit in coexisting with the locals without disrupting their busi-
nesses, a mutual agreement can be reached. As the Ayulta defense commander 
suggested, business owners can promise to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking 
in exchange for an end to extortion and intimidation. Despite continuing 
drug activity, the new status quo would allow businesses to operate without 
the fear and violence that plagues their society. 
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For the Mexican government, the cartel problem is a complicated, protracted 
fight. History suggests that a significant victory against the cartels in Mexico 
will take years of effective strategy. In the interest of their families, businesses, 
and overall livelihood, locals can likely benefit most by taking matters into 
their own hands. While their actions might not solve the problems of drug 
trafficking, they can defuse cartel violence at the local level and prevent the 
country from continuing to spiral into extreme chaos.  
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project.1 Dr. Douglas Borer, U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School, spoke with U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel William H. (“Billy”) 
Shaw on 22 July 2013 in Stuttgart, Germany, where COL Shaw was serving 
with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). They discussed a 
groundbreaking training program for the Afghan Army Special Forces that 
COL Shaw developed while serving in Afghanistan in 2010–2011.2
DR. BORER:  Billy is going to recap some of his experiences for the historical 
record. So Billy, take it away.
COL SHAW: Thanks, Doug. My background is mostly in the Special Forces. I 
spent a year in Djibouti, and 13 months in Afghanistan, as well as a couple of 
tours to Iraq, the first in Provide Comfort Desert Storm, and then Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Now I work at SOCEUR. Specifically, I want to talk about what 
I did when I was in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. When I 
originally got there, I was the deputy commander for CFSOC (Combined 
Forces Special Operations Command) Alpha under General Austin 
S. Miller. General Haas came in a couple of months later. A position 
opened up as the commander for the Special Operations Advisor Group, 
so I became the senior American and de facto camp commander for Camp 
Morehead, which was collocated with the Afghan National Army Special 
Operations Command (ANASOC) Headquarters.
DR. BORER: What year was this?
COL SHAW: This was in 2010. My job was to do a couple of things. First of all, 
I was a base commander with a very small contingent base that was located 
inside a larger ANASOC base called Camp Commando. That was the head-
quarters for one of the kandaks, which is the Afghan equivalent of a battalion, 
as well as the location of the School of Excellence, which was basically the Af-
ghan Special Warfare Training Center where we trained all of these guys. The 
second thing I did was to act as primary advisor to Brigadier General Lawang, 
who was the commander of ANASOC at the time, and then later to Major 
General Karim when he became the commander. That in itself was probably 
about an eight- to 10-hour-a-day job because everywhere the commander 
went, I went as well. The third thing my staff and I did was to oversee and 
resource the School of Excellence, which trained Afghan commandos, Afghan 
Special Forces guys, and then also some MISO (Military Information Support 
Operations), civil affairs, etc. Specifically, one of the things that we did was try 
to address and counter the insider-threat problem. Along with that, there were 
some issues like retention, and we were trying to figure out how to make all 
that work. 
Interviewed by Dr. Douglas Borer, 
Naval Postgraduate School
THE CTAP INTERVIEW
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The commandos were the iconic heroes of Afghanistan. They saw probably 
80% of the combat action. They had never been defeated on the battlefield. 
They were advised by either SEAL, SF, or MARSOC (Marine Corps Special 
Operations Command) teams, but there were still issues below the surface 
for the commandos. We also had Afghan Special Forces guys there. So the 
insider-threat piece really got everyone’s attention. We said, Okay, what can 
we do to counter corruption—the corruption piece was another huge piece—
as well as solidify the resolve of our force so that they don’t turn on their 
American advisors?  
My academic background was teaching ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps) in a number of leadership venues prior to coming back into SF as a 
colonel. While in college, I was exposed to a number of academic programs 
that I found to be very useful for this project that we were taking on. One 
was a class with Dr. Brian Hall, who wrote The Omega Factor and was one 
of the leading U.S. experts on values. His theories on values identify them as 
the underpinning reason for all thoughts, ideas, behaviors, etc. If you want to 
change behavior or the way somebody thinks or feels, you have got to address 
their values at the root level. So that is what we decided to do. We allowed the 
Afghan National Army to define their values. We held a seminar so that the 
senior leadership could expound upon what their values meant, and then we 
assisted them in product development and campaign design.  
The values campaign, specifically, was introduced through the chain of com-
mand and through the School of Excellence back into the force to try to shore 
up the program. In our preliminary research and study, we found that the av-
erage Afghan had very limited exposure to new ideas. He heard three primary 
voices: family and friends, the mullah, and a little bit of media, whether it 
be radio, TV, text, cell phone, or whatever. Those three voices we found were 
inadequate when it came to trying to inoculate our soldiers from being turned 
by the Taliban. General Karim and I were very close friends, and this hap-
pened under his watch. He was also a direct descendant of Mohammad—he 
was a two-star Army general, but people from the surrounding communities 
revered him as being from the holy tribe or holy family, which greatly assisted 
us in what we were doing. Because of the taboo of trying to get involved 
with the soldiers’ religious activities, we were walking a pretty fine line, but 
between General Karim and me it was good because of our trust level. We 
were extremely close, almost like brothers. We agreed early on that we would 
be transparent with one another, and if we agreed to disagree, obviously he 
would win because he was the two-star general and it was his country! 
As we developed this plan, General Karim was very much a player in the de-
velopment of it. What we found was that the Taliban—especially when guys 
were going home on leave for 30 days or so—were stepping in and becoming 
what we termed the “fourth voice.” They became that fourth source of infor-
mation that could convince someone that the Taliban were doing the right 
thing. The average Afghan soldier didn’t have enough educational background 
to refute things that people would tell him. So that fourth voice became very 
important, and we wanted to become the fourth voice. We did not want the 
Taliban to do that. The values campaign and then the messaging strategy be-
came the way ahead. The essence of this is that ANASOC values are very similar 
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to our values and go back to Qur’anic scripture. That was one of the things 
that General Karim would continually talk about, because he knew those 
values were the center of gravity, what the average Afghan Muslim soldier held 
as the essence of his existence. That essence was what was frequently being 
targeted by the Taliban. So we began a series of efforts. Religious and Public 
Affairs defined the Afghan National Army values and then tied them back to 
Qur’anic verse through a series of pamphlets. Additionally, each kandak had 
a mullah. General Karim obviously couldn’t tell these mullahs exactly what to 
say, but he did give them the themes that he wanted taught at mosque. Those 
themes directly tied our (Afghan) values at ANASOC back to the Qur’an. That 
was the first piece.  
We developed four lines of effort. One line of effort was what is called adap-
tive leadership, which was developed at Harvard University. The adaptive 
leadership model lends itself very much to mentorship, where you don’t have 
the authority or the position to direct people on what to do—in my opinion, 
that is not actually leadership; it’s management. What you have to do is create 
conditions that hold a person in an environment long enough for them to 
deconstruct values that are not consistent with what is required, and then 
reconstruct those values. But it requires a captive audience, and it actually 
requires some stress. They don’t have to be super stressed, but just enough. 
That stress—what we called the crowbar; that was our private little term 
that we used—came from illuminating and holding the soldiers accountable 
for the difference between their lived values and their espoused values. The 
difference between those two is disequilibrium. Unless the person is just a 
sociopath, when you hold them in that environment and you offer positive 
reinforcement, then they deconstruct those values that are associated with 
poor behavior. It could go the other way as well, and that is how they got to 
where they are. These men had been in a survival situation for an extended 
period of time under very chaotic and terrible conditions, without being 
continually reinforced to maintain the positive aspects of their life. It would 
be really easy for them to slip into the negative and steal and lie and cheat and 
do all the things that they know are wrong from the Qur’an. But they have 
grown up that way, first because of the conditions in which they lived, and 
second, because there was not enough positive pull the other way to offset 
their survival-type situation.  
So adaptive leadership and mentorship were important, but no one there 
other than myself had any background in how to do these things. The first 
thing I had to do was teach the mentors and get my cadre onboard with these 
methods. Applying the methods of adaptive leadership is not easy to do by 
any stretch of the imagination. But I had to educate my crew because they 
were the ones who were going to carry the message to their crew: their Afghan 
counterparts. 
DR. BORER: When you say “your crew,” who were those guys?
COL SHAW: I had 64 MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Inc., a private 
military contracting firm) contractors, and I had some transmedia3 guys, who 
actually understood what we were trying to do and helped to do it. Then I 
initially had about 12 active duty or green suiters—these were not necessarily 
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active duty but people who were assigned to me—and that group grew to 
around 50 before I left. We were the ones who engaged the Afghans. Here’s a 
little sidebar on why it was important to get us all synced up: We found that 
you could personally engage each person, but they are part of a network or a 
structure that has some pretty constant themes and positions. It’s like a spider 
web, and they are kind of stuck in that environment. Even if you could move 
one person away for a time, the environment would deconstruct what you 
had taught him and he would go back to the status quo.  
DR. BORER: Billy, the challenge of reshaping values sounds like the famous 
recurring line in the The Sopranos [an American television show about a Mafia 
family]: “Just when you think you’re out, they suck you back in.” Is that an 
accurate analogy?
COL SHAW: Yes, exactly. We did a lot of modeling with two guys from MIT 
(the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) who were out there. They were 
doing systems analytics for the VSO (village stability operation) program. 
So they helped out, and one of the transmedia guys, Mike Marks, really got 
involved with it. He had a background that supported a lot of our theories. 
We told our crew, If you have random efforts to deconstruct and reconstruct 
values, or you’re trying to get your counterpart to shift a little bit, it has to be 
a synchronized, holistic approach so that the whole network shifts. Then you 
can hold your ground a little bit there. If not, then the environment will pull 
them back to where they were. This stuff is a slow go. It isn’t something you’re 
going to fix in an hour or a week or maybe even a year. The deconstruction  
and reconstruction of values can take years and years and years. So anyway, we 
started that program, and it worked out pretty well.  
Our second line of effort was our engagement strategy with the ANASOC 
chain of command, and their engagement strategy with their soldiers. We 
did this fairly effectively once we all got through the training. It took about 
four months to get my instructors through a mentorship academy, a three-
day school, as well as give them the academic background to understand 
values and adaptive leadership. Prior to getting there, I had guys who were 
just randomly assigned—you know, Air Force reservists who were not only 
my supply officers, but also the primary mentors to the Afghan brigade staff. 
We were all dual-hatted as advisors, plus we were doing our normal duties in 
whatever position we were in. Prior to that, there was not a common platform 
for the close-to-100 people who were advising. There was no mentor academy; 
there was no pre-train-up to come to ANASOC. People would just kind of 
show up. We had to have that common ground, so we started running a 
mentor academy and got everybody through, and then after that, we would 
run it quarterly so that people who were newly assigned would go through 
and understand what we were doing.  
The third line of operation was obviously the religious aspect. That was fully 
outside of my realm. I was just an advisor to General Karim. I advised Karim 
on how to frame the message and then how to disseminate it back into the 
force, which he did through his mullahs. It was bigger than just that, though; 
it was also training with media. We ended up working with a guy named Ted, 
who came from Great Britain. He was a freelance journalist, and he wanted 
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to do a story on why commandos were important. We showed him the values 
briefing and told him that everybody else who came to see us wanted to see 
night-vision goggles and M4 assault weapons, but that was not the story. The 
story is the human element behind that. So Ted made a film trailer, and I 
think he has produced a movie now, or a series, called “God, Country, Duty: 
The Commando Story.” If you Google that, you will see it. The trailer was all 
values-based. It was personal stories of Afghan soldiers who were from dif-
ferent tribes, and how they initially didn’t trust one another, but after going 
through the training and everything else, they became like close friends and 
brothers. Ted was planning on following them through combat, etc., for a pe-
riod of time and producing this story. Whether that actually happened, I don’t 
know, but you can still see the trailer “God, Country, Duty” on YouTube.
The final piece of this process was institutionalizing the training into 
the Afghans’ systems. Obviously the leadership was already onboard, but we 
wanted to have venues in which to do this. The first thing we did was work 
with the School of Excellence. We went through the POIs (programs of in-
struction), and instead of just teaching someone how to fire a weapon, we also 
infused the message of how the Afghan value system would support them as 
soldiers in combat—that it is about doing the right thing, not hurting women 
and children, not stealing, whatever. These little vignettes were actually 
infused into the instruction. In addition, some of our performance-oriented 
training had values-based or ethics-based scenarios where each trainee had to 
make the call.
The way that we got to this point was also pretty interesting. ICRC (the 
International Committee of the Red Cross) had come out, because of some 
allegations in the open-source media about atrocities committed by village 
stability platform guys. These were the Afghan Special Forces guys who were 
out there doing VSO, or commandos. In fact, three months prior, there was an 
allegation that the commandos had murdered somebody who happened to be 
one of Karzai’s friends, and so a general was fired along with his entire staff. 
The allegations were totally false. It was actually the Taliban that did it. But 
the general was a casualty of rumor at that point. ICRC had some legitimate 
concerns about what was being taught, who was teaching it, how much time 
we were spending on it, and all that other stuff. So the initial reaction from 
our side of the fence would have been to keep them at arm’s length. We would 
have assumed that these ICRC guys are not necessarily making the accusations, 
but they are supporting the people that do make them.  
The ICRC representative, Art Bristol, had military experience from the Aus-
tralian Air Force—he had retired in ’06, but he fully understood the military 
mission. He was not against the military mission, but he was also responsible 
for the law of land warfare. So after a 10-minute discussion, it came down to 
“What we are trying to do is have a values-based, ethical, professional force. 
Well, what is the law of land warfare? It is synonymous.” We were in violent 
agreement at that point that we needed to do something. So my staff and I 
laid out the entire values campaign: what we were doing and how we were 
doing it. We then invited Art and his instructors to come and personally 
give the law of land warfare blocks of instruction to our Afghan instructors 
because, first of all, we didn’t understand it as well as they did. The Afghan 
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instructors were fluent linguists and understood the context, and could 
convey their subject much better through vignettes or stories or whatever else. 
My guys weren’t actual teachers—our Afghan instructors were the commandos 
themselves. They just didn’t have the background that ICRC did. So we wanted 
ICRC to do that for us, which they agreed to do, and that was the first time 
that has ever happened. At the same time, ICRC was very excited about the 
access, about the transparency, about the ability to ensure that the law of 
land warfare was being adequately addressed. The by-product of this was that 
initially there was some nervousness at the higher levels, at the GO/FO (general 
officer/flag officer) level as well as the O6 (colonel) level. 
As a result, the next time an allegation was made, ICRC became the defense 
attorney: “Hey, that is not at all correct, and let me tell you what we are 
doing. We personally give the blocks of instruction. This is the POI they go 
through. It is 20 hours’ worth of training plus etc., etc.” So the unintended 
consequence was that we had a very close ally with very heavy-duty global 
credentials in this area. Like I said, in the end, we were both in violent agree-
ment that we wanted the same thing, but at first we couldn’t figure out how to 
work together.  
DR. BORER: It was the “odd couple.”
COL SHAW: It was, but if it hadn’t been for Art Bristol and his open-mind-
edness and his ability to understand the military mission—he understood 
and saw what could work. We also got those ICRC guys to help us build law 
of land warfare ethical dilemmas into our training environments. They had 
very good context because they received all the reports. So they could take the 
latest and greatest of the bad things that were happening, and we would put 
those into our training events. When the Afghan soldiers went through that 
training, they had to address the problem, and that was part of the after-
action review process. So the learning model was not just didactics. It wasn’t 
just a motivational speech from the commander of the day. It was actually 
experiential learning in a realistic environment, just like how U.S. forces train, 
which had a pretty good impact. So that was a big positive. 
Art took his program—the program that we were currently doing—back to 
Geneva and briefed it. They kept him there for another week, and I believe 
they decided that they were going to change the way they presented their 
global engagement strategy, basing it on values and adaptive leadership. I 
mean, you can teach the laws of why this is good and why this is bad, but if 
you understand the values of the culture you are talking to, you can relate it 
back to them in a way that will gain and maintain their attention a lot better 
than putting it in American-speak. ICRC also adopted the learning model 
of how we infused those vignettes into the training, as opposed to just the 
classroom. There is a guy who is very high up in ICRC, and right before I left, 
he had a meeting with General Haas—he basically came in and gave General 
Haas a hug and said, “This is the greatest thing since sliced bread.” Art Bristol 
brought this program from Afghanistan back to ICRC and said, “We are 
rethinking the whole way we are doing business.” So that was a great extra 
point there that we didn’t even plan on getting.  
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The person who made sure it was received at the senior levels of the Afghan 
command was General Karimi, a U.S.-trained four-star who was the chief 
of the Afghan MoD. He was also U.S. Special Forces-trained back in the 
late 1970s. I used to meet with him about once a week because ANASOC fell 
directly under MoD. Because of ANASOC’s assets, it didn’t fall under one of 
the regional commands. General Karim wanted to brief General Karimi, 
who was a very busy man. I mean, he was always signing papers, or he was 
listening with one ear and you would get the “Yes, yes,” even if it wasn’t a yes 
or no question. We tried to explain to him a little bit about values up front, 
but he was too busy, so we said, “Okay, sir. You need to watch this video.” So 
he watched that trailer, “God, Country, Duty.” After that, he called his aide 
in and said, “Lock the door. I don’t want to be bothered.” MoD was actu-
ally attacked by suicide bombers while this was going on. General Karimi 
just handed his phone to his J2 and said, “You handle it. I am busy right 
now.” That is how much attention it garnered from him. General Karimi 
said, “This is exactly what we need for our force,” because they were having 
problems with people stealing. They were having problems with people going 
AWOL (absent without official leave). And the insider-threat thing was re-
ally weighing heavy on their minds. MoD was getting a lot of pressure to do 
something that would counter that. So when General Karimi understood 
the “fourth voice of influence” arguments that we described, he said, “I am 
adopting this for the Afghans—for the whole armed forces.” Now I don’t 
know whether that actually happened—this was about five days before I left 
in May 2011.
There are two other pieces to this—and this was all very fortuitous because 
it took about three months to conceptually get this right. We had about 20 
whiteboards in a conference room that no one was allowed to touch, and me 
and my guys were trying to turn our ideas into a plan: “How do you opera-
tionalize these academic theories into an executable program or plan?” Then 
we had to train ourselves, so that’s how the whole process started.4 It would 
have been nice if all of this was precooked and we rolled into base hot and 
ready to implement a plan with pre-trained instructors. But it wasn’t that way. 
Very much towards the end there, a couple of things happened. Ted (the film-
maker) had come in six months earlier—with MoD approval but without ISAF 
(International Security Assistance Force) approval—as a freelance journalist 
to do a story. I didn’t have any authority to control his access or censor his 
message. We had to be transparent because it was the Afghans’ post; it wasn’t 
a U.S. post. I think we influenced his perspective of what was important and 
what wasn’t with the values piece, which turned out to be brilliant. I mean, 
the guy is brilliant. It is a moving three-minute clip. You are just saturated in 
values through these personal stories of people. 
About a month before I left, around April (2011), Ted showed back up, and 
he had this video on disk. I watched it, and I said, “Fantastic.” So I gave it to 
my boss, General Linder, who was deputy commanding general for Special 
Operations Forces NTM–A (NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan). GEN 
Linder (who is now commander, Special Operations Command–Africa) was 
fully onboard, and he had been facilitating and contributing to this whole 
values campaign. He would come out and do whiteboard sessions with us 
and get down in the weeds of “How are we going to make this right?” He 
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disseminated our ideas very quickly through ISAF Headquarters. Then Ted put 
the trailer on YouTube, and it went viral—on a very small scale, but a lot of 
Afghans were downloading it and looking at it. It had English subtitles, but it 
was spoken in Pashto. So I got that video from Ted at a very good time.  
The week after that, the secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
visited. I happened to be out on a camp leave, but during that exchange, the 
briefing of values and that video were a very important part of the demonstra-
tions and his visit to the school. Mr. Rasmussen understood about the ICRC 
piece, and he said, “We have got to take this to the NATO summit in Chi-
cago.” Or so I was told by his aides. Then the week after that, the chairman 
(of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), General Martin Dempsey, came. NTM–A 
had four hours with him, and they gave me all four hours—which I wasn’t 
very excited about initially because four hours is a long time to spend with 
the chairman. But after he saw the video, he became very, very interested in 
our program. We laid it out for him, and then took him on an interactive trip 
around the base. Our briefings were given at the top of the mountain on a 
piece of plywood and Plexiglas, but you are standing on top of a 2,000-foot 
mountain, and you can see where all the battles happen. That is a hell of a lot 
better than being in a hot, dusty conference room looking at a PowerPoint. 
I tried to hit the general with a PowerPoint, and when I got into the car he 
said, “You don’t understand. I don’t take PowerPoint from three-star generals. 
I am not going to start with a colonel.” I said, “Maybe you want to watch the 
video.” After he watched the video, he started asking questions. I said, “Sir, 
I’ve got it right here. I can explain it to you, or I can show you.” He said, 
“Okay, I will look at the PowerPoint.” So we went back, and I gave him a 
copy of the disk with all of the stuff on it. 
I gave the presentation all the way up the line to General Linder. I think Gen-
eral Bolger had sent parts of it back to his Center for Army Lessons Learned. 
COL Joe Duncan’s job at the time was the special operations division chief 
at JRTC. (As of today, he is the new J3 for SOCEUR.) So I said to Joe, “Hey, 
this is what we did, and this is what we sent back.” The chairman’s words 
were “Where are we going wrong with this? Why haven’t we done this? We’ve 
been here how many years now? Ten going on 11, 12 years? Why haven’t we 
done this?” That was a very good question. My initial reflection was “Sir, our 
system doesn’t promote long-term stuff. I mean, if I have a combat rotation as 
a major and I have my company in combat, what is the metric we use here? It 
is pretty much kill/capture, number one. Number two, even if I had the best 
values campaign ever, within six months I am not going to have any measur-
able difference—or a very small measure of difference. That is not a part of my 
OER (officer evaluation record) that is going to get me or my battalion com-
mand promoted.” He said, “Wow. You’re right.”5 Consequently, as we talked, I 
noted that the United States gave a lot of money and equipment and taught a 
lot of skills to the Afghans, but they didn’t have the values necessary to sustain 
that long term without our continuing engagement, in my personal opinion.
So anyway, that is the Billy Shaw story, of being in Afghanistan for about 
eight months. It is kind of a different approach—not your average combat 
story. We were trying to use other tools that were not necessarily associated 
with military doctrine, and then worked with very unconventional partners 
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like ICRC to fix problem sets. That level of trust had to be there, but we 
worked with the right guy at the right time, who had the right vision. So it 
ended up working out pretty well for us. 
ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE
COL William (“Billy”) H. Shaw is currently working on a doctorate in 
Adult Education from Auburn University, where he has also served as pro-
fessor of military science for the Army ROTC.
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4 COL Shaw later explained the time line more clearly: “The first 
month at Camp Commando we worked around the clock to 
adjust the production model and quality of the soldiers we were 
training in the School of Excellence. We were not making the 
numbers the command needed and the quality of our graduates 
(especially Special Forces) was poor, in my opinion. It was in 
about the second month of my time at the camp that we started 
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corruption, which was terrible in the unit. It was not until after 
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5 COL Shaw later clarified this point: “The metrics we use to 
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have the values or ethical base to be responsible, then there will 
always be problems with behavior.”
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ETHICS AND INSIGHTS
Kill v. Capture—With a Twist
Dr. Pauline M. Kaurin, Pacific 
Lutheran University
Dr. Pauline Kaurin teaches military 
ethics, warfare, business ethics, and 
philosophy of law at Pacific Lutheran 
University in Tacoma, Washington.
The recent debate in the United States about the use of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs, referred to as “drones” in the popular press) has high-
lighted the question of whether it is more ethical to kill the enemy or capture 
and imprison them. (In some cases, especially with U.S. citizens like Anwar 
al-Awlaki, there may be the issue of legality as well.)1 This kill-or-capture 
debate is a long-standing one in the ethics of war, but recent prison breaks in 
Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya have added a layer of complexity to the discussion.2 
Prison breaks are a time-honored strategy that insurgents, terrorists, and other 
asymmetric fighters have used to both disrupt the enemy and release captured 
fighters—especially leaders; however, the recent rash of these breaks has been 
disconcerting because of concerns that some of them were planned by possible 
al Qaeda affiliates and may be a prelude to further attacks. In this article, I 
explore the argument that the risks posed by prison breaks shift the discus-
sion in favor of killing over capture in ways that merit serious attention and 
reflection.
Let’s begin by considering the debate in general. What are the ethical reasons 
to capture rather than kill in the context of war? There are three major ethical 
issues to consider: (1) proportionality of means, (2) the value of “winning 
hearts and minds,” and (3) material and logistical costs. In both the Just War 
tradition and international law, there is a requirement to use means propor-
tional to the desired end, and also to use the least amount of force that is mili-
tarily necessary to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering. For example, if one 
can achieve the military objective by capturing adversaries instead of killing 
them, then capture would be ethically preferable because it uses less force and 
has milder, more reversible effects. This requirement stems at least in part 
from the notion of “winning the hearts and minds” of a population, which is 
frequently a concern in asymmetric conflicts, but it also relates to consider-
ations about restoring the peace after the conflict is over. We need to consider 
not only what the effects of killing may be on the local populace, but also 
the effects of sending troops in to make a capture, especially of a high-value 
target like Osama bin Laden. Capture may be regarded as more humane and 
compassionate than killing, but capture may actually be more problematic 
in terms of adverse impacts on the population, and on the capturing forces’ 
relationship with the government controlling the territory. In particular, one 
might be concerned with how the prisoners will be treated in captivity and 
what will happen once they are released. Finally, the costs (material and logis-
tical) associated with capturing, keeping, and maintaining prisoners—presum-
ably in compliance with humanitarian standards—must be considered. When 
it comes to ethics, we should certainly examine the tangible costs, but also try 
to assess at least some of the intangible costs, like reputation, moral authority, 
impact on morale, and domestic support for the actions. 
In thinking about these assessments, it is important to be aware of operating 
assumptions. The first assumption is that death is always the most ethically 
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problematic and the least humane option, and that it is to be avoided. Related 
to this is the assumption that humanely conducted confinement causes less 
long-term, irreversible damage to the individual, and to the family and com-
munity, as long as the released prisoner is returned in good health and mental 
shape. The presumption is that capturing causes less resentment and adverse 
feeling among the population one is engaged with, and is less disruptive and 
harmful to community and family life. 
In addition, let’s consider the “warrior” mentality or worldview, and its 
assumptions. The epic Greek hero Achilles certainly did not regard death as 
the worst thing that could happen to him; in fact, he embraced his death as 
the vehicle to immortal glory in ways that might remind us of today’s suicide 
bombers or other fighters for whom martyrdom is desirable. An honorable 
death on the battlefield, especially at the hand of the adversary, may be seen as 
much more of a moral good than the humiliation and shame of imprisonment 
and a return to the community having failed in the goal of the warrior: to 
die well. We should consider whether the ethical harm from this humiliation 
is worse than death, and whether the moral equality of combatants—the idea 
that combatants are not morally responsible or guilty for the justness of the 
cause for which they fight, but fight in good faith—means that we owe an ad-
versary the right to a good death. It may be tempting to deny our adversaries 
a good death, and to view their humiliation as justified by our own suffering, 
but we should recall that we can expect reciprocity if the tables are turned. 
Furthermore, certain forms of humiliation that deny the human dignity of the 
individual are morally and legally problematic in significant ways.
How do the recent prison breaks change these calculations, especially in the 
case of large-scale prison breaks (of several hundred to a thousand inmates) 
that are part of a larger strategy by insurgents? What if it is reasonably likely 
that those who are captured will quickly end up back in the fight? With 
UAVs, we can target and kill adversaries (especially high-value targets and 
leaders) with less risk to ground troops than would be the case when sending 
in a kill team, even an elite force. Having this option available makes the cap-
ture argument much less attractive, especially in light of the warrior mentality 
discussed previously. While some warriors may be more willing to die than 
others, the point of war is to disable the enemy enough to prevail, not neces-
sarily to destroy their worldview or ideology (an outcome we might desire, but 
one that is hardly a militarily achievable objective). We must also consider the 
likely collateral damage (unintended harm, especially to noncombatants) that 
comes with either the drone-kill option or the capture option, especially of a 
well-defended high-value target. Finally, how does one calculate the potential 
damage if captured fighters and leaders escape from prison and return to the 
fight? Clearly this depends on how many escape, what their leadership profile 
is, and also what happened while they were in prison. If they were incarcer-
ated with other like-minded individuals, it is possible that prison becomes an 
opportunity for further radicalization and networking, making them more 
dangerous should they be freed to fight again.
As a thought experiment, consider two prisoners. Prisoner Alpha is captured, 
imprisoned, interrogated, and treated humanely near where he was captured, 
and then released. He returns to his community and family as a productive 
and integrated member of society, along with several others from his village 
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who were also captured. Prisoner Omega is captured, imprisoned, and inter-
rogated to gather intelligence; he makes connections with other prisoners, 
and sets out to gather his own intelligence on the operations of the adversary 
in conjunction with other prisoners, from whom he receives instructions and 
mentoring. Either of these scenarios, as well as a range of other possibilities in 
between these poles, is entirely plausible, which makes our task of reflection 
even more difficult, because it is hard to predict which scenarios are likely in 
any given context.
One way to think through the issues here is to return to a core ques-
tion: What is the moral point or value of dying in war? Why take the risks 
(physical, material, financial, and social) that come with war or conflict? 
Historically, dying in war seems to be an act of sacrifice by the individual 
for fellow citizens, for a greater good, and/or for the community. The flip 
side of this is to ask, what is the moral point of killing in war? The answer, 
presumably, is to protect and defend the community and the common good 
from some kind of serious injustice, harm, or threat. What is the moral point 
of capturing (instead of killing) in war? It seems that it is to immobilize the 
enemy, stop the threat that the enemy poses, and prevent the enemy’s further 
action for the duration of the conflict. This is not to assume that enemy 
fighters will never pose any kind of threat in the future, but only that the 
present threat is neutralized. The understanding in conventional conflicts is 
that prisoners will be taken care of in certain prescribed ways, including being 
repatriated at the end of the conflict. Clearly the asymmetric context of to-
day’s military operations—often open-ended, often unfolding in the midst of 
the civilian population, and typically fought against unconventional combat-
ants who may be indistinguishable from the locals—makes this question more 
complicated. In some cases, especially in counterterrorism, there may also 
be considerations of deterrence, intelligence gathering, and possible criminal 
prosecution where appropriate when deciding whether to kill or capture. 
This brings us back to the prison break phenomenon: How do we assess the 
threat and the danger that prison breaks pose, and how do we decide whether 
killing is the best way to deal with that threat in terms of the possible and 
likely effects? To the degree that prison breaks heighten the possible threat 
posed by prisoners, that consideration will complicate the argument for 
capture (unless intelligence is needed or prosecution is being considered) and 
weight the decision toward killing. This argument, however, should include 
two caveats: first, these kinds of assessments are often highly speculative and 
prone to be wrong, because in war we tend to either overestimate or downplay 
the threat that an adversary poses, in part because of limited information, but 
also due to our presuppositions and working assumptions. Second, the pre-
sumption against killing in war is powerful and long-standing for a myriad of 
important ethical, religious, social, material, and practical reasons. Any move 
to weaken that presumption requires deeper reflection and conversation.   
NOTES
1 For more on the debate about the Al Awlaki case, see Steve Coll, 
“Kill or Capture,” The New Yorker, 2 August 2012: http://www.
newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/08/kill-or-capture.
html
2 For more details, see “Interpol Issues Alert on Mass Prison Breaks 
in Pakistan, Iraq and Libya,” RT, 3 August 2013: http://rt.com/
news/prison-break-al-qaeda-006/
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The Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle 
CPT Edval Zoto, Albanian Army
Even to serious fans of WW II history, devoting an entire book to the opera-
tions of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in wartime Albania 
might seem to be a generous enterprise, but the story told by historian Rod-
erick Bailey in The Wildest Province: SOE in the Land of the Eagle is intriguing. 
Both strategically and politically, the British SOE engagement in Albania was 
a complete failure. The 100 men who were sent by the SOE into the country 
between 1942 and 1944 to prevent an Axis takeover did not make history; they 
could neither play a substantial role in helping local guerrillas fight the Axis 
forces, nor could they prevent the subsequent installation of communism in 
Albania. The reasons for this failure of British military and political efforts in 
the Balkans during WW II deserve attention, and Bailey provides a thorough 
description of what the SOE mission did and did not accomplish in Albania. 
The book, however, deals less with the issues of Britain’s “grand strategy” for 
defeating the Axis forces by sending in SOE to support local guerrillas, and 
more with the challenges and dangers faced by those British liaison officers 
(BLOs) once they were on the ground. The action takes place at a time when 
the Axis’ power in the region was declining and local resistance was abruptly 
increasing under the influence of Communist cadres. The author, a decorated 
veteran of British Army operations in Afghanistan, is a prominent military 
historian whose more recent works on irregular warfare and special operations 
have been cited by the British government. 
The most engaging aspect of the book is the deep research done by the author, 
who had access to the personal diaries of the SOE officers who went into 
Albania. Bailey brings to life the colorful and dramatic experiences of these 
men in the wildest province, where they worked with “enough chiefs and 
tribes and rifle-wielding guerrillas to conjure lively images of Lawrence and 
the Arabs.” The fact that the men kept such diaries, risky and unwise as it 
might have been, offers us the rare opportunity to understand their motives 
for joining the SOE’s Albanian campaign. The British soldiers sent there were 
intrepid adventurers, which explains in part why many of them persisted in 
carrying out their dangerous, difficult, and ultimately futile missions until the 
Germans finally withdrew.  
The first SOE men infiltrated Albania in early 1943 by ground, after being 
parachuted into neighboring Greece. They literally started from scratch. Their 
mission was to conduct guerilla warfare with the support of the local resis-
tance in an attempt to make the Italians capitulate, but from the beginning of 
the campaign they lacked proper intelligence on the ground. They soon had 
to change their plans anyway, because the political situation changed rapidly 
after the Italians signed an armistice in September 1943 and the Germans 
stepped in to occupy the Balkans. 
Besides the political changes on the ground, the SOE operation in Albania was 
also being affected by political problems at home. Greece and Yugoslavia were 
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intriguing for its descriptions of 
the preparations and conduct of 
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clandestine operations in Europe.
pressuring the British government over the issue of which political factions to 
support in Albania. This meant that local groups often refused to cooperate 
with the BLOs because Britain, as one of the world’s “great powers,” had not 
yet expressed its opinion on what would happen in Albania after the war. 
Meanwhile, Albanian Communist forces supported by Yugoslav and Soviet 
advisers were gaining strength at the expense of British influence. The SOE 
officers on the ground found themselves at the mercy of these strategic and 
political uncertainties while trying to deal with the operational difficulties of 
working without local support, not to mention the tremendous tactical risks 
of their mission. Bailey’s detailed descriptions of both major operations and 
minor events provide the reader with a lively picture of the daily life of these 
daring Special Forces officers while they were in Albania. The Wildest Province 
may also serve as a starting point for understanding why British and American 
secret operations that attempted to overthrow the Albanian Communist 
regime in the late 1940s and ’50s met with such failure.
Students and practitioners of irregular warfare and special operations may 
find this book intriguing for its descriptions of the preparations and conduct 
of what were the first special and clandestine operations in Europe. The 
book details mission planning, force selection and training, contact develop-
ment and infiltration, and then the mission itself. How these men managed 
operational security and communications with the SOE HQ and developed 
relationships and coordinated with both local guerrilla forces and the civilian 
population, as well as how they carried out their sabotage operations, can offer 
some surprising insights for today’s SOF officers. 
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the Defense Analysis department of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
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Any epic novel’s lore can be enhanced by a mysterious urban legend. 
The meteoric success of The Ugly American, published in 1958, created high 
expectations among readers for authors William J. Lederer’s and Eugene 
Burdick’s second collaboration. They published Sarkhan in 1965, and received 
initial high praise from early reviews. The Literary Guild and the Reader’s Di-
gest Condensed Book Club made it an immediate selection for their readers. 
Bookstores around the nation stocked tens of thousands of copies on publica-
tion day. Yet, the book simply disappeared without explanation, supposedly 
recalled by the publisher. Lederer and Burdick spent years attempting to 
discover why their work had been withdrawn, and blamed agencies within the 
U.S. government for suppressing the book because of its disapproving view of 
American foreign policy in Southeast Asia.1 The novel was finally re-released 
under the title The Deceptive American in 1977, after an additional 12 years of 
effort by the authors to republish it.   
Readers today will be shocked by how the main themes of the novel still reso-
nate. The action takes place in Sarkhan, the same fictitious Southeast Asian 




country faces a pivotal transition of leadership in which Crown 
Prince Lin is set to replace his retiring father, King Diad, in a 
ceremonial transfer of authority. A covert Communist insurgency, 
supported by external powers, positions itself to manipulate the 
government and take advantage of the confusion during the 
transfer to seize control. The Communists run a highly functional 
underground network that allows them to influence key negotia-
tions and sway both Sarkhanese and U.S. perceptions, thus setting 
the conditions for the Communists’ attempt to seize power.  
Washington’s foreign policy mistakes are evident throughout 
the book and unfortunately are recognizable as ones that still 
occur today. The various U.S. agencies that are working through 
the U.S. embassy in Sarkhan lack a comprehensive strategy for 
engagement and development. Aid, intelligence, diplomacy, and 
military assistance frequently run counter to each other. U.S. 
embassy officials put too much faith in the wrong Sarkhanese 
power brokers and are often attracted by the power brokers’ 
American education and flawless use of English, rather than their 
actual accomplishments and abilities.
Lederer and Burdick emphasize the importance of understanding 
a culture in order to relate to it.  The two protagonists, a retired 
U.S. Navy captain turned merchant trader and an American 
anthropologist who lives in Sarkhan, are fluent in many dialects of 
Sarkhanese. Their ability to accurately read the rapidly changing 
situation results from their long-standing relationships within Sarkhan, a deep 
understanding of the cultural nuances, and familiarity with the key Sarkha-
nese power brokers. These factors should reverberate with present-day Special 
Forces soldiers as essential traits for operational success around the world.
In the following scene, the protagonists, Coldstone and McCauley, argue with 
an embassy official against blindly increasing military aid to the Sarkhanese 
government. They insist that a more population-centric approach will be more 
effective to counter the Communists’ efforts.  
In Sarkhan, the Communists are educating and brainwashing the 
best people in the rural areas, which is ninety percent of Sarkhan. 
Almost daily, they are visiting villages which have almost no com-
munication with the government in Haidho [the capital] except 
when the tax collector comes or the Army requires recruits. The 
Communists soon will have a network of communications through 
Sarkhan. (p. 168)
Most American diplomats and intelligence people go for the “sure” 
military man. And wind up with unstable dictators in Korea, 
Vietnam, Formosa, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan—the list 
seems endless. The only sure victory is a solid political victory, but 
Americans are not prepared to travel that harder, slower, more te-
dious route. The Communists are. American men must go overseas 
as patriots, preferably without families, willing to die, willing to 
learn the language and the customs, the emotional patterns, the 
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historical and religious backgrounds.  They must be willing as 
Americans to suffer and be as dedicated as saints. (p. 169)
The enemy and locales maybe different today, but it is easy to see the simi-
larity to problems that the United States faces in its current overseas contin-
gency operations.
This novel is a great read for anyone who will operate at the battalion level 
with SOF. Even if that individual is not going to work in Asia, the story 
of The Deceptive American is still useful to help identify the culture biases 
that many Americans possess, so that such biases can be mitigated in future 
engagements. 
ABOUT THE REVIEWER 
MAJ Donald K. Reed is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer currently 
pursuing an MS degree in Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School.
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Hybrid Warfare 
by Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson 
Issue Date: August 2013
Major Timothy McCulloh and Major Richard Johnson wrote this monograph 
on hybrid warfare while they were students at the School of Advanced Mili-
tary Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written in two parts, their individual 
approaches complement each other by providing a synergistic combination 
of both an overarching theory as well as an operational perspective. While 
the idea of hybrid warfare is not new, the authors together provide a clear, 
useful, and relevant contextual understanding of the differences between 
conventional conflicts and the realm of irregular warfare. Major McCulloh’s 
contribution in the first section lays the theoretical basis for a definition of 
hybrid warfare, while addressing the pertinent question of its historical origin. 
Major Johnson’s section uses historical examples and case studies to approach 
hybrid threats through a lens of U.S.-oriented operational art. The authors 
contribute to the understanding of warfare as a spectrum of conflict rather 
than a dichotomy of black and white alternatives.
Douglas Porch 
Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013 
ISBN: 978-1-107-02738-1 Hardcover
Excerpt from the Preface: 
My argument continues to be that what has long been called small wars in its 
various reiterations as imperial policing or COIN (counterinsurgency opera-
tions) does not constitute a specialized category of warfare. Rather, it consists 
of the application of petty war tactics that its advocates since the 1840s have 
puffed as infallible prescriptions for effortless conquest, nation-building, and 
national grandeur. Small wars enthusiasts basically reject the Clausewitzian 
character of war in favor of a Jominian tactical and operational approach, in 
large part to evade democratic civilian control. Claims in doctrine for success 
in small wars, at least at a reasonable strategic, financial, and moral cost, have 
relied on mythologized versions of the past too often supported by shoddy re-
search and flawed, selective analysis of cases. History cooked as COIN folklore 
can lead to people getting killed because it fails to convey that each insurgency 
is a contingent event in which doctrine, operations, and tactics must support 
a viable policy and strategy, not the other way around. (xi–xii)
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Special Operations Research Topics 2014 
Issue Date: August 2013
The Special Operations Research Topics 2014 publication presents a list of SOF-related research topics for research 
to be undertaken by PME students, JSOU senior fellows, and other SOF researchers who desire to make timely and 
meaningful contributions to SOF issues and challenges. Each year representatives from USSOCOM, the Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs), SOF chairs from the war colleges, and Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 
senior fellows meet at the JSOU campus for three days to collaboratively review topic submissions received from the 
SOF community and debate emerging issues and challenges. That collaboration results in the first draft of this publica-
tion, a prioritized list of salient issues confronting SOF. The list is vetted through the components and TSOCs to ensure 
that research will advance SOF missions and support SOF interests. Ultimately, the research, study, and debate of these 
topics will inform decision makers and better prepare SOF for our current conflicts and future challenges.
Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy  
by Francisco Wong-Diaz 
Issue Date: August 2013
The publication of Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz’s monograph coincides with a 
major strategic reassessment of U.S. national security interests and the future 
military posture taking place at the national level. Today’s strategic environ-
ment requires astute statecraft to formulate and execute grand strategy—
strategy that effectively blends all forms of power and uses them smartly, that 
is, effectively and efficiently. Though there is no consensus on what constitutes 
the smart use of U.S. power, the concept of “smart power” is a dominant 
theme in policy circles. Smart power, however defined, is directly relevant to 
the SOF community. With a smaller footprint than conventional forces, SOF 
are both a cost-effective and less visible instrument of national power. SOF are 
expected to combine both hard- and soft-power approaches instinctively to 
achieve strategic-level effects. Using case studies from around the world, Dr. 
Wong-Diaz expertly draws the links between the strategic-level projection of 
power by states and their consequences on the ground.
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